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From Fairness to Efficiency: The
Transformation of Tort Law in New York,
1920-1980
WILLIAM E. NELSONt
INTRODUCTION

Beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes' magisterial
essay, The Common Law,' no topic has captured the attention of private law theorists in America more than the
law of tort. Innumerable scholars, many of whom, like
Holmes, have written from the perspective of legal history,
have striven to identify the principles and policies underlying judicial decisions concerning whether and to what
extent victims of injury should receive compensation.
I This Article focuses on developments in New York's tort
law between 1920 and 1980. I have chosen to focus on the
law of a single state because such a focus makes possible a
distinct kind of study, in which one can examine not only
leading cases known to all casebooks but also the often
highly revealing secondary opinions of the state's highest
court and the opinions of intermediate and trial court
judges. This focus also makes statistical analysis of the
work of trial courts possible and in other ways facilitates
the placement of doctrinal change in a broader pattern of
political, intellectual and cultural development. Hopefully,
the study of a single state will produce a deeper kind of
knowledge than would a rehash of the leading cases we
t Joel and Anne Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University. A.B.,
Hamilton College, 1962; L.L.B., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard
University, 1971. Helpful comments and criticisms were offered especially by
Sarah B. Gordon and by other members of the Legal History Colloquium at New
York University, and the author is deeply grateful and indebted for this
invaluable assistance. Research support was provided by the Filomen
D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York
University School of Law, both to support student researchers who completed a
statistical sample and to assist in the author's writing of this Article.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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already know.
The reason for choosing New York as the state for study
is that, during most of the period under analysis, it was the
most populous state and the cultural and economic leader of
the nation. In its metropolitan center, in its upstate industrial cities, in its suburbs and in its rural farmlands and
environmentally protected woodlands, New York contained
locales similar to those in all the rest of the nation except
the Deep South and the Pacific Southwest. New York was
more representative of the nation as a whole than any other
state, and hence the findings of this Article should serve as
revised hypotheses about twentieth century development of
American tort law in general until other scholars, through
equally detailed studies of California, Texas, Georgia and
elsewhere, prove them wrong.
The main claim of this Article is that in the first half of
this century courts focused on issues of fairness in the
adjudication of tort cases, but that during the second half of
the century judges have made considerations of efficiency
their primary concern. A further claim is that this shift
from fairness to efficiency was the result, albeit indirectly,
of policies adopted by the United States military establishment during the course of World War II. These claims, if
accepted, have significant implications for the existing
scholarly literature on the subject of tort law.
Three categories of literature require examination. The
first is the prescriptive, doctrinal literature, in which judges
and law professors have debated normative questions about
the theory and underlying principles of tort. The second is
the general historical literature, in which social historians,
on the one hand, and law professors on the other, have engaged in a methodological controversy about how best to
conduct research on the history of tort. The third is the
specific historical literature discussing either particular developments in tort law or individual tort cases in twentieth
century New York.
For the past quarter century, the doctrinal debate has
been framed by George Fletcher's classic essay, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory.2 Since Fletcher's article, two
theories of tort liability, fairness and efficiency, have

2. George Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972).
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influenced tort law.3 It would be in vain to cite all the
authors who have participated in the debate over the two
theories or to capture all the nuances of their scholarship.'
All that can be done is to capture the main lines of the
arguments.
On one hand, a number of scholars have argued that
courts historically have focused and normatively ought to
focus on issues of fairness in addressing matters of tort
liability. Among the historians, Robert Rabin and Gary
Schwartz have argued that concerns for fairness were the
motivating force behind nineteenth century judicial decision
making in tort cases,5 and several writers of normative
scholarship, Fletcher himself and Jules Coleman, Richard
Epstein, and Ernest Weinrib, have agreed that fairness
should be important. Each, however, has a somewhat
different conception of the concept of fairness as it applies
to tort.
Fletcher's conception of fairness, for example, rests on
notions of reciprocity: he would not require actors who impose reciprocal risks of harm on each other to provide
compensation when harms come to fruition but would demand compensation only from a tortfeasor who imposes a
nonreciprocal risk on her victim.6 Coleman, in contrast, argues for a principle of corrective justice, by which a tortfeasor has a duty to repair wrongful losses of her vic-tims
for which she is responsible.7 Epstein supports an analogous
and overlapping principle, which holds one person liable for
any harm she causes another,8 while Weinrib also turns to
corrective justice as the fundamental principle of tort doctrine.9 Coleman differs from Epstein and Weinrib, in that
3. See Alan Schwartz, Causation in PrivateTort Law: A Comment on Kelman,
63 Cm.-KENTL. REv. 639 (1987).
4. For an overview of the major literature, see FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (Saul
Levmore ed., 1994); PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (Robert L. Rabin ed., 4th ed. 1995).
5. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the FaultPrinciple:A
Reinterpretation,15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, The Characterof
Early American Tort Law, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 641 (1989); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort
Law and the Economy inNineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE
L.J. 1717 (1981).
6. See Fletcher, supranote 2, at 541-48.
7. See JULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 305, 329, 361 (1992); Jules L.

Coleman, The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 30 (1995).
8. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A
REFORMULATION OF TORT LAw (1980).

9. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of CorrectiveJustice, 44 DUKE
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he believes that existing tort doctrine has departed and jus-0
tifiably may depart from the principle of corrective justice,'
whereas the others make no such concession. Coleman also
differs from Weinrib in that his principle of corrective
justice gains its content from a community's common sense
morality and shared moral and legal practices, whereas
Weinrib's principle is more abstractly and philosophically
grounded."
In contrast to the advocates of fairness, law and economics scholars have argued that courts should focus on
issues of efficiency in addressing matters of tort liability.
Most prominent among them have been Guido Calabresi
and Richard Posner. Apart from their agreement on the
value of economic analysis in the field of tort, Calabresi,
Posner, and other law and economics scholars disagree
about virtually everything else. For example, Calabresi's
early masterpiece, The Costs of Accidents,' uses economic
analysis to demonstrate that legal attribution of damage
liability to potential defendants typically will induce them
to take precautions against harm and thereby reduce accidents to their optimal level. In contrast, Posner in his
early work praised the efficiency of the Hand calculus for its
immunization of many defendants from liability, thereby
reducing enterprise costs and promoting entrepreneurial
activity.$ In addition to disputing whether efficiency analysis has a pro-plaintiff or a pro-defendant bias, law and economics scholars have disagreed over efficiency's very meaning, with some insisting on Pareto optimality, others demanding a Kaldor-Hicks standard and still others requiring only wealth maximization in order to declare an
economic initiative efficient. 4
L.J. 277 (1994); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL
L.J. 403 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 0CC.-KENT L.
REV. 407 (1987).
10. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 7, at 386.
11. Compare Coleman, The Practiceof Corrective Justice, supra note 7, at 26,
29, with Weinrib, Causationand Wrongdoing, supranote 9, at 444-50.
12. Guino CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCEDENTS (1970). Two other classics by
Calabresi are Guido Calabressi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972), and Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
13. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33
(1972).
14. For the distinction between Pareto optimality and the Kaldor-Hicks test,
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More relevant for present purposes is Posner's claim,
fully articulated in a co-authored book, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law, 5 that "the rules of the Anglo-American common law of torts are best explained as if designed
to promote efficiency in the sense of minimizing the sum of
expected damages and costs of care; or, stated differently,
that the structure of the common law of torts is economic in
character" and that the "logic of the common law is an
economic logic." 6 Other law and economics scholars, however, have disagreed. Lewis Kornhauser, for one, has
doubted whether traditional tort rules have, in fact,
reflected efficiency concerns, 7 while Izhak Englard has demonstrated that the law and economics movement has had
little but a rhetorical effect upon contemporary processes of
tort adjudication. 8
The present Article takes no position in the normative
debate whether some concept of fairness or some concept of
efficiency should govern the law of torts; a fortiori, it also
offers no view as to what is the best definition of each of
these concepts. Nor does the Article deny that concerns both
of fairness and of efficiency have impacted on tort law
throughout its long history. However, it does deny that any
single conception of fairness or efficiency has had a dominant input on tort law throughout the entire course of this
century. The assumption underlying the Article is that the
concepts both of fairness and of efficiency are socially constructed. Its thesis is that, in response to the political and
propaganda needs of the American military during the
World War II era, a socially constructed conception of efficiency replaced a socially constructed conception of fair-ness
as the dominant way of thinking about tort in the midtwentieth century. Acceptance of this thesis precludes desee Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critiqueof the TraditionalDefinition and
Use of the Concept of 'The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency.
Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually all Law-andEconomics Welfare Arguments are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 488-506 (1993).
For the distinction between Pareto optimality and wealth maximization, see Lewis
A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8
HOFSTRAL. REV. 591, 592-97 (1980).
15. WILIAI M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAw (1987).
16. Id. at 312.
17. See Kornhauser, supranote 14, at 591.
18. See Izhak Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical
Assessment of the Theory's Impact on Courts, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1991).
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scriptive claims, such as those of Posner, that the common

law over time has possessed any consistent logic or struc-

ture. It also counsels those who make normative claims to

adopt the approach of scholars like Calabresi and Coleman,
both of whom recognize that tort doctrine should be formulated in response to societal choices and desires.19
Although this Article does not propose any full-scale
resolution to the fairness-efficiency debate, it does reflect
my considered views about how to write legal history, a
subject of vexing debate among legal historians. Ever since
J. Willard Hurst first appreciated the need to study legal
history from the perspective not simply of judicial doctrine
but of law in action, historians have debated whether in
their study of the law's past they should focus on judicial
doctrine or on economic, cultural and societal development.
Today, no one questions the insight of Hurst and his
successors in broadening the scope of scholarly inquiry
beyond mere doctrine. It is obviously useful not only to
know the analysis of the appellate judges who declare the
formal legal rules, but also to examine the interplay
between formal doctrine and the lives of ordinary citizens.
Thus, it has become routine for legal historians to inquire
into how public attitudes affect judicial lawmaking and into
how common law rules impact on who commences and who
wins litigation.
Some historians, however, appear to go beyond Hurst.
Two senior scholars, Lawrence Friedman and Morton
Horwitz, for instance, have denied the autonomy of doctrine
and have treated nineteenth century tort law as a product
of judicial policy choice among various claims presented by
competing interest groups. A group of younger, "hybrid
19. See Guido Calabresi, An Exchange about Law and Economics:A Letter to
Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 557-58 (1980); Coleman, The Practiceof
CorrectiveJustice,supra note 7, at 15, 26, 29.
20. See generally J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS (1950); J. WLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). See also Robert Gordon, J. Willard
Hurst and the Common Law Traditionin American Legal Historiography,10 L. &
SoC'YREv. 9 (1975).
21. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A IISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 12 (2d ed. 1985);

Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967); MORTON J. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 67-108 (1977); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Conservative Traditionin the Writing ofAmerican Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 275 (1973).
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sociolegal"" scholars go even further. These scholars appear
to believe that judge-made doctrine has little, if any, impact
on the substance of the law or on the law's effect on
ordinary people, and, as a result, they strive to write legal
history mainly from nondoctrinal sources.2" Their approach
must be contrasted with that of doctrinal scholars like Gary
Schwartz, who has written that "[c]ommon law history...
provides a fascinating combination of political history and
intellectual history ...[and] is well worth pursuing."'
In part, this debate about how to write legal history
reflects differing views about the questions that historians
should ask of the past, with common law historians asking
why doctrine developed as it did and sociolegal historians
asking how ordinary people live under a legal order. For
reasons I have elaborated elsewhere, I believe that historians should be free to frame as they wish the questions they
ask of the past and that they ought not be criticized for the
choices they make.25 But the debate also concerns the
evidence that historians should use in determining how law
affects ordinary people.
Without doubt, in making such determinations historians should rely on statistical analysis and on statements
about law by lay people. Often, however, historical sources
are too imprecise to permit sophisticated statistical analysis, and statements by the laity are rare, if they exist at
all. Sociolegal scholars, in my view, sometimes err both
when they fail to recognize the unavailability of such direct
evidence to answer the admittedly important questions they
want to ask and when they refuse, even when direct evidence is missing, to turn to another source of insightjudicial opinions.
22. The terminology can be found in RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING
DANGER: INJURYAND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870-1910, at 1 (1992).
23. See id.; ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CiviL LITIGATION
IN THE BOSTON TRIAL COURTS, 1880-1900 (1981); Thomas D. Russell, Historical
Study ofPersonalInjury Litigation:A Comment on Method, 1 GA. J. S. LEGAL HIST.
109 (1991).
24. Schwartz, The Characterof EarlyAmerican Tort Law, supra note 5, at 641,
646. See also G. Edward White, The Appellate Opinion as Historical Source
Material,1 J. INTERDISc. HIST. 491 (1971). Another example of common law history
is my own work on Massachusetts. See WiLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,

1760-1830 (1974).
25. See William E. Nelson, Standardsof Criticism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 447, 477-93
(1982).
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The opinions of judges, in fact, contain a wealth of historical evidentiary data. Those who work with judges know
that their opinions are not prepared lightly. Although
judges are acutely aware of the limitations on their writ
and power, they also know that their judgments may affect
how people live. Even more significant is their understanding that persuasion is their best, perhaps their only,
tool for making their judgments effective, both in the short
and long run. Although judges are not perfectly informed
about how those who read their opinions will receive them,
they typically are well informed. Insofar as their information about those whom their opinions must persuade is
accurate, their holdings and the reasoning advanced to
support them provide a window of insight into the thoughts
of a much larger number of citizens who never commit
those thoughts to paper. Accordingly, judicial opinions
merit historical analysis, not only to learn the history of
doctrine for its own sake but also for the window it provides
into contemporary social and cultural development.
This study, mainly of doctrinal developments in New
York's law of tort between 1920 and 1980, attempts both to
understand legal doctrine for its own sake and to use
doctrine in an effort to portray the larger economic, cultural
and societal context in which the doctrine emerged. It also
turns to nondoctrinal historical sources in its effort to
portray law in context. As it does so, it depicts the development of twentieth century tort law quite differently than
does the received wisdom.
The received wisdom is derived from Charles Gregory's
time-honored article, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability.26 Gregory's account begins in the nineteenth
century, when courts, it is said, eliminated unintended
trespass as a substantive tort and established a consistent
theory of liability based on fault. Their goal, in his view,
was to subsidize industrial enterprise by conferring immunity from liability for accidental harm. Then, in the twentieth century, "[c]hanging times and the amazing growth of
our industries, together with a gradual shift in the basis of
political power," convinced the public "that industry not
only ha[d] no further need of subsidization but also should
be made to assume the burden of paying for all damage
ensuing from its normal operations." This new attitude
26. 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951).
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made "the climate ... right for iudges" to adopt a theory of
absolute liability without fault.2

The most elaborate version of the received wisdom
occurs in Ted White's 1980 book, Tort Law in America."
White makes explicit an assumption that also underlies
Gregory's work, "that the ideas of certain elite groups
within the legal profession have had an influence disproportionate to the numbers of persons advancing these
ideas,"2 9 and then proceeds, like Gregory, to examine as

primary sources only materials authored by those
professional elites. Using the same sources, he predictably
agrees with Gregory that the "attitudes of educated Americans toward injuries have changed dramatically over the
past hundred years" and that a "widespread attitude which
associated injury with bad luck or deficiencies in character
has been gradually replaced by one which presumes that
most injured persons are entitled to compensation.""
Although some revisionist work questions the received
wisdom in regard to the nineteenth century's shift from
trespass to negligence," existing scholarship overwhelmingly supports the conclusions of Gregory and White."
This Article disagrees and presents a new interpretation of the development of twentieth century tort law. It
rejects Gregory's claim that twentieth century courts imposed increasing liability on industrial enterprises as the
economic need for subsidization declined and White's claim
of a change in elite attitudes toward compensatory justice.
Instead, the Article maintains that the military establishment's assertions during World War II that the exercise of
care could significantly reduce battle casualties permeated
the minds of millions of Americans and led them in the
postwar years to focus on how to deter civilian accidents.
This focus on deterrence rather than fair compensation
27. Id. at 383.
28. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
37-50, 102-13, 163-76, 189-207 (1980).
29. Id. at xii.
30. Id. at xv.
31. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 925.
32. See Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And How it Grew, 45 U.
TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995); HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMAnON OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860, supra note 21, at 67-108; George L. Priest, The Intervention of Enterprise
Liability:A CriticalHistory of the IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14
J. LEGAL STuD. 461 (1985).
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pointed the way, in turn, toward the ultimate question of
efficiency-identifying the socially optimal level of
accidents.
This Article also disagrees with the received wisdom on
some specific issues. Most notably, it rejects the traditional
33 which
interpretation of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad,
ironically sees Andrews' dissenting opinion as a legal realist
tract34 and Cardozo's majority opinion as a fact-specific
exercise written, without regard to considerations of competing social interests, by a judge of such "purity" that he
was uninfluenced by "frustrated ambitions with their en35
vies, and... hopes of preferment with their corruptions."
Instead, this Article interprets Cardozo's opinion as a
brilliant compromise of a decades-long political conflict over
the proper standard of compensatory justice in personal
injury cases and Andrews' dissent as a conservative effort
to leave the judiciary free to set aside plaintiffs' verdicts in
the absence of tight connections between moral fault and
injury.
Part I of the Article, which follows, will begin by
examining the pre-1920s conflict in New York over the
proper standard of compensatory justice. First, it will
delineate the two paradigms of tort liability that competed
against each other throughout the first few decades of the
century-the traditional tort doctrine of causation designed
to protect the existing distribution of wealth and resources
by limiting tort recoveries to cases involving moral fault
which had caused harm and a newer, more liberal view that
entrepreneurs who created conditions that ultimately
caused others to be injured should pay for those injuries.
Part I will then turn to Cardozo's attempt in Palsgrafand
other cases to synthesize the two views. Finally, the Part
will conclude with a detailed examination of important
33. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
34. See MORTON J. HORwTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 61 (1992); WHITE, supranote 28, at 98-99.
35. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO,
HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 121 (1976). Noonan's
essay on Palsgrafis the best piece of writing on the case to date and effectively
summarizes the earlier scholarship. See id. at 111-51. The language quoted in the
text was reprinted and was originally from a eulogy of Cardozo by Learned Hand
published in the Columbia, Harvard and Yale law reviews. See id. at 121. Learned
Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1939); Learned Hand, Mr.
Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1939); Learned Hand, Mr. Justice
Cardozo, 48 YALE L.J. 379, 380-81 (1939).
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areas of personal injury law, such as the rules of product
liability, the general principles of negligence, and a series of
classic doctrines dealing with assumption of risk, contributory negligence, the liability of landowners, and vicarious
and joint liability. This examination will attempt to show
how the two competing paradigms of tort liability and
Cardozo's effort at synthesis affected day-to-day doctrine in
the pre-World War II period.
Part II will trace the shift to judicial concerns for social
utility and efficiency during the years from 1940 to 1980.
After an introduction suggesting how World War II made
millions of Americans conscious of their ability to reduce
accidents, Part II will turn to the law of product liability,
the liability of landowners to people entering on their land,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, joint liability
and res ipsa loquitur, all of which changed in fashions designed to deter accidents. Part II will conclude with a
general discussion of the law of negligence that seeks to
establish how the goals of reducing accidents and providing
compensation were related to and part of a larger strategy
of delineating and achieving the optimally efficient level of
accident deterrence.
Of course, the goals of the tort system both now and a
hundred years ago were far more variegated than this
oversimplified summary would suggest, and it is hoped that
the variety and complexity of tort law in all periods will
emerge in the extended analysis below. This introduction's
emphasis on World War II is also an overstatement, since
no one could write about mid-twentieth century American
history without taking into account the Great Depression
and the New Deal, against the background of which the
War had its enormous impact, and the events after the War
which cemented its effects into place. Accordingly, the contribution of these events to change in the law of tort must
also be kept in mind throughout the pages that follow.

I. FAIRNESS AS THE BAsIs OF TORT LAW, 1920-1940
A. Introduction:The Search for an UnderlyingPrincipleof
Tort
Many historians have observed that the aftermath of
World War I was a time of widespread conflict in America
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between the capitalist and laboring classes. 6 As President
Woodrow Wilson declared to Congress in a cable from
Versailles, the "question .

.

. stand[ing] at the front of all

others amidst the present great awakening is the question
of labor," the question of how those "who do the daily labor
of the world [are] to obtain progressive improvement in the
conditions of their labor.., and to be served better by...
the industries which their labor sustains.""7 On the eve of
the War, Louis Brandeis had similarly urged that "[t]he labor question is and for a long time must be the paramount
economic question in this country."38 A few years after the
War another reformer, Frederick Howe, wrote in an autobiographical sketch that, although the upper classes opposed a world of
' 9 equality, "[1]abor would not [any longer]
serve privilege.
New York, of course, was hardly immune from the class
conflict affecting the rest of the nation, if not the whole
industrialized world. Indeed, conflict between established
elites and a restless working class was the central issue in
New York politics and
constitutional adjudication into the
40
decade of the 193OS.

This class conflict also impacted on the development of
tort law during the same period. In the early decades of the
twentieth century the core principle underlying common
law tort doctrine in New York, like much other common law
of the period, was the protection of a particular distributional norm, that wealth or property not change hands
without consent unless the person from whom it was being
transferred had committed some moral wrong that had
resulted in damage to another. Thus, the law enforced the

36. See ELIOT ASINOF, 1919: AMERICA'S Loss OF INNOCENCE 129-223 (1990);
HARVEY GREEN, THE UNCERTAINTY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 1915-1945, at 33-36 (1992);
ARTHUR S. LINK, AMERICAN EPOCH: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE
1890S, at 234-40 (1963); BURL NOGGLE, INTO THE TWENTIES: THE UNITED STATES
FROM ARMISTANCE TO NORMALCY 66-121 (1974).
37. Quoted in JOHN MILTON COOPER, THE WARRIOR AND THE PRIEST: WOODROW
WILSON AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT 264 (1983).
38. Quoted in PHmIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
103 (1984).
39. FREDERICK HOWE, CONFESSIONS OF A REFORMER (1925), quoted in Steve
Fraser, The 'Labor Question,' in STEVE FRASER & GARY GERSTLE, THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 55 (1989).
40. See William E. Nelson, The ChangingMeaning of Equality in TwentiethCentury ConstitutionalLaw, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 3-19 (1995).
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"familiar principle[s]"4 first, that a "violation of a legal
right knowingly committed gives to the injured party a
cause of action against the wrongdoer" 2 and second, "that
one who acts must exercise due care not to do damage to
another's person or property."43 "If property [was] destroyed
or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it [was] just that
the loss should fall upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather
than on that of a guiltless person."' People had a "right to
' 5
be protected against loss attributable to another's wrong, 4
and "elementary policy" dictated "that a wrongdoer shall
not profit by his own wrong." 6
On the other hand, it stood "to reason that a person
[could] not recover . .. [for] an inevitable accident. There
[were] plenty of misfortunes to which people [were] subjected where they must suffer without recompense,"47 and
courts could not permit "sympathy, although one of the
noblest sentiments of our nature," to "decide ... questions
of law" and thereby become a "basis of transferring the
property of one party to another."48 In the words of the midnineteenth century case of Ryan v. New York Central
Railroad,49 everyone in a "commercial" country "to some
extent" ran the "hazard of his neighbor's conduct." 0
In short, judicially elaborated tort doctrine demanded
that compensation be paid when a person was injured by
another's wrongdoing, but not for an injury, however
serious, resulting from innocent conduct. Two early cases
are illustrative. In Laidlaw v. Sage,5 a thief entered the
business premises of defendant Russell Sage, demanded
41. The No. 1 of New York, 61 F.2d 783, 784 (2d Cir. 1932).
42. Bolivar v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 729 (App. Div. 1931). A harmful act
committed without knowledge of its potentiality for harm was not, however,
tortious. See Butler v. John H. Leadley Co., 247 N.Y.S. 81, 84 (App. Div. 1930).
Similarly, harm done without violation of a right was not actionable. See National
Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488,489 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
43. The No. 1 of New York, 61 F.2d at 784.
44. Rozell v. Rozell, 8 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1939).
45. Cashin v. City of New Rochelle, 176 N.E. 138, 140 (N.Y. 1931). See also
Rollin v. Grand Store Fixture Co., 244 N.Y.S. 82, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
46. Rock v. Belmas Contracting Co., 252 N.Y.S. 463, 466-67 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
See also Martin v. Gotham Nat. Bank, 221 N.Y.S. 661 (App. Div. 1927).
47. Morison v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R., quoted in BERGSTROM, supra
note 22, at 60, 172.
48. Laidlaw v. Sage, 52 N.E. 679, 690 (N.Y. 1899).
49. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
50. Id. at 217.
51. Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 679.
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$1,200,000 and threatened to set off a bomb if he did not
receive it. After he had discussed the matter with the thief,
Sage positioned another employee, the plaintiff Laidlaw,
between himself and the thief and then, in essence, refused
the demand. When the thief set off his bomb, Laidlaw was
severely injured but Sage was saved. Plaintiff recovered a
jury verdict against Sage, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the bomber had caused Laidlaw's injury and that there was "no evidence in the case of any
necessary relation of cause and effect" between Sage's
words and actions "and the explosion which caused his
[Laidlaw's] injury."52

Pardington v. Abraham53 was analogous. In that case,
the defendant department store owner maintained a
swinging door which another customer pushed open,
whereupon the door ricocheted back and struck and injured
Eliza Pardington. In reversing a jury verdict for Pardington, the court found that the doors were no less safe than
similar doors used in like establishments and that "carelessness in the use of any form of door may inflict injury
upon one who happens to be sufficiently near it." The court
continued, "No doubt the plaintiff has been the victim of a
lamentable accident; but it is attributable, as it seems to
me, not to any fault of the defendants, but rather to the
hasty carelessness of a third person, over whose movements
and conduct they had no control."54
By the opening decades of the twentieth century, however, traditional judicial doctrine could no longer claim to
be the only plausible approach to issues of causation in tort.
Randolph Bergstrom, whose valuable book on New York
tort litigation covers a forty-year period almost immediately prior to the period here under study, shows that a
competing "popular conception of liability" which its proponents "never clearly articulated"" was emerging slowly in
the years around and after the turn of the century. The
evidence available to Bergstrom did not permit him to
elaborate this popular paradigm in detail, but there can be
little doubt, in view of a growing tendency of jury verdicts to
52.
53.
1906).
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 689.
87 N.Y.S. 670 (App. Div. 1904), affd on opinion below, 76 N.E. 1102 (N.Y.
Id. at 671.
BERGSTROM, supranote 22.
Id. at 172.
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diverge from judges' views57 and of the hostile reaction of
judges and leaders of the bar to the divergence, that a
competing paradigm existed and disturbed profoundly those
adhering to the traditional paradigm.58 In the words of
Judge M. Bruce Linn, for example, the law was "menaced
by those who would completely transform it," with "no regard for its history; no reverence for its traditions; no
conception of its obligations; and no appreciation for its
ideals," while Judge William Hornblower worried about
the frequency with which juries "yield[ed] to local sentiment
...
[producing] erroneous decisions in accordance with the
popular idea of the demands of justice.""
This new "popular conception of liability ... was never
clearly articulated"6' by its proponents, at least in part
because the juries which administered it could speak only
through general verdicts. The best efforts at definition thus
came from the mouths of lawyers who opposed the new
view. Clearest of all, though guilty of exaggeration, was Eli
Hammond, who wrote that the new popular conception was
"in favor of looting any public or quasi-public treasury in
aid of private suffering or private want."62 The distinguished Elihu Root agreed that "[d]istorted and exaggerated
conceptions [were] disseminated by men ... overexcited by
contemplating unhappiness and privation which perhaps no
law or administration could prevent."63 H.T. Smith agreed
that "Wjuries are naturally sympathetic and ... inclined to
take the view that an employee should be compensated
when,, injured no matter what the judge tells them about the
law. 6
As juries and others adopted the new paradigm holding
57. Id. at 142-43, 166, 171-78.
58. M. BRUCE LINN, THE LAWYER AN OFFICER OF THE COURT: A LECTURE BEFORE
THE STUDENTS OF THE ALBANY LAW SCHOOL 15 (1912), quoted in BERGSTROM, supra
note 22, at 173.
59. Id.
60. William B. Hornblower, New York State Bar Association Minutes, 1 AM.
LAW. 49 (1893), quoted in BERGSTROM, supra note 22, at 171.

61.

BERGSTROM,

supranote 22, at 172.

62. Quoted in BERGSTROM, supranote 22, at 171 n.12.
63. ELIHu ROOT, JudicialDecisionsand Public FeelingAddress as Presidentof
the New York Bar Association at the Annual Meeting in New York City, January
19, 1912, at 5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1912), quoted in
BERGSTROM, supranote 22, at 172-73.
64. H.T. SMITH, Liability Investigations and Adjustments, in LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION INSURANCE

67 (1913).
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that victims of injury should receive compensation from

some source, they simultaneously rejected the older, nineteenth century world view that injury, death and other sudden calamities were inevitable, random and frequent events
attributable to cosmic rather than human agency. 5 Whereas nineteenth century judges had not traced out complex
chains of causation in order to identify the human agent
most responsible for a disaster but had instead typically let
"losses . . . lie where they fell,"66 early twentieth century
jurors "came to assign cause differently."6 7 The newly
emerging tort paradigm, to quote at length from the findings of Randolph Bergstrom, had developed
an understanding of cause and effect that included a fuller sense
of remote causation-that actors not at the site of an event could
create the conditions that cause the event-and begun to assess
the liability of participants temporally and physically removed
from accidents. The scope of the search for liability was pushed
beyond immediate contact to outlying areas where those who
created the conditions that caused injury worked.
Understanding cause to spring from sources remote as well as
immediate, New Yorkers brought suit over injuries from commonplace causes that "ordinarily were never noticed hitherto," and
that had previously been considered the random working of fate.
In doing so, they defined anew the "inevitable" event as a compensable injur, conceiving it as the cause and responsibility of
someone else.

By 1920, these newly emerging, though not uniformly
accepted, ideas of causation and tort liability had begun to
attain legitimacy even in judicial circles. As a result, traditional doctrine no longer provided easy answers in every
case, and judges began to recognize that issues of liability
and causation involved policy choice. Competition between
the new and old paradigms left no doubt that determining
when a plaintiff had "a legal right ' or when a defendant
had committed "a wrongful act" 7 required courts to consider
whether there was "a relationship between the parties of
65. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JusTicE 57-59 (1985).
66. Id. at 58.

67. BERGSTROM, supranote 22, at 175.
68. Id.

69. Bolivar v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 729 (App. Div. 1931).
70. Rozell v. Rozell, 8 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1939).
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such a character.., that as a matter of good faith and
general social policy" the defendant had a duty not to harm
the plaintiff.' More specifically, the courts came to understand that they had "to harmonize the necessities of a
competitive industrial system of business with the
teachings of morality,"2 that is, with "the sense of universal
justice exemplified in the Golden Rule," all "without too
radical a departure from recognized legal rules."' 3
The Court of Appeals sought to work out the tension
between the competing paradigms of liability in the pacesetting case of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad.4 Not surprisingly, the court did not adopt either paradigm wholesale, but instead strove to elaborate a middle position
entailing a policy compromise. Thus, it adhered to the
traditional doctrinal approach that "some culpability on the
part of a defendant" was the key factor that rendered
conduct tortious. At the same time, however, it defined culpability more expansively and thereby increased the range
of cases in which victims of injury could obtain compensation.
Still studied by all first-year law students under the
rubric of proximate cause, the majority opinion in Palsgraf
authored by Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo has never
been examined by scholars in the context of the ongoing
conflict between supporters of the new and supporters of
the old paradigm of tort liability. Such an examination
suggests that Cardozo wrote his Palsgrafopinion with the
conflict in mind, that he embraced the new paradigm, but
that he also recognized a need to limit the range of liability
to which defendants might be subjected thereby.
The case arose when the plaintiff, Helen Palsgraf, who
had purchased a ticket from the railroad and was waiting
for a train, was injured when scales, dislodged as a result of
an explosion of fireworks at the other end of the station's
platform, fell from their proper place. The explosion had
occurred when two railroad employees had knocked a small
package out of the hands of another passenger while
helping him board a moving train. The package contained
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Gould v. Flato, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y. Supp. 685, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
Id.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939).
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the fireworks, "but there was
nothing in its appearance to
76
give notice of its contents."
The traditional understanding of negligence and proximate cause was elaborated by Judge William S. Andrews in
a dissent that would have affirmed the opinion of the
Appellate Division directing judgment for the plaintiff. In
Andrews' view, "Ielvery one owe[d] to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably
threaten the safety of others." Negligence consisted in
breach of this duty, and the railroad had been negligent in
Palsgrafwhen its employees permitted a man to board a
moving train and even assisted him in doing so. But
"[o]bviously," as Judge Andrews himself observed in
an7
other case, negligence liability had to have "its limits.""
The limit was the doctrine of proximate cause. By
virtue of this doctrine, negligence did not invariably give
rise to a cause of action for damages, unless the damages
were "so connected with the negligence that the latter may
be said to be the proximate cause of the former." 8 By
"proximate" Andrews meant "that, because of convenience,
of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point," not as a matter of "logic" but of "practical
politics." In determining proximate cause, a court had to
ask questions such as "whether there was a natural and
continuous sequence between cause and effect," whether
"the one was a substantial factor in producing the other,"
and whether there was "a direct connection between them,
without too many intervening causes." For Andrews,
inquiries into proximate cause always involved "question[s]
of fair judgment" and could lead at best not to a clear rule
but only to "an uncertain and wavering line" that would
yield "practical" results "in keeping with the general
understanding of mankind.""
Andrews' language about "public policy," "a rough sense
of justice," and "practical politics" was not the language of
the nascent legal realist movement, as other scholars have
76. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
77. International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 155 N.E. 662, 663 (N.Y. 1927).
78. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103.
79. Id. at 104. For a similar opinion by Judge Charles Clark viewing proximate
cause as dependent on a judge's "values and his notions of sound and desirable
social policy," see Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939).
80. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 104.
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suggested.8 It would be two more years before the movement would receive its name and its designation as an
intellectual movement in Karl Llewellyn's famous article, A
Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 2 and, even then,
legal realists did not often use the words quoted above that
were used by Andrews. As I have urged elsewhere,
Andrews' language was more typically the language of the
descendants of the realists in the aftermath of World War
II, not the language of first-generation realists in the
decade of the 1930s. 3 It makes more sense to understand
Andrews to be describing conservative tort doctrine of
recent decades, of which he was intimately aware, rather
than a jurisprudential movement which had not yet occurred.
In addition to the Sawe and Abraham cases discussed
above, Salsedo v. Palmer was a 1921 Second Circuit precedent that strongly supported Andrews' views. The
plaintiff was the widow of a deceased alien who had been
arrested and imprisoned on the orders of Attorney General
A. Mitchell Palmer. She alleged that her husband had been
subjected to physical and mental torture by his federal
captors until he committed suicide as the only means of
escape. Nonetheless, two out of the three judges sitting on
the Second Circuit panel voted to dismiss her complaint,
declaring that it would be "a most unreasonable inference.., to say that suicidal mania can be regarded as
the natural and probable consequence of either mental or
physical torture." The dissenter, in contrast, thought it
obvious "that the infliction of such wrongs continuously
over a long period of time might naturally and probably
would lead to... self destruction."" However, as the dissenting judge further observed, the concept of "natural and
probable consequence"87 over which the court was battling
was a mere "expression... to explain the reason for the
decision on the facts"8 8 -a decision that must have resulted,
81. See HORWrrz, supranote 34, at 61; WHITE, supra note 28, at 98-99.
82. 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930).
83. See William E. Nelson, The Integrity of the Judiciaryin Twentieth-Century
New York, 51 RuTGERS L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1998).
84. 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921).
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id. at 100.
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id. at 100.
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at least in part, from the judges' differing views on the
propriety of Attorney General Palmer's anti-immigrant
raids.
Other authorities also supported Andrews' digression in
Palsgraf into proximate cause. In McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.," for example, the Court
of Appeals had declared "that one who seeks to hold another
responsible for neglect" had to show that the "neglect..
directly resulted in damages measured by the value or
amount of the rights which were lost by the default.""0
Similarly the Court of Claims thought it "a well-settled rule
of law" that a person guilty of negligence was "responsible
for the natural and proximate consequence of his misconduct," but not "for a remote cause, and he is only liable
when the injury resulting follows in direct sequence, with-91
out the intervention of a voluntary independent cause."
Likewise, the law was "well settled" that an owner of land
on which a fire began was responsible for its spread only to
abutting lands and not to lands distant from the 9 premises
on which the fire originated, "as being too remote."
Of course, there was also authority for the reform
principle favored by Cardozo and the Palsgrafmajority, the
principle that, "where one undertakes to do something involving a dangerous situation, he must do it with reasonable care."9' Cardozo himself had taken a preliminary step
89. 133 N.E. 444 (N.Y. 1921).
90. Id. at 446.
91. Potorik v. State, 181 N.Y.S. 181, 182 (Ct. C1. 1920). See also The Milwaukee Bridge, 15 F.2d 249, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Brush v. Lindsay, 206 N.Y.S.
304, 308 (App. Div. 1924). For subsequent cases, see Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of
Buffalo, 300 N.Y.S. 126 (App. Div. 1937); Benenson v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 257 N.Y.S. 15,
20-21 (App. Div. 1932); Sporborg v. State, 234 N.Y.S. 476 (App. Div. 1929);
Sherman v. Millard, 259 N.Y.S. 415, 422 (Sup. Ct. 1932); In re McCafferty's Will,
264 N.Y.S. 38, 45 (Surr. Ct. 1933). However, "a wrongdoer" needed to "do more
than merely suggest the possibility that the tort of another may have intervened."
The B.B. No. 21, 54 F.2d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 1931).
92. Moore v. VanBeuren & New York Bill-Posting Co., 203 N.Y.S. 305, 308
(App. Div. 1924). Cf. Homac Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 244 N.Y.S. 51 (Sup. Ct. 1930)
(noting property on opposite side of street was sufficiently contiguous to permit
recover for fire originating across street). Whether activity by a defendant was the
proximate cause of an injury was an issue of fact for the jury. See Tierney v. New
York Rapid Transit Corp., 277 N.Y.S. 553 (App. Div. 1935); United Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co., 275 N.Y.S. 27 (App. Div. 1934).
93. Miller v. City of Rochester, 188 N.Y.S. 334, 336 (App. Div. 1921). See also
Barbeau v. Hines, 189 N.Y. Supp. 690, 692-93 (App. Div. 1921) (dictum) (noting the
duty of a railroad at grade crossings). For a subsequent case, see Ford v. Grand
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toward that view in Glanzer v. Shepard,94 in which a public
weigher who had weighed beans at the request of a seller
was held liable to the buyer for weighing them erroneously.
As Cardozo explained, the "controlling circumstance" in
determining whether or not tort liability existed was "not
the character of the consequence" but "the thought and
purposes of the actor,"95 and in Glanzer, the possibility of
harm to the buyer should have been within the thoughts of
the weigher. Thus, the weigher was liable.96
Writing for the Palsgrafmajority, Chief Judge Cardozo
expanded on his holding in Glanzer and further embraced
the position advocated by reformers as the underlying
principle for the law of torts. Proclaiming that a finding of
negligence "would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary," the Chief Judge
held that the doctrine of proximate cause would not limit
liability as Judge Andrews' dissent suggested it had traditionally done in New York law. In Cardozo's words, "[t]he
law of causation remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the
case before us."'? When this holding was added to the ruling
in Glanzer that liability depended on the mental state of
actors rather than the consequences of their actions, the
reform principle was complete. Chief Judge Cardozo and a
majority of the Court of Appeals had rendered people in
positions of power responsible in damages if they foresaw
harm resulting from their actions, however remote the
harm might be and by whatever indirection it might be produced.98
But, at the same time that Cardozo and his brethren
brought the reform program to fruition, they also imposed
Union Co., 270 N.Y.S. 162 (App. Div. 1934).
94. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
95. Id. at 276-77.
96. Glanzer was later read as support for a far-reaching rule that "a negligent
statement may be the basis for a recovery of damages." International Prods. Co. v.
Erie R.R., 155 N.E. 662, 663 (N.Y. 1927). See also Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen &
Riley, Inc., 184 N.E. 729, 732 (N.Y. 1933), and that rule, in turn, was held to
permit a damage suit by an African-American who purchased a bus ticket from
Buffalo, New York to Montgomery, Alabama on an oral assurance of the ticket
agent that he would not be discriminated against on the basis of his race. See
Battle v. Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 13 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
97. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
98. Note should be taken of the parallelism between Cardozo's rulings in
Glanzer and Palsgraf,on the one hand, and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), on the other.
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limits upon it. Cardozo and the other judges were not radicals, and they appreciated the uncertainties that entrepreneurs, who could always foresee harm, would face if they
were liable in damages whenever harm, however remote
and indirect, occurred. "Proof of negligence in the air,"
Cardozo thus wrote, would "not do."99 Defendants who were
negligent would not be liable for all the harms in the world,
but only for damages suffered by those at whom their
negligence was directed. "Negligence," Cardozo continued
was not an open-ended concept, but "a term of relation, " "°6
pursuant to which "[t]he plaintiff sue[d] in her own right for
a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious
beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Cardozo
concluded that no negligence had occurred toward plaintiff
and hence she could not recover damages for her injury
since, at least "to the eye of ordinary vigilance," the act of
helping a passenger onto a moving train was "innocent and
harmless... with reference to her."''
In a line of cases before and after Palsgraf,the Court of
Appeals elaborated the rule that in order "[to be negligent,
a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way
that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risks." Conversely, a person could not "be held liable in negligence for
failing to provide against a danger he could not have
reasonably foreseen.""2 In a case decided in the same month
as Palsgraf,the Court of Appeals, with only Judge Andrews
dissenting, wrote that "[n]egligence is gauged by the ability
to anticipate." 0 3 "The risk reasonably to be perceived
define[d] the duty to be obeyed."" 4 The "one fundamental
rule," according to still another opinion from which only
Judge Andrews dissented, was "that the act of a party
sought to be charged is not to be regarded as a proximate
cause... unless it could have been reasonably anticipated
that the consequences complained of would result from the
alleged wrongful act."' 5
99. 162 N.E. at 99.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. at 100.
102. Payne v. City of New York, 14 N.E.2d 449,450 (N.Y. 1938).
103. McGlone v. William Angus, Inc., 161 N.E. 469,470 (N.Y. 1928).
104. Storm v. New York Tel. Co., 200 N.E. 659, 661 (N.Y. 1936).
105. Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 141 N.E. 904, 905 (N.Y.
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In light of this principle, the court decided cases such as
Wagner v. InternationalRailway, 6 where it found a railroad liable to a plaintiff who had gone upon a trestle to
rescue his cousin who had fallen from a train. The reasoning, in another famous Cardozo opinion, was that "[dlanger
invites rescue.""7 Since a rescue attempt was "Within the
range of the natural and probable"' and hence foreseeable
reactions to the possible peril of a man lying injured on
railroad tracks, the court held the railroad liable when the
person attempting the rescue was injured.'9
1923). See also Benenson v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 183 N.E. 505 (N.Y. 1932).
106. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Lower courts agreed that negligence rested upon the existence of a duty
on the part of the defendant "to protect the plaintiff, or a class to which he
belongs--a duty dependent "upon whether or not the risk of sustaining the
harm... was of such a nature as to have been reasonably anticipated in common
experience as a consequence of the negligent act." Campbell v. Cunningham
Natural Gas Corp., 298 N.Y.S. 200, 204 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Defendants were liable
only for accidents "within the range of natural and probable consequences," but not
for accidents "due to unusual and reasonably unforeseeable combinations of
extraordinary circumstances." Collins v. Noss, 15 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (App. Div.
1939). See also In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559, 563-64 (2d Cir. 1931); Heller
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 265 F. 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1920); Wildman v. City of
New York, 3 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1938); Demjanik v. Kultau, 274 N.Y.S. 387,
390 (App. Div. 1934); Cole v. Vincent, 242 N.Y.S. 644, 650-51 (App. Div. 1930);
Daly v. State, 235 N.Y.S. 331, 333 (App. Div. 1929); Wein v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
227 N.Y.S. 923 (App. Div. 1928); Babcock v. Fitzpatrick, 225 N.Y.S. 30, 33-34 (App.
Div. 1927), affid, 162 N.E. 543 (N.Y. 1928); Woodruff v. Oleite Corp., 192 N.Y.S.
189, 190 (App. Div. 1922); Erich v. Guar. Trust Co., 186 N.Y.S. 103, 107 (App. Div.
1921), affd, 135 N.E. 950 (N.Y. 1922); Gainer v. Hines, 184 N.Y.S. 768, 771 (App.
Div. 1920); Stanley v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 275 N.Y.S. 804, 807 (App. Term 1934);
Braman-Johnson Flying Serv., Inc. v. Thomson, 3 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1938); Miller v. El Mirasol, Inc., 297 N.Y.S. 380, 384 (City Ct. 1937); Coughlin
v. Jones, 295 N.Y.S. 681, 684 (City Ct. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 1 N.Y.S.2d
820 (App. Term 1937), rev'd per curiam, 6 N.Y.S.2d 363 (App. Div. 1938)
(reinstating decision of City Court); Daniels v. Firm Amusement Corp., 285 N.Y.S.
557, 562 (Mun. Ct. 1935); Vann v. Ionta, 284 N.Y.S. 278, 287 (Mun. Ct. 1935);
Reardon v. City of New Rochelle, 272 N.Y.S. 399, 400 (County Ct. 1934); Tod v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 220 N.Y.S. 174, 175 (Mun. Ct. 1927), rev'd on
other grounds, 226 N.Y.S. 388 (App. Term 1927). Federal judges likewise
"hesitate[d] a long while before" subjecting a defendant to damages "unless
something put him actually on notice" that damages would occur. Barry v. Hughes,
103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1939). Thus, if a danger arose "which defendant could not
reasonably foresee or guard against," negligence did not exist. Demilt v. Hart, 139
N.E. 575 (N.Y. 1923). See also Barnevo v. Munson S.S. Line, 147 N.E. 75 (N.Y.
1925); Paradise v. Rhinelander Theatres, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 117 (App. Div. 1938);
Waterman v. Frost, 295 N.Y.S. 914 (App. Div. 1937); Shaw v. Irving Trust Co., 291
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Of course, damage remained "the very gist and essence
of the plaintiffs cause," and that damage had to flow "from
an infraction of a duty, to the injured party, from an
invasion of his legal rights," in order for "legal liability" to
be imposed."' There could "be no actionable negligence in
N.Y.S. 571 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 10 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1937); Wentz v. J.J.
Newberry Co., 280 N.Y.S. 824 (App. Div. 1935); Duggan v. Nat'l Constructors &
Eng'rs, Inc., 228 N.Y.S. 126 (App. Div. 1928); Scott v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 226
N.Y.S. 287 (App. Div. 1928); Maher v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 216 N.Y.S. 629,
631-32 (App. Div. 1926); Birss v. Consol. Amusement Enter., Inc., 9 N.Y.S.2d 927
(App. Term 1939); Weinstein v. R.H. Macy & Co., 296 N.Y.S. 341 (App. Term
1937). On the other hand, negligence would be found if a risk was known or should
have been known either to a defendant, see Duggan v. Natl Constructors & Eng'g,
Inc., 228 N.Y.S. 126, 129-30 (App. Div. 1928), or to its agents, see Haverstick v.
Clarence Hansen & Sons, 13 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 1938). Likewise, contributory
negligence would be found if a plaintiff had been aware of a risk and had acted in
light of it. See Jolly v. Kelly, 227 N.Y.S. 598 (App. Div. 1928). Proof of prior
accidents or prior repairs was relevant and thus admissible to show that a
defendant knew about a risk. See Caspersen v. LaSala Bros., 171 N.E. 754, 755
(N.Y. 1930); Vincitorio v. Kilar Constr. Co., 267 N.Y.S. 89 (App. Div. 1933); Glynne
v. Natl Exhibition Co., 198 N.Y.S. 751 (App. Div. 1923). But see Pfannenstiel v.
Luckey, Platt & Co., 235 N.Y.S. 733 (App. Div. 1929); O'Leary v. Atlantic
Amusement Co., 215 N.Y.S. 303, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1926). This was true at least when
physical conditions at the time of the prior accidents were similar to those at the
time of the accident at issue. See Schabel v. Onseyga Realty Co., 251 N.Y.S. 280,
287 (App. Div. 1931). But evidence of prior occurrences was not admissible when
they occurred for reasons other than negligence, see Hovell v. Evergreens, 151 N.E.
212 (N.Y. 1926), or when they would merely "show a tendency to carelessness,"
since "general carelessness [was] not admissible in proof of specific negligence."
Coutts v. Christopher, 251 N.Y.S. 291, 293-94 (App. Div. 1931). A plaintiff could
also introduce evidence to show that safer appliances were available. See
Freedman v. Clinton Court Corp., 3 N.Y.S.2d 956, 959 (City Ct. 1937), affd, 3
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (App. Div. 1938), rev'd on othergrounds, 18 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1939).
Similarly, proof of continued use of an instrumentality without any accidents for a
long period of time negated any claim of negligence and was thus admissible in
evidence, see DeSalvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp., 23 N.E.2d 457, 458 (N.Y.
1939); Roy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div. 1939); O'Leary v.
Atlantic Amusement Co., 215 N.Y.S. 303, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1926), when the
surrounding circumstances on prior occasions were substantially the same as those
on the occasion at issue, see Alexander v. Am. League Baseball Club of New York,
258 N.Y.S. 292 (App. Div. 1932). So was evidence that an instrumentality causing
an accident was in proper repair after the accident. See Mironchik v. Sagadahoc
S.S. Corp., 174 N.E. 69 (N.Y. 1930). However, proof of subsequent repairs generally
was not admissible. See Kunschman v. United States, 51 F.2d 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y.
1931), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1932); Cahill v. Kleinberg, 135
N.E. 323, 324 (N.Y. 1922); Golden v. Horn & Hardart Co., 278 N.Y.S. 385 (App.
Div. 1935), affid, 200 N.E. 309 (N.Y. 1922); Fraumberg v. Schmohl, 190 N.Y.S. 710
(App. Term 1921); Rosen v. Chesebrough Bldg. Co., 189 N.Y.S. 131 (App. Term
1921).
110. Comstock v. Wilson, 177 N.E. 431,432 (N.Y. 1931).
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the absence of a legal duty to the plaintiffs.""' And,
determining the scope of citizens' duties to each other was
"1 2a
difficult matter which could not "be tested by pure logic.
There were some matters on which the New York courts
reached agreement. For example, they agreed that citizens
were under no duty to provide assistance to each other, but
that they came under a duty if they volunteered to provide
help".. or entered into a contractual relationship."4 Indeed,
a duty arising out of a contract could sometimes "inure to a
third person," someone other than a party to the contract,
"under certain circumstances.""' What, however, were those
circumstances? When, for example, would a water company
that had made a contract with a city to provide water to its
residents be liable to the residents for damage resulting
from a failure to provide the water? Or when would an
accountant that had audited a firm's books be liable to a
person who had lent money to the firm in reliance on the
audit?
Chief Judge Cardozo addressed these questions in two
of his leading opinions: H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co."' and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche." His concern was
that the "field of obligation" not "be expanded beyond reasonable limits.""' Although "[tlhe assault upon the citadel
of privity," of tort upon contract, was "proceeding...
apace,"" Cardozo was unwilling to expose contracting parties to "the involuntary assumption of a series of new
relations, inescapably hooked together" 12' and thus "to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate

111. Gambon v. City of New York, 271 N.Y.S. 244,248 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See also
Sporborg v. State, 234 N.Y.S. 476, 479 (App. Div. 1929); Stern v. Pres. and Dirs. of
Manhattan Co., 235 N.Y.S. 634, 638 (App. Term 1929); Zerder v. Friman Holding
Co., 274 N.Y.S. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Hakala v. VanSchaick, 12 N.Y.S.2d 928, 934
(City Ct. 1939); Senauke v. Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., 284 N.Y.S. 710, 712 (Mun. Ct.
1936).
112. Comstock, 177 N.E. at 432.
113. See Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935), affd,
287 N.Y.S. 136 (App. Div. 1936); Zaepfel v. Parnass, 250 N.Y.S. 740 (Sup. Ct.
1931).
114. See Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Weinberg, 181 N.Y.S. 15 (App. Term 1920).
115. Harriman v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 171 N.E. 686, 687 (N.Y. 1930).
116. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
117. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
118. H.R. Moch Co., 159 N.E. at 897.
119. UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 445.
120. H.R. Moch Co., 159 N.E. at 899.
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time to an indeterminate class," all out of concern that the
"hazards of a business conducted on these terms" would be
too "extreme."12 ' He was unwilling, in short, to permit large

business entities to become vehicles for the redistribution of
their shareholders' and customers' wealth to random sufferers of damage whose susceptibility thereto could not
have been specifically foreseen and prevented. Cardozo was
prepared to impose liability only on those who callously let
others get hurt.
Thus Cardozo, keeping true to Palsgraf,held that in the
absence of "reckless and wanton indifference to consequences measured and foreseen" 2' or of "reckless misstatement.., or insincere profession of opinion.., liability for
negligence... [would be] bounded by the contract." 3
Whether a defendant had acted insincerely or recklessly
toward individuals who might be damaged by the negligent
performance of a contract so as to become liable to them in
tort presented a question of fact for juries and for future
divisions on the Court of Appeals, the precise outcome of
which could not readily be predicted.'24
Despite the difficulties involved in its application in
borderline cases such as Moch and Ultramares, the foreseeability standard elaborated by the Palsgrafmajority and
numerous other New York cases during the 1920s and
1930s had significant doctrinal consequences in comparison
with the alternative articulated by the Palsgrafdissent.
The first consequence was to restrict the freedom of
trial judges and juries. The traditionalist approach of Judge
Andrews in dissent required a jury first to inquire whether
the defendant had committed an act that "unreasonably
threaten[ed] the safety of others."'25 Then, either the jury or
the trial judge had to make a "fair judgment" about where
to "draw an uncertain and wavering line" marking the point
where "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series
of events beyond a certain point." In performing these
tasks, judges or juries would not have recourse to facts or

121. UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 444.
122. H.R. Moch Co., 159 N.E. at 899 (emphasis added).
123. UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 448; see also O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d
50, 53 (2d Cir. 1937).
124. See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1938).
125. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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"logic," but would be engaging in "practical politics.""6 In
contrast, the approach of Cardozo and most New York
judges pointed juries to a coherent factual inquiry. That is,
did the defendant know or have reason to know that its
activities posed a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to the
class of people of which the plaintiff was a member? This
standard, which did not involve any "a balance of probabilities" but only "the existence of some probability of sufficient moment to induce action to avoid it, ""' was a simple
test that did not permit juries or judges to make any
practical political decisions or other balancing judgments.
The second consequence of the Cardozo approach was
an almost total absence of mention in the cases of today's
popular calculus of risk standard, detailed by Learned
Hand in the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing
Co." 9 By not encouraging juries to balance the foreseeability
of injury against the utility of the defendant's conduct, New
York law during the 1920s and 1930s largely avoided utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as part of the negligence determination. During the two decades in question, New York
negligence law almost uniformly was not utilitarian. Rather
it rested on a simple moral insight that it was the obligation of those who used "numbers of people.., for gain
and profit, to be vigilant in their efforts to protect such
people."3
131
A federal admiralty case, The No. 1 of New York,
makes this point with unique emphasis. In The No. 1 of
New York, a New York City drawbridge operator had
opened a bridge for a tug and its tow and then closed it to
permit fire engines to pass, resulting in the bridge colliding
with one of the barges in tow. The court held that "a bridge
owner" who had once opened a bridge could "not withdraw
his consent to the passage, even in the exigency of a

126. Id. at 103-04.
127. Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1939).
128. Of course, difficult issues could arise at the edges when it became
necessary to determine whether a plaintiff was a member of the class on which
risk was imposed or whether the injury was of the nature which the defendant
should have anticipated. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708
(2d Cir. 1964).
129. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
130. Schubart v. Hotel Astor, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1938), affd, 8
N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1938), affd, 22 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1939).
131. 61 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1932).
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demand by fire apparatus responding to an alarm, at a time
when withdrawal should be foreseen as endangering the
vessel."' The noteworthy fact about this opinion is that the
court, consisting of Judge Swan and the two Hand cousins,
never asked what seemed quite likely, whether the harm
that would have been done by not allowing the fire engines
to pass outweighed the harm that occurred to the barge. All
that mattered was that the bridge operator, having undertaken a duty to the tug and its tow, could not fail to perform
that duty even when it could foresee that greater harm

might result from its failure.'33

132. Id. at 784.
133. Only one case decided in the state courts prior to the 1940s ever hinted at
a willingness to consider utilitarian reasoning, when it declared that "[tihe degree
of care to be exercised is commensurate with the danger to be avoided." Roach v.
Yonkers R.R., 271 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (App. Div. 1934). See also The John Carroll, 275
F. 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1921). Analysis of the case reveals, however, that the word
"danger" meant no more to the court than foreseeability of harm, as is made clear
by the fact that the examples given by the court of great danger all involved highly
foreseeable harm, while those of slight danger involved sudden, almost
unforeseeable harm. In all the examples, the gravity of the harm was held
constant, and never in its opinion did the court even consider the burden of
avoiding the harm.
A somewhat similar federal case was Ex Parte Hicks, 52 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.
1931), which arose when a small launch immensely overcrowded with about 78
men in its small cabin was struck by ice in the Hudson River and sank with the
loss of at least 35 lives. In this case, Judge Learned Hand declared that "[tihe
degree of care exacted in any situation depend[ed], not only upon the likelihood
of injury, but on its gravity if it comes." Id. at 132. Hand may have been
starting in this case to think in terms of the calculus of risk, which he would
outline only one year later. But on its facts Hicks was a simple foreseeability
case, in which the operator of the launch knew that it could not navigate in ice,
was aware of the possible presence of ice in the river, and should have
recognized that 78 men could not escape in time from the launch's small cabin if
it sank rapidly. On these facts, Hand concluded that grave harm, namely,
death, was foreseeable and that the launch should not have been used.
A second federal case, which involved a man who hurried across a street to
speak with a man on the other side, only to be struck by an oncoming vehicle,
looked more explicitly to the calculus of risk. It declared that "[c]ontributory
negligence involves taking a risk which the interest at stake does not warrant"
and then held that the "interest in getting across to speak to a man who was
awaiting ... was not sufficient to warrant taking the risk which the man took."
Mortenson v. Hagg, 99 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1938). Such a balancing of the
utility of conduct against the risk of harm to which it might lead was not new,
however, in contributory negligence cases; in New York, it dated back at least to
the nineteenth century case of Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
Moreover, reasons of policy called for cost-benefit analysis in contributory
negligence while prohibiting it in negligence. Declaring people contributorily
negligent for taking risks warranted by self-interest would have interfered
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Only one federal case, Sinram v. Pennsylvania Railroad,14 cannot be reconciled with the New York mainstream. On the issue of whether a tug which rammed and
damaged an empty barge above the waterline was liable for
loss of a subsequently loaded cargo of coal which caused the
barge to take on water through the damaged area and
thereafter to sink, Judge Learned Hand declared that "we
are not bound to take thought for all that the morrow may
bring, even though we should foresee it." Although a tug
operator who thought enough about "the precise train of
events" that might follow a collision would have foreseen
the sinking, the foreseeability "canon," according to Hand,
was "cmore equivocal than appears on the surface," and
"ignore[d] the excuses for much conduct.., likely to involve
damage to others." Duties, Hand continued, were "a resultant not only of what we should forecast, but of the propriety of disregarding so much of it as our own interests justify
us in putting at risk.""5
Sinram was an explicit, early statement of the calculus
of risk standard later put forward by Hand in Carroll
Towing. It implied that a tug operator's interest in getting
its job done quickly and efficiently, and the economic
benefits that would flow therefrom, outweighed the costs of
foreseeable but highly improbable accidents, such as the
one that had occurred when the damaged barge was loaded
without any inspection for potential leaks. Sinram,
however, was the only case of its kind prior to the 1940sthe output of the mind of an unusually prescient judge who,
perhaps because of his life-tenure appointment on the
federal bench, did not participate in the more politicized
effort of state judges like Cardozo to identify an underlying
principle of tort liability.
Except for this one unusual opinion, however, New
York tort law during the 1920s and 1930s, in the end,
reflected a policy judgment that people who intended harm
to others or who acted toward others in ways which they
excessively with individual freedom of choice, but holding them negligent for
profiting from risks they imposed on others merely made them pay for their
callousness. For these reasons, the use of cost-benefit analysis in contributory
negligence cases was easily reconcilable with the general tendency of New York
law during the 1920s and 1930s to impose tort liability on those who intended
to impose or foresaw that they would impose harm on another.
134. 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932).
135. Id. at 771.
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foresaw would produce harm were liable for any harm they
brought about as a result. If harm to others was either
intended or foreseen, no interest on the part of an actor,
however strong that interest might be, would justify a
refusal to pay damages for infliction of the harm. A harm
was not compensible only if it was neither intended nor
reasonably foreseeable.
By so depriving those who administered tort law of the
capacity to engage in balancing and instead tying them to a
strict principle of moral obligation, the New York courts
insured that classes of people within the ordinary bounds of
foreseeability, such as workers, consumers of most products
and people on public highways, would recover damages
when they suffered injury. They thereby transformed the
doctrine of proximate cause, which had been a discretionary
political principle available in a wide range of cases to prevent members of the underclasses from recovering damages
against capitalist entrepreneurs of wealth and power, into
an incomprehensible rule applicable only in weird cases.
While insuring entrepreneurs that they would not be liable
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class merely by conducting business, New
York judges made tort law consistent with popular assumptions, which had emerged in the early twentieth century,
that victims of injury should recover damages from those
who had created the conditions that had caused them to be
hurt.
B. The Law of PersonalInjuries, 1920-1940
1. Product Liability. Product liability law was one
important area of tort that conformed almost precisely during the 1920s and 1930s to the culpability standard of
Palsgraf.The then recently decided case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 36 which held a manufacturer liable to a
purchaser of its product for negligent defects that had
foreseeably led to injury, even when the purchaser had
obtained the product through a retail dealer and thus was
not in privity of contract with the manufacturer, 131was followed in several cases during the 1920s and 1930s. In one
136. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
137. See Friedman v. Swift & Co., 18 F. Supp. 596, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
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case, Smith v. Peerless Glass Co.,"' which held manufacturers of component parts liable to consumers for injuries
caused by defects in the final manufactured product, the
MacPhersonrule was even extended.
In its adherence to Palsgraf, however, MacPherson
applied only to products "inherently beset with danger
and... reasonably certain to imperil life or limb if carelessly made,"3 9 not to products where "injury was [merely] a
possible consequence of the defective construction," but "not
a probable result."' ° A manufacturer could "not be charged
with negligence where some unusual result" occurred that
could not "reasonably be foreseen" and was "not within the
compass of reasonable probability."' Thus, failure to establish that a manufacturer could readily foresee dangers from
products, such as a hair dye which injured a hair dresser
but not a customer 4 2 or cigarettes containing a steel
blade, 4

1

would result in dismissal of a plaintiffs product

liability suit.
Other limitations on MacPherson were also consistent
with the underlying purposes of the Court of Appeals in
Palsgraf.For example, the limitation that the MacPherson
rule applied only to suits involving physical injuries and not
to commercial loss'" fit well with the underlying goals of

Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13 F.2d 128
(W.D.N.Y. 1926); Hoenig v. Cent. Stamping Co., 6 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1936); Genesee

County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 189 N.E. 551 (N.Y.
1934); Connolly v. Halliwell-Shelton Elec. Corp., 248 N.Y.S. 538 (App. Div. 1931);

Miller v. Inter1 Harvester Co., 184 N.Y.S. 91 (App. Div. 1920); Meditz v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 357 (City Ct. 1938), affd, 25 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App.

Term 1938); Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co., 222 N.Y. Supp. 724 (Mun. Ct. 1927).
138. 181 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1932).
139. Creedon v. Automatic Voting Mach. Corp., 276 N.Y.S. 609, 611 (App. Div.
1935).
140. Cook v. A. Garside & Sons, Inc., 259 N.Y.S. 947, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1932); see
also Schfranek v. Benhamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Jaroniec
v. C.O. Hasselbarth, Inc., 228 N.Y.S. 302 (App. Div. 1928); Sherwood v. Lax &
Abowitz, 259 N.Y.S. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1932), affd, 262 N.Y.S. 909 (App. Div. 1933).
141. Boyd v. American Can Co., 291 N.Y.S. 205 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 10
N.E.2d 532 (N.Y. 1937).
142. See Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 160 N.E. 360 (N.Y. 1928). But cf Cahill v. Inecto,
Inc., 203 N.Y.S. 1 (App. Div. 1924) (upholding a verdict for a plaintiff whose scalp
had been injured by hair dye).
143. See Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y.S. 922 (App. Term
1937).
144. See A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d
424 (App. Div. 1939), affd, 28 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1940).
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tort reformers, who sought to protect workers, consumers
and highway users, but not business entrepreneurs. A second limitation, that the rule applied only to claims of
negligence and not to suits for breach of warranty, where
privity of contract between consumer and manufacturer
was still required, 145 similarly reflected Cardozo's concerns
in Moch and Ultramares that the "field of obligation" not
"be expanded beyond reasonable limits"46 and that
contracting parties not be exposed to "the involuntary
assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked
together,"47 since the "hazards of a business conducted on
these terms" would be too "extreme."
Finally, a plaintiff also had to satisfy the culpability
standard by offering "direct proof' that a manufacturer's
negligence had resulted in a product defect, 4 1 that is, that
the "defect... might and ought to have been discovered by
him." 5' "If a cause other than the negligence of the
defendant might have produced the accident," plaintiff had
"to exclude the operation of such cause by a fair preponderance of the evidence" and could "not merely 'deduce'
that the defendant's product caused his or her injury.11
Thus, it would not suffice for physicians who treated an
injury to testify that "they 'think' that the condition was
caused by" the product. "Conjecture" was not enough.5 2 The
plaintiff also had to show that the product was defective
when it left the hands of the manufacturer.' Questions as
to a defendant's negligence and to the adequacy of a
defendant's precautions normally were within the province
of the jury.'

145. See Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 139 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1923); see also Jaroniec
v. C.O.Hasselbarth, Inc., 228 N.Y.S. 302 (App. Div. 1928).
146. H.R. Moch Co., 159 N.E. at 897.
147. Id. at 899.
148. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
149. Cullem v. M.H. Renken Dairy Co., 285 N.Y.S. 707 (App. Div. 1936), see
also Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 160 N.E. 398, 399 (N.Y. 1928).
150. Licari v. Markotos, 180 N.Y.S. 278,280 (App. Term 1920).
151. Goelet v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 294 N.Y.S. 542, 545 (City Ct. 1936), see also
Kalinowski v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 272 N.Y.S. 759, 762-63 (App. Div.
1934), affd, 200 N.E. 304 (N.Y. 1936).
152. Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 160 N.E. 398, 399 (N.Y. 1928).
153. See Reiss v. Kirkman & Son, Inc., 273 N.Y.S. 7 (App. Div. 1934).
154. See Holzman v. Harkavy Beverage Co., 293 N.Y.S. 832 (App. Div. 1937);
Miller v. Natl Bread Co., 286 N.Y.S. 908 (App. Div. 1936); McCarthy v. Cent.
Concrete Mixing Corp., 277 N.Y.S. 277 (App. Div. 1935). But see Galvin v. Lynch,

1999]

TRANSFORMATION OF TORT LAW

149

2. General Principlesof Negligence. General negligence
law, of course, was also consistent with Palsgraf,its controlling authority. In any negligence case, "the burden rest[ed]
upon the plaintiff to show by a fair preponderance of the
evidence" that an "accident was caused by the fault of
defendant."'55 More was required than proof of a "mere error
of judgment";56 a plaintiff had to establish a defendant's
241 N.Y.S. 479, 480 (City Ct. 1930) (ruling that whether a product was dangerous
was "sometimes... a question for the jury and sometimes a question for the
court"). Jury verdicts for plaintiffs were sustained in cases involving electrical
transformers, see Rosebrock v. Gen. Elec. Co., 140 N.E. 571 (N.Y. 1923); Sider v.
General Elec. Co., 197 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1922), affd, 143 N.E. 792 (N.Y. 1924),
sparklers, see Henry v. Crook, 195 N.Y.S. 642 (App. Div. 1922), and cans
containing chlorinated lime, see Hallenbeck v. S. Wander & Sons Chem. Co., 189
N.Y.S. 334 (App. Div. 1921). By analogy, courts held that there would be sufficient
evidence for a case to go to a jury in cases involving faulty design or maintenance
of aircraft, see Gladstone v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 5 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App.
Div. 1938); American Airways, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct.
1939), affd, 31 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1940), mouse fragments in smoking tobacco, see
Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 241 N.Y.S. 233 (App. Term 1930), affd, 249
N.Y.S. 924 (App. Div. 1931), a pin in a sanitary napkin, see LaFrumento v. Kotex
Co., 226 N.Y.S. 750 (City Ct. 1928), and a wrinkle in a shoe lining that led to a
fatal blister, see Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 11 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1937). On the
other hand, complaints were dismissed or verdicts for plaintiffs set aside in cases
involving a needle lodged in a carton, see Spiegel v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, Inc.,
244 N.Y.S. 654 (Sup. Ct. 1930), pork infected with parasites causing trichinosis, see
Dressler v. Merkel, Inc., 284 N.Y.S. 697 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 4 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y.
1936), and ammunition of greater than normal force manufactured by defendant,
sold without special warning, and used by a plaintiff unaware of its special power,
see Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 280 N.Y.S. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 290
N.Y.S. 130 (App. Div. 1936).
155. Lane v. City of Buffalo, 250 N.Y.S. 579, 582 (App. Div. 1931); see also
Gildon Holding Corp. v. New York & Queens Transit Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 539, 541
(Mun. Ct. 1935). The law, unwilling to "assume, in the absence of proof" that a
loss "'was the result of negligence,'" In re Toukatley, 203 N.Y.S. 175, 177 (Sur. Ct.
1923), "demand[ed] more than mere speculation or surmise." Riley v. Larocque,
297 N.Y.S. 756, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1937); see also Hirsch v. Safian, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570
(App. Div. 1939); Kalonczyk v. State, 285 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1936) (holding
that allowing the plaintiff to recover when it has failed to establish that the
accident was caused by the negligence of the state would be making an award
based on mere conjecture); Adler v. Nelson, 210 N.Y.S. 437, 439 (App. Term
1925);Wass v. Western Union Tel. Co., 10 N.Y.S.2d 956, 959 (Mun. Ct. 1939).
However, a "plaintiff was not required to offer evidence which positively excluded
every other possible cause of the accident." Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 183 N.E. 28283 (N.Y. 1932). The rule was "well settled that where there [were] several possible
causes of injury, for one or more of which defendant [was] not responsible, plaintiff
[could] not recover without proving the injury was sustained.., by a cause for
which the defendant was responsible." Digelormo v. Weil, 183 N.E. 360, 363 (N.Y.
1932); see also Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 14 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1938);
Fearick v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 206 N.Y.S. 640, 644 (App. Div. 1924).
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"[flailure to use ordinary precaution" 5" or "to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily
have done
15 8
under the circumstances of the situation."
The most notable exception to the ordinary requirement
that plaintiffs provide evidence of fault occurred with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allowed negligence to be
proved by less than "positive and direct evidence," when
"circumstances" could be "shown" from which a "reasonable
inference" could be drawn that an "injury resulted from
negligent acts."'59 The res ipsa rule rested on a pragmatic
156. Kawacz v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 181 N.E. 87,88 (N.Y. 1932).
157. Vangellow v. East Side Sav. Bank, 11 N.Y.S.2d 982, 985 (City Ct. 1939).
158. Daurizio v. Merchants' Despatch Transp. Co., 274 N.Y.S. 174, 183 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); see also National Lead Co. v. City of New York, 43 F.2d 914, 917 (2d Cir.
1930); Heller v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 265 F. 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1920); In re
Smith's Estate, 266 N.Y.S. 666, 669 (Sur. Ct. 1933). "Te standard," of course, was
"not what the jurors... would have done, but... that of the typical prudent man."
Warrington v. New York Power & Light Corp., 300 N.Y. Supp. 154, 158 (App. Div.
1937). But see Weitzen v. Camp Mooween, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 640, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(approving the "standard of the average reasonable parent"). Consistent with
possessing the burden of proof, the plaintiff was required to plead the specific facts
on which any such negligence was based. See Newell v. Woodward, 270 N.Y.S. 258
(App. Div. 1934); Wasmer v. Town of Brant, 225 N.Y.S. 242 (App. Div. 1927);
Matusow v. Camp Orinsekwa, 280 N.Y.S. 626, 628 (City Ct. 1935). Failure to do so
would result in dismissal of a complaint. See Maher v. Madison Square Garden
Corp., 152 N.E. 403 (N.Y. 1926); Hamilton v. Munson S.S. Line, Inc., 293 N.Y.S.
190 (App. Div. 1937); Joyce v. W.T. Grant Co., 278 N.Y.S. 435 (App. Div. 1935);
Russell v. Union Ry. Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 925 (App. Term 1939); Leach v. Sibley,
Lindsay & Curr Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 287 (City Ct. 1939). However, when sufficient
evidence of negligence was pleaded and proved at trial, a complaint would not be
dismissed. See Barrow v. 42nd Street, Manhattanville & St. Nicholas Ave. Ry., 276
N.Y.S. 996 (App. Div. 1935); Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 280
N.Y.S. 857 (App. Div. 1935). The duty to go forward with exculpatory evidence
would shift to the defendant. See Rice v. Von der Lieth, 181 N.Y. Supp. 767 (App.
Term 1920). At the close of the trial, both sides were entitled to have the jury
consider not only their own evidence but also the evidence submitted by the other
side to whatever extent it supported their contentions. See Tumulty v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 229 N.Y.S. 700,705 (App. Div. 1928).
159. Warner v. New York, 0. & W.R.R., 204 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (App. Div. 1924).
Res ipsa loquitur, however, was a doctrine "of limited application," by which "the
fact of the occurrence of an injury" under "circumstances of control and
management by the defendant" merely established "plaintiffs prima facie case,
and present[ed] a question of fact for the defendant to meet with an explanation."
Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R., 135 N.E. 504, 505 (N.Y. 1922). "Shifting the
burden.., of going forward with the case, [however, did] not shift the burden of
proof," and "[i]f a satisfactory explanation [were] offered by the defendant, the
plaintiff... [had to] rebut it by evidence of negligence or lose his case." Id. at 288.
See also In re McAllister, 53 F.2d 495, 501 (2d Cir. 1931); O'Brien Bros., Inc. v. City
of New York, 36 F.2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1928), affd, 36 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1929);
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judgment that, in cases where an injured party had "no
adequate means of ascertaining" the facts 6 and where the
instrumentality producing the injury was "within the exclusive possession, control, and oversight of the person
charged with negligence," that person ought to be compelled
to give an "explanation of the accident consistent with freedom from negligence." "[Ihf he [did] not give it, a presumption [arose] against him."16' Ultimately, res ipsa loquitur
advanced the new tort paradigm advocated by reformersnamely, that a defendant not be permitted to "carry on its
undertaking without making good any loss that occurs to
the business or property of another" 6 and that no one be
allowed "rightly [to] levy toll upon the legal rights of others"
by carelessly and callously advancing his or her own

Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 15 N.Y.S.2d 38,41 (App. Div. 1939).
160. Central R.R. of New Jersey v. Peluso, 286 F. 661, 667 (2d Cir. 1923). "The
mere happening of an accident [was], of course, not proof of negligence," Brady v.
Farley, 27 F. Supp. 840, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), and in the absence of an imbalance of
knowledge between the parties, would not suffice to bring res ipsa into play.
161. See Slater v. Barnes, 149 N.E. 859, 860 (N.Y. 1925); see also Lessig v. New
York Cent. R.R., 2 N.E.2d 646, 647 (N.Y. 1936). However, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply "where plaintiff ha[d] full knowledge and testifie[d] as to the
specific act of negligence which [was] the cause of the injury complained of."
Whitcher v. Bd. of Educ. of Rensselaer, 251 N.Y.S. 611, 612-13 (App. Div. 1931); see
also Norris v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 215 N.Y. Supp. 478, 484 (App. Div. 1926). But see
Rosenzweig v. Hines, 280 F. 247, 248 (W.D.N.Y. 1922). It also did not apply when
the instrumentality causing harm was outside the defendant's control. See
Murray v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 260 N.Y.S. 132 (App. Div. 1932);
Stasiuldewicz v. Marcus Contracting Co., 232 N.Y.S. 160, 163 (App. Div. 1928);
Henzi v. Benezra, 292 N.Y.S. 392 (App. Term 1936); Guttman v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 288 N.Y.S. 819 (Mun. Ct. 1936). The cases in which the doctrine was applied
on its facts without coherent doctrinal explanation, so as to lead to judgments for
plaintiffs, see Bartley Scow Corp. v. J.V. Petrie & Son, Inc., 37 F.2d 58, 59 (2d Cir.
1980); Kesten v. Einhorn & Singer Dev. Corp., 249 N.Y.S. 205, 207 (App. Div.
1931), affd, 180 N.E. 327 (N.Y. 1931); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Serv., Inc., 247
N.Y.S. 251 (App. Div. 1930); Losee v. Paramount Hotel Corp., 242 N.Y.S. 608, 611
(Sup. Ct. 1930); Donohue v. U.S. Hoffman Mach. Corp., 218 N.Y.S. 558, 559-60
(Mun. Ct. 1926); Lynch v. Fred T. Lery & Co., 197 N.Y.S. 360, 363-64 (Mun. Ct.
1922), and those in which it was held inapplicable so as to result in judgments for
defendants, see Taylor v. City of New York, 296 N.Y.S. 680, 681 (App. Div. 1937);
Riles v. Murray, 12 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (City Ct. 1939); Melia v. Southern
Boulevard R.R., 286 N.Y.S. 501 (City Ct. 1936), were approximately even in
number. As one trial judge observed, the extent to which res ipsa loquitur could
"be carried [was] often, a nice question, and the cases [were] not entirely in
harmony." Hammond v. Hammond, 236 N.Y.S. 100, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1929), affid, 237
N.Y.S. 557 (App. Div. 1929).
162. Loesberg v. Fraad, 197 N.Y.S. 229, 232 (Mun. Ct. 1922).
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interests. 63
Cardozo and other judges also advanced the cause of
tort reformers with their holdings concerning the weight to
163. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469, 473 (County Ct.
1933). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not, of course, change the basic precept,
as stated by the Appellate Division in Palsgraf,that "every case [of negligence]
must stand upon its own facts." 225 N.Y.S. 412, 414 (App. Div. 1927), rev'd on other
grounds, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See also The City of Harvard, 52 F.2d 461, 46263 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Gardner v. State, 1 N.Y.S.2d 994, 998 (Ct. C1. 1938). As always,
the question of negligence, which was "a mixed and compound question of law and
fact," People ex rel. Flinn v. Barr, 251 N.Y.S. 116, 120 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aftd, 252
N.Y.S. 937 (App. Div. 1931) was "usually one ...for a jury." Huston v. Chenango
County, 1 N.Y.S.2d 252, 256 (App. Div. 1937), affd, 16 N.E.2d 301 (N.Y. 1938); see
also ONeill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1929); Noonan v. Henry Sonn & Co.,
198 N.E. 31 (N.Y. 1935); Dudar v. Milef Realty Corp., 180 N.E. 102, 104 (N.Y.
1932); Wojenski v. Prankard, 164 N.E. 581, 582 (N.Y. 1928); Kern v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Co., 130 N.E. 572 (N.Y. 1926); Kruger v. T. Hogan & Son, Inc., 138 N.E. 23
(N.Y. 1923); Cassin v. Stillman, Delehanty, Ferris Co., 133 N.E. 906 (N.Y. 1922);
Stauffer v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 1939); Burke v. Bond
& Mortgage Guarantee Corp., 7 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div. 1938); Miller v. M & D
Holding Corp., 299 N.Y.S. 496 (App. Div. 1937), affid, 14 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1938);
Gramegna v. Rubsam & Horrman Brewing Co., 299 N.Y.S. 183 (App. Div. 1937);
Baker v. Robbins-Ripley Co., 299 N.Y.S. 145 (App. Div. 1937); Cleary v. Sweeney
Realty Corp., 291 N.Y.S. 570 (App. Div. 1936); McCabe v. Richell Realty Corp., 288
N.Y.S. 611 (App. Div. 1936); Primoschitz v. Harris Structural Steel Co., 288 N.Y.S.
364, 365 (App. Div. 1936); Smith v. Salop, 285 N.Y.S. 857 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 3
N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1936); Egan v. Werfel, 282 N.Y.S. 834 (App. Div. 1935);
Alexander v. Scoville's Village, Inc., 278 N.Y.S. 201 (App. Div. 1935); Anderson v.
St. Rose of Lima's Roman Catholic Church, 268 N.Y.S. 224 (App. Div. 1933);
Vollstedt v. Joseph A. Mollar, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 552, 554 (App. Div. 1933); Simpson
v. Fiero, 260 N.Y.S. 323 (App. Div. 1932), affid, 188 N.E. 20 (N.Y. 1933); Baker v.
Adamo, 260 N.Y.S. 78 (App. Div. 1932); Rix v. Siegel, 257 N.Y.S. 345 (App. Div.
1932), affd, 185 N.E. 748 (N.Y. 1933); Bourg v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 251
N.Y.S. 142 (App. Div. 1931); Peck v. Weil, 248 N.Y.S. 468 (App. Div. 1931); Reiss v.
City of New York, 246 N.Y.S. 302, 303 (App. Div. 1930); Halperin v. Mogoba
Constr. Co., 218 N.Y.S. 15 (App. Div. 1926); Dougherty v. Pratt Inst., 216 N.Y.S.
441 (App. Div. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 155 N.E. 67 (N.Y. 1926); Pepperman
v. Overseas Shipping Co., 215 N.Y.S. 574 (App. Div. 1926); Hammer v.
Bloomingdale Bros., 213 N.Y.S. 743 (App. Div. 1926); Ragone v. State, 207 N.Y.S.
544, 547 (App. Div. 1925) (concurring opinion); Clemens v. Benzinger, 207 N.Y.S.
539, 542 (App. Div. 1925); Anastasio v. Hedges, 202 N.Y.S. 109, 111 (App. Div.
1923); Sheridan v. Rosenthal, 201 N.Y.S. 168, 171 (App. Div. 1923); Garlinger v.
Linwood Constr. Co., 200 N.Y.S. 423 (App. Div. 1923); Bellantoni v. Thomas &
Buckley Hoisting Co., 196 N.Y.S. 667 (App. Div. 1922); Schlomowitz v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 194 N.Y.S. 520 (App. Div. 1922); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Peet & Powers,
193 N.Y.S. 796 (App. Div. 1922); Gumbrell v. Clausen Flanagan Brewery, 192
N.Y.S. 451, 454 (App. Div. 1922); Slomka v. Nassau Elec. R.R., 182 N.Y.S. 156
(App. Div. 1920); S. & F. Serv. Inc. v. Motor Haulage Co., 201 N.Y.S. 683 (App.
Term 1923); Jennings v. Carling, 181 N.Y.S. 359 (App. Term 1920); Toombs v.
Texas Oil Co., 260 N.Y.S. 773 (City Ct. 1932). Cf. Zurich General Accident & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 171 N.E. 391 (N.Y. 1930).
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be accorded to statutes, ordinances and custom. The basic
rule, laid down by Cardozo in Martin v. Herzog,' was that
breach of a statute is "more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in itself."'65 This rule, which was
reiterated in many cases,'66 reflected the extreme deference
of New York judges during the 1920s and 1930s to
legislative alterations of the usually pro-business rules of
the common law. The consequence of the rule was that,
whenever reformers had sufficient political success to obtain enactment of legislation on their behalf, they could
count on the ready translation of that success into results in
individual cases."'
164. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
165. Id. at 815. Thus, in tort cases involving statutes, as the Court of Appeals
explained, "[nlo element of ordinary negligence" had to be shown since "[violation
of the statute itself becomes the actionable default." Moreover, as a procedural
matter, "[a] public statute... need not be pleaded," nor was "there any requirement that during the trial it shall be brought to the attention of the court or
opposing counsel." Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Prods. Mfg. Co.,
162 N.E. 84 (N.Y. 1928). Maintaining an action for negligence arising out of breach
of a statute thus required no proof of negligence other than the fact of breach of the
statute.
166. See Michalek v. United States Gypsum Co., 16 F. Supp. 708, 709
(W.D.N.Y. 1936); Homin v. Cleveland & Whitehall Co., 24 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y.
1939); Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939); Mazzu v. Darojo Realty Co., 13
N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1939); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 280
N.Y.S. 836, 841 (App. Div. 1935); Coe v. City of New York, 265 N.Y.S. 10, 12 (App.
Div. 1933); Lynn v. Hewit Pharmacies, Inc., 254 N.Y.S. 9 (App. Div. 1931); Bolivar
v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 726 (App. Div. 1931); Rounds v. Fitzgerald, 202 N.Y.S.
595, 598 (App. Div. 1924), affd, 147 N.E. 199 (N.Y. 1924); Kavanagh v. New York,
0. & W. Ry., 187 N.Y.S. 859,860 (App. Div. 1921); Wager v. State, 10 N.Y.S.2d 310
(Ct. Cl. 1939); M.H. Treadwell Co., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 287
N.Y.S. 49, 51 (Sup. Ct. 1936), affd, 293 N.Y.S. 928 (App. Div. 1937), rev'd on other
grounds,9 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1937). But see Clark v. Doolittle, 199 N.Y.S. 814 (App.
Div. 1923), affd, 199 N.Y.S. 814 (1923); Koffler v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 214 N.Y.S.
787, 789 (Mun. Ct. 1926).
167. As the court recognized in Martin v. Herzog, however, negligence liability
for breach of statutes was somewhat limited, and it was necessary for judges to be
on their "guard... against confusing the question of negligence with that of the
causal connection between the negligence and the injury." 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y.
1920). It was "only in the case where a violation of a statute... ha[d] such a direct
connection with the injury which ha[d] been received as to form and be a part of
the act causing the injury" that recovery for negligence could be had. Klinkenstein
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 158 N.E. 886, 887 (N.Y. 1927). See also Hamin v. Cleveland
& Whitehall Co., 24 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1939); LoGalbo v. Columbia Cas. Co., 255
N.Y.S. 502 (App. Div. 1932). In particular, the Court of Appeals held that engaging
in an activity for which a license was required without first obtaining one normally
would not constitute negligence absent a showing that the defendant lacked the
necessary skill to engage in the activity. See Klinkenstein v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.,
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Thus, legislation, a vital weapon in reform efforts to
institutionalize a new tort paradigm, received special treatment from New York judges during the 1920s and 1930s.
Local ordinances, in contrast, were given less weight than
statutes: violation of an ordinance did not constitute
negligence per se but was merely "some evidence of negli158 N.E. 886, 887 (N.Y. 1927); Corbett v. Scott, 152 N.E. 467 (N.Y. 1926); Brown v.
Shyne, 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1926). Similarly, the breach of a rule respecting the
operation of elevators was held not to be the cause of death of a man struck by an
ice box that fell out of an elevator. See Currie v. International Magazine Co., 175
N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1931). The absence of a hallway light required by the Tenement
House Law was held not to be the cause of a fall down a dark stairway when there
was "a total absence of proof of any causal connection between the accident and the
absence of light" Wolf v. Kaufmann, 237 N.Y.S. 550, 551 (App. Div. 1929), appeal
dismissed, 173 N.E. 882 (N.Y. 1930). Parking a truck on the wrong side of a street
was held not related to a death of a boy killed when the truck pulled away. See
Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpenter, 160 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1928). And removal of a
barrier for the purpose of doing work on an open elevator shaft ten minutes prior
to plaintiffs fall into the shaft was held not to be the cause of the fall. See Korfanta
v. Vanderbilt Ave. Realty Co., 184 N.Y.S. 503 (App. Div. 1920).
Nor would tort liability for breach of a statute arise unless the statute
disclosed "an intention" on the part of the legislature "that from disregard of a
statutory command a liability for resultant damages shall arise." Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 829 (N.Y. 1936). Determination
of the legislature's intention depended, in turn, on whether the duty under the
statute had been "imposed for the special benefit of a particular group of class of
persons" or "in the interest of the general public," id.; see also Pine Grove
Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Mfg. Co., 162 N.E. 84, 85 (N.Y.
1928), or alternatively on whether the statute altered or merely supplemented
an existing common law rule, see Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939).
For some judges, as least, this focus on legislative intention became a device to
hinder the reform agenda. In the view of one, for example, any statute alleged
to "create... [tort] liability where otherwise none would exist, or [to]
increase.., a common-law liability ... [should] be strictly construed." Sardo v.
Herlihy, 256 N.Y.S. 690, 693 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Others agreed, as they ruled that
a statute "intended to protect against a particular hazard" would not create
negligence liability when "a hazard of a different kind" occurred, DeHaen v.
Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 179 N.E. 764, 765 (N.Y. 1932) (dictum); that speeding
laws were inapplicable in the case of a vehicle out of control, see McCormick v.
Merritt, 250 N.Y.S. 443, 446-47 (App. Div. 1931); that a statutory provision
regarding passenger elevators was not applicable to freight elevators, see
Sarconi v. One Hundred and Twenty-Two West Twenty-Sixth St. Corp., 150
N.E. 137, 138 (N.Y. 1925); and that provisions in the Labor Law protecting a
business owner's employees did not apply when work was performed by an
independent contractor, see Iacono v. Frank & Frank Constr. Co., 182 N.E. 23,
24 (N.Y. 1932). But see Nasca v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church Soc. of
Dunkirk, 290 N.Y.S. 439 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 292 N.Y.S. 383 (App. Div.
1936); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Brandt Masonry Corp., 299 N.Y.S. 984
(App. Div. 1937) (noting a distinction where the contractor had agreed to
indemnify the owner).
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gence."'68 The same rule applied to administrative regulations,'69 and general usage or custom. 7 ° Custom was also
given less weight than statutes in the obvious way that
statutes could change the law, whereas custom could at
most supplement it." Moreover, the fact that a particular
litigant routinely followed a practice did not establish the
practice as a custom.'72 Private rules of a business entity
were also accorded little authority, and even that only if
they were known to and relied upon by the public.'
3. The Weight of Stare Decisis. At this point, a brief
recapitulation seems appropriate. We have seen that, as the
1920s began, tort law was witness to a conflict between a
traditional paradigm of tort liability, which permitted
compensation to be paid only when a person was injured
directly by another's wrongful act, and a newly emerging
reform paradigm, which held that victims of injury should
receive compensation from some source. During the 1920s
and into the 1930s, the conflicting paradigms related to the
legal system in complex ways. To understand the relationships, it is necessary to focus on three precise issues.
First, we must focus on the goal ofjudges with regard to
the paradigms. Led by Benjamin N. Cardozo, who served as
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals during much of the
168. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 197 N.E. 306, 308 (N.Y. 1935); see
also Hyland v. Cobb, 169 N.E. 401 (N.Y. 1929); Caminiti v. Matthews Constr. Co.,
272 N.Y.S. 245 (App. Div. 1934); Touris v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 240 N.Y.S. 225
(App. Div. 1930); Dodican v. Smith, 222 N.Y.S. 748 (App. Div. 1927); Palladino v.
Onondaga County Sav. Bank, 295 N.Y.S. 583 (Sup. Ct. 1937), affd, 8 N.Y.S.2d 773
(App. Div. 1938); Seitz v. Yates Lehigh Coal Co., 255 N.Y.S. 279 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
See also Reilly v. Gristede Bros., 276 N.Y.S. 194 (App. Div. 1934), affd, 198 N.E.
406 (N.Y. 1935). Of course, breach of an ordinance would be evidence of negligence
only if the ordinance was applicable to the activity at hand. See Garety v. Charles
Meads & Co., 286 N.Y.S. 297 (App. Div. 1936).
169. See Homin v. Cleveland & Whitehill Co., 24 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1939);
Schumer v. Caplin, 150 N.E. 139, 140 (N.Y. 1925); Moccia v. Pfaudler Co., 296
N.Y.S. 711 (App. Div. 1937).
170. See T.J. Hooper,.60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); National Land Co. v. City of
New York, 43 F.2d 914, 917 (2d Cir. 1930); Levine v. Russell Blaine Co., 7 N.E. 673
(N.Y. 1937); Welch v. Enright, 15 N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 1939).
171. See Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Lesher, Whitman & Co., 215 N.Y.S.
225, 229 (City Ct. 1926).
172. See In re Highlands Navigation Corp., 29 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1928).
173. See Taddeo v. Tilton, 289 N.Y.S. 427, 430 (App. Div. 1936) (dictum);
Krivitsky & Cohen, Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 221 N.Y.S. 525, 529 (Mun. Ct.
1927).
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period, most of the judiciary strove to accommodate both
paradigms. Cardozo, in particular, seems to have wanted
both to preserve the fairness values underlying the traditional paradigm while simultaneously incorporating significant elements of the reform program into the body of New
York case law.
Second, we need to inquire about the direction of legal
change during the years in question. To the extent that
courts reconsidered particular legal doctrines, they tended
to adopt the newer reform values rather than the older traditional ones. Thus, it seems clear that the direction of doctrinal development in New York tort law during the 1920s
and 1930s was toward the reform program and away from
classic nineteenth century values.
Third, we need to examine the overall pattern of legal
doctrine that confronted litigants during the decades in
question. Focusing on this issue, it seems clear that, as a
result of the doctrine of stare decisis, which meant that in
the absence of explicit reexamination old law remained in
place, litigants continued to confront mostly nineteenth
century rules. Whatever changes occurred as a result of the
efforts of reformers, they were overwhelmed in the larger
picture of 1920s and 1930s by established rules which remained in place through sheer inertia. We must turn now
to four sets of established rules, dealing with assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, tort liability of landowners,
and joint and vicarious liability, all of which continued to
reflect the traditional paradigm's concern that people be
held responsible only for harms they had directly caused.
a. Assumption of Risk. Pursuant to the doctrine of
assumption of risk, it was "well settled," for example, that
"an employee assumes the obvious risks of his employment."' Thus, no recovery could be had by a window cleaner injured as a result of the visible absence of hooks on a
window to which a safety belt could be attached. 5 or by a
volunteer who assisted in unloading a truck he was under
no duty to unload."76 Nor could participants in a sport such

174. Paquet v. Pictorial Review Holding Corp., 223 N.Y.S. 686, 691 (Mun. Ct.
1927).
175. See Dougherty v. Pratt Inst., 155 N.E. 67 (N.Y 1926).
176. See Mandala v. Wells, 209 N.Y.S. 35 (App. Div. 1925).
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as swimming 7 recover for hazards of which they were
aware. 178 In short, the archaic doctrine of assumption of risk
continued to bar many injury victims from obtaining damage recoveries, although with some amelioration as a result
of a ruling by the Court of Appeals that the doctrine typically raised an issue 7of
9 fact for the jury rather than a legal
defense for the court.
b. Contributory Negligence. Contributory negligence
was also a total bar to recovery. 8 ° Under New York law, the
plaintiff had the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence,"' except in wrongful death cases, where
the burden was on the defendant.' Normally contributory
negligence was treated as an issue of fact to be decided by
the jury,"' at least as long as the jury was instructed
177. See Curcio v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y 1937).
178. See Frieze v. Rosenthal, 269 N.Y.S. 1010 (App. Div. 1934), rev'g, 264
N.Y.S. 378 (Sup. Ct. 1933). However, a golf caddy did not assume the risk of being
struck by a ball which was hit by a player in violation of the game's practices. See
Povanda v. Powers, 272 N.Y.S. 619, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
179. See Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 171 N.E. 391
(N.Y. 1930), rev'g, 237 N.Y.S. 42 (App. Div. 1929).
180. See Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 21 N.E.2d 507, 509 (N.Y.
1939); see also Nitti v. East River Mill & Lumber Co., 206 N.Y.S. 237 (App. Div.
1924) (holding that in case involving claim of contributory negligence, inadequate
verdict resulting from apparent compromise by jurors had to be set aside).
Contributory negligence was a bar to recovery not only in a negligence action for
personal injuries but also in a suit for negligent misrepresentation, see Gould v.
Flato, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1938), but not in an action for "a willful or
wanton" or otherwise intentional wrong, Nefligar v. State, 197 N.Y.S. 820, 823 (Ct.
Cl. 1923), rev'd on othergrounds, 200 N.Y.S. 840 (App. Div. 1923); see also Fardette
v. New York & S. Ry., 180 N.Y.S. 179, 182 (App. Div. 1920) (dictum).
181. See Gloshinsky v. Bergen Milk Transp. Co., 17 N.E.2d 766, 768 (N.Y.
1938); Fitzpatrick v. Interl Ry., 169 N.E. 112 (N.Y. 1929); Walheim v. City of
Batavia, 12 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 1939); DeNisi v. J. Krugman Co., 10 N.Y.S.2d
681 (App. Div. 1939), affd, 24 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1939); Potruch v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. Co., 256 N.Y.S. 232 (App. Div. 1932); Wager v. State, 10 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Ct. Cl.
1939). But see Treacy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 292 N.Y.S. 767 (App. Div. 1937). But
cf.Whitehouse v. Single, 216 N.Y.S. 588 (App. Div. 1926) (holding that evidence on
plaintiffs appeal from nonsuit must be construed most favorably to plaintiff).
182. See Lee v. City Brewing Corp., 18 N.E.2d 628, 629 (N.Y. 1939); Schrader
v. New York, Chicago & St Louis R.R. Co., 172 N.E. 272, 273 (N.Y. 1930); see
generally Roche v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 224 N.Y.S. 656 (App. Div. 1927);
Grimm v. Maurocordato, 181 N.Y.S. 609 (App. Div. 1920). "Absence of contributory
negligence [was] as much a part of the cause of action as the negligence of the
defendant." Drennan v. Dansville & Mt. Morris R.R. Co., 292 N.Y.S. 91, 92 (App.
Div. 1936), affid, 12 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1937).
183. See Bauman v. Black & White Town Taxis Co., 263 F. 554 (2d Cir. 1920);
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specifically with reference to the facts of the case before it.'
Recognizing that "[elach case is governed by its own condi-

tions and circumstances" and that "[n]o two crossing acci-

Hanson v. McGraw-Hill Co., 152 N.E. 407 (N.Y. 1926); Kruger v. T. Hogan & Son,
138 N.E. 23 (N.Y. 1923); Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 135 N.E. 272
(N.Y. 1922); Rutledge v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1939);
Burke v. Bond & Mortgage Guar. Corp., 7 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div. 1938); Miller v.
M & D Holding Corp., 299 N.Y.S. 496 (App. Div. 1937), affd, 14 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y.
1938); Cleary v. Sweeney Realty Corp., 291 N.Y.S. 570 (App. Div. 1936); Smith v.
D'Esposito, 291 N.Y.S. 372 (App. Div. 1936); Zaino v. Frutkin, 290 N.Y.S. 907 (App.
Div. 1936); Kaufinan v. John Abramson & Co., 288 N.Y.S. 305 (App. Div. 1936);
Brinkerhoff v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 283 N.Y.S. 109 (App. Div. 1935); Egan v.
Werfel, 282 N.Y.S. 834 (App. Div. 1935); Sherman v. Leicht, 264 N.Y.S. 492 (App.
Div. 1933); Simpson v. Fiero, 260 N.Y.S. 323 (App. Div. 1932), affd, 188 N.E. 20
(N.Y. 1933); Rix v. Siegel, 257 N.Y.S. 345 (App. Div. 1932), affd, 185 N.E. 748
(N.Y. 1933); Hine v. Aird-Don Co., 250 N.Y.S. 75 (App. Div. 1931); Galletta v.
Taylor-Fichter Steel Constr. Co., 249 N.Y.S. 581 (App. Div. 1931); United States
Gas. Co. v. Chieffetz, 249 N.Y.S. 279 (App. Div. 1931); Peck v. Wel, 248 N.Y.S. 468
(App. Div. 1931); Reiss v. City of New York, 246 N.Y.S. 302 (App. Div. 1930); Crist
v. Art Metal Works, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (App. Div. 1930), afTd, 175 N.E. 341 (N.Y.
1931); Touris v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 240 N.Y.S. 225 (App. Div. 1930); Berman
v. R.S. & Z. Realty Corp., 236 N.Y.S. 576 (App. Div. 1929); Underhill v. Major, 221
N.Y.S. 123 (App. Div. 1927), affld, 161 N.E. 168 (N.Y. 1928); Whitehouse v. Single,
216 N.Y.S. 588 (App. Div. 1926); Conrow v. Snyder, 214 N.Y.S. 410 (App. Div.
1926); Kolanko v. Erie R.R. Co., 212 N.Y.S. 714 (App. Div. 1925); Dunston v.
Greenberger, 200 N.Y.S. 426 (App. Div. 1923); Bellatonti v. Thomas & Buckley
Hoisting Co., 196 N.Y.S. 667 (App. Div. 1922); Lang v. Hay Foundry & Iron Works,
197 N.Y.S. 277 (App. Term 1922); Mayo v. Sherwood, 13 N.Y.S.2d 899 (County Ct.
1939). Cf. Read v. New York City Airport, 259 N.Y.S. 245 (Mun. Ct. 1932). But see
Holland v. Turner, 134 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1921).
184. See Dydkiewicz v. Unterberg Realty Corp., 226 N.Y.S. 698, 701 (App. Div.
1928); see generally Richardson v. Nassau Elec. R.R. Co., 180 N.Y.S. 109 (App. Div.
1920). This was true even when a plaintiff committed an error of judgment in an
emergency, see Kolanko v. Erie R.R. Co., 212 N.Y.S. 714 (App. Div. 1925); Van
Dusen v. State, 182 N.Y.S. 15 (Ct. Cl. 1920); when a plaintiff was riding without
permission in a vehicle struck by the defendant's vehicle, see Baker v. Dingwell
Bros., 147 N.E. 194 (N.Y. 1924); or when a plaintiff entered an elevator shaft
without looking, see Borger v. Kane, 8 F.2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), affd, Kane v.
Borgio, 12 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1926); Lessin v. Bd. of Educ., 161 N.E. 160 (N.Y.
1928); Christensen v. James S. Hannon, Inc., 129 N.E. 655 (N.Y. 1920); cf. Laufer
v. Shapiro, 206 N.Y.S. 189 (App. Div. 1924); Hluboky v. 1726 Davidson Ave. Corp.,
286 N.Y.S. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1935), affd, 286 N.Y.S. 281 (App. Div. 1936); although not
when a plaintiff entered a dark stairwell marked "private," see Rowell v. John
Hutzler Lumber Co., 239 N.Y.S. 192 (App. Div. 1930), affd, 175 N.E. 322 (N.Y.
1930); climbed a fire escape without following directions, see Roth v. Mitteldorf,
287 N.Y.S. 533 (App. Div. 1936); struck her head against an automobile lift in
plain view, see Losie v. Frisk, 278 N.Y.S. 25 (App. Div. 1935); or crossed a street
without looking, see McGuire v. New York Ry. Co., 128 N.E. 905 (N.Y. 1920);
Lichtbach v. Kelbach, 186 N.Y.S. 126 (App. Term 1921). But see New York Tel. Co,
v. Beckers, 30 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1929).
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dents are identical," the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam
opinion probably written by Chief Judge Cardozo, thus
refused to be "influenced by the 'stop, look and listen' rule
which was carried to such
an extreme in Baltimore &
185
O.R.R. Co. v. Goodman."
There were occasional ameliorations of the rule that
contributory negligence totally barred a plaintiffs recovery,
such as the doctrine of last clear chance' and the statutory
185. Schrader v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis. R.R. Co., 172 N.E. 272, 274
(N.Y. 1930). Although its "rule of conduct [was] not standardized," the court had
nonetheless "stated repeatedly" that "[olne who approaches any crossing, at any
time, or under any circumstances, without taking any precautions for his safety, is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law." Id. The Court of Appeals
adhered to the general rule that the issue of contributory negligence is one of fact
for the jury even in cases where young children were plaintiffs. See Camardo v.
New York State Ry., 159 N.E. 879 (N.Y. 1928); see also LaRosa v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 278 N.Y.S. 368 (App. Div. 1935). But, once ajury found a plaintiff to be an
infant, "that plaintiff [was] not held to such a high degree of care as an adult," but
was required only "to exercise a degree of care commensurate with her age and
capacity." Sheffield v. Yager, 11 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (App. Div. 1939); see also
Gloshinsky v. Bergen Milk Transp. Co., 17 N.E.2d 766, 768 (N.Y. 1938); Armstrong
v. Rapp, 1 N.Y.S.2d 219, 222 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Cf. Sherman v. Millard, 259 N.Y.S.
415, 421 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (person "in a dazed condition" held not to be "a responsible
human being" and thus not "guilty of contributory negligence"), rev'd in part on
othergrounds, Sherman v. Leicht, 264 N.Y.S. 492 (App. Div. 1933). Note, however,
that a plaintiff of "advanced age" was held to the ordinary standard of reasonable
care. See Von Hulse v. Schmiemann, 223 N.Y.S. 921 (App. Div. 1927). There was
one important exception to the pattern of deference to juries in cases involving
children. That exception occurred in cases holding that parents as a matter of law
were not guilty of contributory negligence when they entrusted their children to
caretakers, see Longacre v. Yonkers R.R. Co., 140 N.E. 215 (N.Y. 1923), or sent
them to school in the custody of older children, see Lamb v. Farrell, 209 N.Y.S. 365
(Sup. Ct. 1925).
186. See Dino v. Eastern Glass Co., 246 N.Y.S. 306 (App. Div. 1930). In cases
where New York courts applied the doctrine of last clear chance, the defendant
was in a better position to foresee and prevent harm than was the plaintiff. The
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable unless the defendant had actual
knowledge of the plaintiffs peril in sufficient time to take steps to avert injury. See
Jerrell v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 68 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1934); Storr v. New York
Cent. R.R., 185 N.E. 407 (N.Y. 1933); Woloszynowski v. New York Cent. R.R. Co.,
172 N.E. 471 (N.Y. 1930); Snyder v. Union Ry. Co., 255 N.Y.S. 155 (App. Div.
1932); Trbovich v. Burke, 255 N.Y.S. 100 (App. Div. 1932); Frazier v. Reinman, 245
N.Y.S. 32 (App. Div. 1930), affd, 177 N.E. 168 (N.Y. 1931). Knowledge of the
plaintiffs peril was required, even though it could be proved by circumstantial
evidence. See Srogi v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 12 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 1939);
Srogi v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 286 N.Y.S. 215 (App. Div. 1936). But the
doctrine of last clear chance would not apply if the plaintiff could prove only that
the defendant should have had knowledge of his peril or when the negligence of
both parties was simultaneous. See Panarese v. Union Ry. Co., 185 N.E. 84 (N.Y.
1933). The doctrine also did not apply in the case of a bailment, as when an
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rule transforming contributory negligence into comparative
negligence in FELA cases. 87 Nonetheless, rules of contributory negligence protected by the doctrine of stare decisis
continued to bar recovery for many prospective plaintiffs.
c. Liability of Landowners. Probably the most important set of nineteenth century, pro-defendant rules concerned the duty of landowners toward strangers entering
upon their land. Black letter law divided the strangers into
three categories-invitees, licensees and trespassers.
Invitees were defined as people present on the premises

automobile owner parked his car in a garage and both parties were negligent in
leaving the keyin the ignition. See Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 9 N.Y.S.2d
1018 (City Ct. 1938). Nor did it apply in a case where the plaintiff was not
negligent. See Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 198 N.E. 629 (N.Y. 1935).
187. See Healy v. Erie R.R. Co., 180 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1932); Caldine v. Unadilla
Valley Ry. Co., 159 N.E. 172 (N.Y. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 278 U.S. 139
(1928); Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 248 N.Y.S. 15 (App. Div. 1931), rev'd on
other grounds, 181 N.E. 11 (N.Y. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 288 U.S. 275
(1933); Barry v. Boston & M.R.R., 229 N.Y.S. 378 (App. Div. 1928); Straker v. Erie
R.R., 201 N.Y.S. 243 (App. Div. 1923); Tuell v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 196 N.Y.S.
883 (App. Div. 1922). The same rule also applied under the Federal Safety
Appliance Act. See Lierness v. Long Island R.R. Co., 216 N.Y.S. 656 (App. Div.
1926). But see Van Derveer v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co., 84 F.2d 979, 981-82 (2d
Cir. 1936) (holding that worker whose negligence consisted in violating rule of
railroad totally barred from recovery). Some diminution of damages was
mandatory once contributory negligence was found. See Sherry v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 17 (App. Div. 1936). The deduction had to be the same for all
elements of its verdict, such as that for pain and suffering and that for pecuniary
loss. See Long v. Payne, 190 N.Y.S. 803 (App. Div. 1921). Although not required, it
was better practice for the court to ask the jury to state the percentages of
negligence contributed by plaintiff and defendant. See Wolf v. Baltimore & O.R.R.
Co., 267 N.Y.S. 199 (App. Div. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 189 N.E. 780 (N.Y.
1934). A preliminary question in FELA cases was always whether the injured
worker had been engaged in interstate commerce so as to make the federal act
applicable. See Borelli v. Interl Ry. Co., 147 N.E. 356 (N.Y. 1925); Hendricks v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 231 N.Y.S. 375 (App. Div. 1928), rev'd on other
grounds, 167 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1929).
188. The rules discussed in this section applied only to persons in possession
and control of premises. A landowner who parted with both possession and control
of his premises had no duty to anyone for injuries occurring or resulting from
activities on the premises. See Potter v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 185 N.E. 708 (N.Y.
1933). Instead, the party who assumed possession and control also assumed the
duty. This rule applied both to a mortgagee in possession of property, though not to
a mere receiver of rents and profits, and to a tenant charged with maintenance of
the premises. See Mortimer v. East Side Sav. Bank, 295 N.Y.S. 695 (App. Div.
1937); Weson v. Neujan Bldg. Corp., 190 N.E. 648 (N.Y. 1934); Appel v. Muller,
186 N.E. 785 (N.Y. 1933).
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for the purposes of the owner.189 As such, their susceptibility
to injury could readily be foreseen. Included within the category of invitee were a customer or _patron in a store, 9 '
restaurant, 9' park, 92 public library,' public swimming
pool,'94 parking garage9 or livery stable;' 96 a person delivering goods to a landowner;'97 an employee or applicant
for a job;. or an employee of a contractor performing work
on the owner's premises. 199 A child of an employee who was
present at the workplace with the employer's consent was
also an invitee,.. as was a child playing at the home of a
189. See Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94 F.2d 170, 171 (2d Cir. 1938);
Radoslavich v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 72 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1934).
190. See Powers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 295 N.Y.S. 712 (App. Div. 1937),
affd, 12 N.E.2d 595 (N.Y. 1937); McNally v. Oakwood, 206 N.Y.S. 759 (App. Div.
1924), affd, 148 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1925); Tryon v. Chalmers, 200 N.Y.S. 362 (App.
Div. 1923). Cf. Lewis-Kures v. Edward R. Walsh & Co., 102 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1939)
(including a former post office which plaintiff reasonably believed yet to be open);
Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 127 N.E. 491 (N.Y. 1920) (including a fireman using
driveway built as means of entry to defendanfs business); Petluck v. McGohick
Realty Co., 268 N.Y.S. 782 (App. Div. 1934) (including as invitee a representative
of a prospective purchaser of the entire business).
191. See Frey v. Russian Village, Inc., 72 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1934); Damilitis v.
Keijas Lunch Corp., 300 N.Y.S. 574 (City Ct. 1937).
192. Cf. Dorsey v. Chautauqua Inst., 196 N.Y.S. 798 (App. Div. 1922) (including public recreation grounds for which admission charged).
193. See LaMarca v. Brooklyn Pub. Library, 10 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1939).
194. See Esposito v. St. George Swimming Club, Inc., 255 N.Y.S. 794 (Mun. Ct.
1932).
195. See Hamblet v. Buffalo Library Garage Co., 225 N.Y.S. 716 (App. Div.
1927); Warner v. Lucey, 201 N.Y.S. 658 (App. Div. 1923), affd, 144 N.E. 924 (N.Y.
1924).
196. See Storms v. Lane, 227 N.Y.S. 482 (App. Div. 1928). Cf Getlar v.
Rubinstein, 11 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (riding stables at camp held agency by
estoppel of camp), afftd, 16 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 1939).
197. See Dack v. Trustees of Peekskill Military Academy, 286 N.Y.S. 48 (App.
Div. 1936); Adams v. Misena Realty Co., 267 N.Y.S. 869 (App. Div. 1933).
198. See Mideastern Contracting Corp. v. O'Toole, 55 F.2d 909, 910 (2d Cir.
1932); Standard Oil Co. v. Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 25 F.2d 339 (E.D.N.Y.
1928), affd, 32 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1929).
199. See O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1929); Ferro v. Leopold
Sinsheimer Estate, Inc., 176 N.E. 817, 818 (N.Y. 1931); Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng.
Co., 175 N.E. 123, 124-126, (N.Y. 1931); DeLee v. T.J. Pardy Constr. Co., 162 N.E.
599 (N.Y. 1928); Hinkley v. John E. Redman Sand & Gravel Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d
875 (App. Div. 1939); Marino v. Farrell, 194 N.Y.S. 356 (App. Div. 1922), afTd, 139
N.E. 715 (N.Y. 1923). Cf Hudson v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 166 N.E. 306 (N.Y.
1929) (woman delivering sewing to a church, for which service she was paid).
200. See Kerr v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 299 N.Y.S. 995 (App. Div. 1937); DiBiase
v. Ewart & Lake, Inc., 240 N.Y.S. 132 (App. Div. 1930), affd, 175 N.E. 339 (N.Y.
1931). Cf. Hume v. Ten Eyck, 280 N.Y.S. 808 (App. Div. 1935) (holding that elderly
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friend."°' A plaintiff claiming the status of invitee had the
burden of proving the requisite facts.2 2
A landowner owed an invitee a duty of reasonable care
and was obliged to make its premises reasonably safe. 3
This requirement was totally consistent with the general
standard of foreseeability. According to Chief Judge
Cardozo, it was not one of "[e]xtraordinary prevision"
gained by "[l]ooking back at the mishap with the wisdom
born of the event," but "only the ordinary prevision to be
looked for in a busy world."2 4 Thus, premises had to be
made "reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was
accustomed to be used," not for every "unexpected or unheard of event, or... every possible accident which might
occur."20 5 An owner of an apartment house, for example, was

required only "to guard the one invited from dangers known
to the owner, but not to the invitee" and was "not required
to reconstruct or alter his premises to remove known or
obvious dangers,"2

6

although "[o]ne entering a store, thea-

ter, office building, or hotel [was] entitled to expect that far
greater preparations to secure his safety will be made than
one entering a private building[,]"2 °7 apparently on the
theory that "'those who collect numbers of people in one
place, for gain and profit, [must] be vigilant in their efforts
to protect such

people[.]' 2

°

Whether a landowner had

fulfilled the duty of reasonable care to an invitee was a

parent of employee was within protected class). But see Duschnik v. Deco
Restaurants, Inc., 12 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that no protection extended
to friend of employee present at workplace without employer's permission).
201. See Bergman v. Feitelowitz, 1 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 1938), rev'd on
other grounds,16 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 1938).
202. See Heinrichs v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 290 N.Y.S. 620 (App. Div.
1936); Minnelli v. Marotta, 208 N.Y.S. 238 (App. Div. 1925). The jury, of course,
decided the issue of fact. See Hochman v. Aronowitz, 297 N.Y.S. 429 (App. Div.
1937); Nagler v. James Butler, Inc., 202 N.Y.S. 527 (App. Div. 1924).
203. See Miller v. Gimbel Bros, Inc., 186 N.E. 410 (N.Y. 1933); Cook v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 278 N.Y.S. 777 (App. Div. 1935), aff'd, 198 N.E. 423 (N.Y.
1935); Aloia v. Berkowitz, 274 N.Y.S. 426 (App. Div. 1934); Stark v. Franklin
Simon & Co., 260 N.Y.S. 691 (App. Div. 1932); De Lee v. T.J. Pardy Constr. Co.,
226 N.Y.S. 345, 348 (App. Div. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 162 N.E. 599 (N.Y.
1928); OToole v. Thousand Island Park Ass'n, 200 N.Y.S. 502 (App. Div. 1923).
204. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
205. Polemanakos v. Cohn, 256 N.Y.S. 5 (App. Div. 1932).
206. Lindsleyv. Stem, 197 N.Y.S. 106 (App. Div. 1922).
207. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr. Co., 248 N.Y.S. 491, 492 (App. Div.
1931) (dictum), rev'd on othergrounds, 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
208. Schubart v. Hotel Astor, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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question of fact for a jury,"9 with decisions being made both
against plaintiffs,21 ° especially in slip and fall
for and
21 1
cases.

People who were not invitees were either trespassers or
209. See Friedman v. Neufeld, 282 N.Y.S. 664 (App. Div. 1935); Perricone v.
Abramo, 245 N.Y.S. 690 (App. Div. 1930); Burns v. Frederica Gusenburger & Son,
Inc., 207 N.Y.S. 189 (App. Term 1924).
210. For decisions in favor of plaintiffs, see Eustace v. Evergreens, 196 N.E.
560 (N.Y. 1935) (favoring plaintiff who was injured in defendants cemetery); Kane
v. Couch, 4 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. Div. 1938) (favoring plaintiffs with injuries
resulting from weak fire escape); Larrison v. Salisbury, 1 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div.
1938) (favoring plaintiffs with injuries resulting from unguarded trap door);
Loturco v. Turco, 292 N.Y.S. 230 (App. Div. 1936) (favoring plaintiffs injured in
open cellarway); HIluboky v. 1726 Davidson Ave. Corp., 286 N.Y.S. 281 (App. Div.
1936); Kleiman v. Feldstein, 254 N.Y.S. 649 (App. Div. 1932) (favoring plaintiffs
injured in open cellar); Sarapin v. S. & S. Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 204 N.Y.S.
778 (App. Div. 1924) (favoring plaintiffs injured by discarded machinery);
O'Connor v. Kulerban Holding Corp., 274 N.Y.S. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (finding for
plaintiffs injured by weak fence); Hyde v. Maison Hortense, Inc., 229 N.Y.S. 666
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (favoring plaintiffs injured in unguarded elevator shaft). For
decisions in favor of defendants, see Goldsmith v. Dickes, 295 N.Y.S. 180 (App. Div.
1937) (favoring defendants injured by bicycle in hallway); Robinson v. O.J. Gude
Co., 197 N.Y.S. 292 (App. Div. 1922) (finding for defendant where plaintiff injured
by falling dumb-waiter).
211. For decisions in favor of plaintiffs, see Mulac v. Greentree Homes, Inc., 11
N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 1939); Welden v. E.B. Meyrowitz, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 265
(App. Div. 1938); Geiger v. Voorhees, 300 N.Y.S. 849 (App. Div. 1937); Thompson v.
Palladino, 294 N.Y.S. 461 (App. Div. 1937); Laundrie v. W.T. Grant Co., 272 N.Y.S.
630 (App. Div. 1934); Wheeler v. Deutch, 272 N.Y.S. 161 (App. Div. 1934);
McDonald v. Louis K Liggett Co., 272 N.Y.S. 95 (App. Div. 1934); Clark v. New
York Hotel Statler Co., 227 N.Y.S. 671 (App. Div. 1928); Beech v. Weber, 206
N.Y.S. 718 (App. Term. 1924); Bussue v. Wagner Leasing Co., 202 N.Y.S. 711 (App.
Term, 1924); Baractaris v. Hofmann, 292 N.Y.S. 367 (City Ct. 1936). For decisions
in favor of defendants, see Antenen v. New York Tel. Co., 2 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1936);
Kmeth v. Delehanty, 195 N.E. 218 (N.Y. 1935); Lobsenz v. Rubinstein, 15 N.Y.S.2d
848 (App. Div. 1939), affd, 28 N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 1940); Mona v. Erion, 228 N.Y.S.
533 (App. Div. 1928); Kern v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 204 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div.
1924); Wentz v. J.J. Newberry Co., 273 N.Y.S. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1934), affd, 280 N.Y.S.
824 (App. Div. 1935). Similarly, courts held that a child, while a customer in a
meat market, who lost three fingers in a grinding machine, was negligent as a
matter of law if he was suijuris and that his mother's negligence barred recovery if
he was not. See Kwiatkousky v. Nadolny, 226 N.Y.S. 672 (App. Div. 1928), affd,
162 N.E. 543 (N.Y. 1928). See also Connelly v. Carrig, 154 N.E. 829 (N.Y. 1926)
(barring recovery for child who lost finger in coffee grinder). On the other hand, a
homeowner who waited more than four hours on a Sunday to remove snow from
her stoop was held not negligent since "the day was Sunday, when it is not usual
or easy to employ labor." Green v. Green, 208 N.Y.S. 689 (App. Div. 1925); see also
McAuley v. United Cigar Stores of America, 198 N.Y.S. 154 (App. Div. 1923)
(finding no negligence in failing to clear snow late at night "when outdoor labor
customarily ceases work for the day"), affd, 142 N.E. 313 (N.Y. 1923).
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licensees. What distinguished a licensee from a trespasser
was that the licensee was present on premises with the
"acquiescence" of the owner.2 A licensee was distinguished

from an invitee, in turn, by the fact that an invitee "must
come for a purpose connected with the business in which
the occupant is engaged," and there "must be at least some
mutuality of interest in the subject to which the [invitee's]
business relates." 13 The fact that the "[p]laintiff had been
invited by defendant to the building where he was hurt"214
would not suffice to make the plaintiff an invitee. Thus, a
person who came to premises as a social guest,2"' as a
salesperson or peddler,"16 or to make some other gratuitous
use of the premises217 was a licensee rather than an invitee.
Even a fireman had the status of a mere licensee.2 8
All courts agreed that a landowner was not liable to a
licensee for an injury resulting from a defect in the premises attributable only to negligence on the part of the own-

er; the only duty to a licensee to which all courts would hold

a landowner was to refrain "from inflicting intentional,
wanton, or willful injuries."219 Two cases also indicated that
212. Donohue v. Erie County Say. Bank, 15 N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1939).
213. Brister v. Flatbush Leasing Corp., 195 N.Y.S. 424,428 (App. Div. 1922).
214. Johnson v. Cerretta Dietrich, Inc., 4 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1938)
(dissenting opinion), affd, 18 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1930).
215. See Coughlin v. Jones, 1 N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1937); Klein v. Ramapo
Park, Inc., 1 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1938); Meyer v. Pleshkopf, 295 N.Y.S. 341
(App. Div. 1937), affd, 13 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1937).
216. See Stacy v. Shapiro, 209 N.Y.S. 305 (App. Div. 1925); Wolf v. Hotel
Operating Assocs. Inc., 180 N.Y.S. 547 (App. Term. 1920); Reuter v. Kenmore Bldg.
Co., 276 N.Y.S. 545 (City Ct. 1934). But see Katz v. Strauss, 199 N.Y.S. 687 (App.
Term. 1923) (holding that a jury could enter a verdict in favor of a peddler whom
an inhabitant of a tenement house had invited to the house on business).
217. See Simmons v. Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank, 7 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1938)
(holding that a child playing with permission on roof of building was a licensee),
affd, 25 N.E.2d 977 (N.Y. 1940); Griffin v. State, 295 N.Y.S. 304 (App. Div. 1937)
(holding a tourist at state park to be a licensee); Poock v. Strahl, 261 N.Y.S. 48
(App. Div. 1932) (holding as a licensee a friend of factory employee returning from
errand for the employee); Fischer v. Amity Harbor Corp., 261 N.Y.S. 41 (App. Div.
1932) (finding as a licensee a user of pathway to a beach); Morrison v. Hotel
Rutledge Co., 193 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1922) (holding as a licensee a former hotel
employee permitted to stay overnight in room after discharge); Avery v. Morse, 267
N.Y.S. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (holding as licensee a child swimming with permission
in neighbor's residential pool).
218. See Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th Street Corp., 12 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div.
1939).
219. See Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 179 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1932); Sanders v. Jacob
Rand Realty Corp., 272 N.Y.S. 745, 747 (App. Div. 1934); Rosado v. Perch Realty
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landowners would be liable to licensees for injuries caused
by pitfalls or hidden dangers, such as spring guns or
kindred devices,"2 ' while other cases declared that landowners also had a duty to refrain from affirmative acts of negligence,22' such as "enticing" a licensee "into places where
there were inherently dangerous objects."222 The rules limiting the liability of landowners to licensees did not apply,
however, when one licensee inured another licensee on
land owned by some third party.
Trespassers-a category that comprised all who failed
to sustain the burden of proving that they were either invitees or licensees"2 4 -constituted the third group of strangers present on the land of another. "Toward mere trespassers," whose presence could not be foreseen, "the rule
[was] well settled that the only duty owing to them by the
owner... [was] to abstain from inflicting intentional, wanton or willful injuries." 5 The rule was applied with special
Corp., 267 N.Y.S. 561, 563 (App. Div. 1933); Klippel v. Weil, 198 N.Y.S. 13, 14
(App. Div. 1923).
220. See Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 179 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1932); Campbell v.
DaParma, 183 N.Y.S. 679 (App. Div. 1920).
221. See Paquet v. Barker, 293 N.Y.S. 983 (App. Div. 1937); Rosado v. Perch
Realty Corp., 267 N.Y.S. 561 (App. Div. 1933).
222. Parkes v. New York Tel. Co., 198 N.Y.S. 698, 702 (Sup. Ct. 1923), affd,
201 N.Y.S. 930 (App. Div. 1923).
223. Cavanaugh v. People's Gas & Elec. Co., 254 N.Y.S. 835 (App. Div. 1932).
224. See Fey v. Wolf, 9 N.Y.S.2d 493,494 (App. Div. 1939).
225. Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 199 N.E. 56, 60 (N.Y. 1935); see also Breeze
v. City of New York, 292 N.Y.S. 716 (App. Div. 1937), affd, 11 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y.
1937); Gallagher v. Fordham & Lording Corp., 13 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (City Ct.
1939). Of course, a few exceptions existed to the rule of no duty to trespassers. The
first exception was that a plaintiff injured by a defendant while trespassing on the
land of a third person could recover from the defendant, though not from the third
person. See Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 199 N.E. 56, 59-60 (N.Y. 1935). Similarly
a landowner was liable to a plaintiff whom he injured while the plaintiff was
travelling on a public highway, see Boylhart v. DiMarco & Reimann, 200 N.E. 793,
794-795 (N.Y. 1936); Klepper v. Seymour House Corp. of Ogdensburg, 158 N.E. 29,
31 (N.Y. 1927); Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 898, 900 (N.Y. 1921);
cf. Danna v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 300 N.Y.S. 437 (App. Div. 1937)
(holding defendant liable for public passageway on defendant's land), affd, 14
N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1938); but see Frank v. Muller, 193 N.Y.S. 416 (App. Div. 1922)
(holding landowner not liable for injuries occurring on a public way as a result of
negligent conditions thereon), affid, 139 N.E. 726 (N.Y. 1923); even if the injury
resulted when the plaintiff "by a slight deviation" incidentally trespassed on the
defendant's land. Bennett v. City of Mount Vernon, 276 N.Y.S. 205, 207-08 (App.
Div. 1934) (dictum). A question that arose with some frequency was whether a
person maintaining a depression adjacent to a public way was liable to a passerby
who fell into it. Cf Bryan v. Hines, 281 N.Y.S. 420 (App. Div. 1935) (finding
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harshness to child trespassers playing upon facilities such
as railroad tracks 226 elevators, 22 unfinished buildings, 228 fac'
230
tory machinery,,22 steel towers,
' and reservoirs,231 even
when the child had entered the premises through an open
gate 2 or with permission from a watchman. 23 3 As the Court
of Appeals ruled, "the so-called doctrine of attractive
nuisance [simply did] not apply in New York." 34 To hold
defendants to a higher duty of care toward trespassers
would be "inefficient" and would "impose an unreasonable
burden." As Judge Irving Lehman remarked for the Court
of Appeals, the "play of boys" was "not without its hazards,"
and "it may hardly be said that the defendant was under a
duty to protect the children from possibility of a fall from a
flight of steps which presented no
2 3 6 dangers greater than
boys encounter in their usual play."
As Judge Lehman's remarks and the many other cases
cited above show, the ancient rules limiting the liability of
landowners continued to protect property owners from
defendant liable), with Kraus v. Wolf, 171 N.E. 63 (N.Y. 1930) (finding defendant
not liable). Thus, a landowner was liable for golf balls or bullets shot out of his land
into a public way, see Ford v. Grand Union Co., 197 N.E. 266 (N.Y. 1935); Gleason

v. Hilcrest Golf Course, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 886 (Mun. Ct. 1933); unless the person
who took the shot was a trespasser in respect to whom the landowner could not

foresee any danger, see De Ryss v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.E.2d 788 (N.Y.
1937).

226. See Di Caprio v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 746 (N.Y. 1921).
227. See Countias v. Thomas, 285 N.Y.S. 906 (App. Div. 1936).
228. See Olsen v. Fennia Realty Co., 159 N.E. 684 (N.Y. 1927).
229. See Fabisiak v. Empire Steel Partition Co., 238 N.Y.S. 298 (App. Div.
1929), affd, 175 N.E. 327 (N.Y. 1931).
230. See Brown v. American Mfg. Co., 205 N.Y.S. 331 (App. Div. 1924).
231. See Jaffy v. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R., 192 N.Y.S. 852 (Sup. Ct.
1922).
232. See Basmajian v. Bd.of Educ. of City of New York, 207 N.Y.S. 298 (App.
Div. 1925).
233. See Cunningham v. City of Niagara Falls, 272 N.Y.S. 720 (App. Div.
1934).
234. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19 N.E.2d 981, 983 (N.Y. 1939); see also
Hockstein v. Congregation Talmud Torah Sons of Israel, 258 N.Y.S. 479 (App.
Term 1932). But see New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Fruchter, 271
F. 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1921) (holding state rule inapplicable in federal court), rev'd on
othergrounds,260 U.S. 141 (1922).
235. Cunningham v. City of Niagara Falls, 272 N.Y.S. 720, 723 (App. Div.
1934).
236. O'Callaghan v. Commonwealth Eng'g Corp., 159 N.E. 884, 885-86 (N.Y.
1928). An exception, perhaps, was that an owner might be liable to a trespassing
child whom he knew to be playing in a dangerous fashion on his land. Grant v.
Hausman, 261 N.Y.S. 595 (App. Div. 1933).
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liability and to prevent injury victims from recovering damages. In regard to landowner liability, in short, the doctrine
of stare decisis and the old common law rules continued to
produce especially harsh results.
d. Vicarious and Joint Liability. The final body of
ancient, generally pro-defendant law arose in regard to doctrines of joint and vicarious liability. The basic starting rule
was that, except for statutory extensions, "a person [was]
responsible only for his own torts,"237 and then only to the
individual who was injured.238 There were other exceptions
to this general rule, however, and expansive interpretations
of those exceptions would have had a tendency to undermine the basic pro-defendant rule. On the whole, though,
the exceptions were construed narrowly during the 1920s
and 1930s.
The first exception arose in "[tihe case of master and
servant," where "the negligence of the servant, while acting
within the scope of his employment, [was] imputable to the
master." 9 Cases of master and servant which gave rise to
vicarious liability had to be distinguished, however, from
cases involving independent contractors. Thus, a general
contractor was not liable for the torts of a subcontractor if
the general had delegated all its duties to the sub and had
surrendered all control and superintendence. 240 A contractor
was also not liable for the general maintenance of the land
on which it was working, 24 for work it had completed once
237. Hennessy v. Walker, 17 N.E.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. 1938).
238. City of New Yorkv. Barbato, 5 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (Mun. Ct. 1938).
239. Dunne v. Contenti, 4 N.Y.S.2d 148, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1938), affd, 9 N.Y.S.2d
248 (App. Div. 1959); see also Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 199
N.Y.S. 9 (App. Div. 1923).
240. See Beierwalter v. C.P. Ward, Inc., 10 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1939);
Simovich v. Fillmore Gardens Corp., 279 N.Y.S. 58 (App. Div. 1935); Sieger v.
William L. Crow Constr. Co., 257 N.Y.S. 774 (App. Div. 1932); Cavanaugh v. C.P.
Boland Co., 268 N.Y.S. 390, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1933). Cf. Hayes v. Borup, 279 N.Y.S.
563 (App. Div. 1935) (holding that owner not liable for negligence of general
contractor in absence of control). But see Rosenholz v. Frank G. Shattuck Co., 183
N.Y.S. 23 (App. Term 1920) (holding owner liable pursuant to municipal
ordinance). A general contractor or owner seeking to escape liability for the
negligence of a subcontractor had the burden of proving that it had surrendered
full control. See Hooey v. Airport Constr. Co., 171 N.E. 752 (N.Y. 1930); Schmidt v.
Stern, 196 N.Y.S. 727 (App. Term 1922).
241. See Hanniball v. Franco Am. Baking Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 153 (App. Div.
1933), affd, 189 N.E. 726 (N.Y. 1934). Landowners might, however, be required to
maintain the worksite in a reasonably safe condition for employees of a general
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that work had been accepted by the owner,242 or for work it
performed in accordance with plans which the owner had
provided.24 Nor was a vendor of realty liable to people
injured on the property after it had4 been sold and possession had been delivered to a vendee.1
The principle of vicarious liability also was in issue in
litigation growing out of automobile accidents, which frequently involved people other than the negligent drivers of
vehicles in question. One set of issues revolved around the
liability of car owners for damage resulting from drivers'
negligence. At common law, a vehicle "owner was not liable
for the negligence of a person to whom he had loaned his
car, whether a member of his family or a stranger, while
the car was being used upon the business or pleasure of the
borrower."" The owner would be liable, however, if he was
present in the vehicle and thereby had the right to control
its operation246 or if the vehicle was being used by the driver
to accomplish the owner's purposes.2 47 The common law rule
contractor or subcontractor by virtue of statutes requiring provision of a safe
workplace. See Brenner v. Schoeplein, 270 N.Y.S. 513 (App. Div. 1934); Wohlfron v.
Brooklyn Edison Co., 265 N.Y.S. 18 (App. Div. 1933), affd, 189 N.E. 691 (N.Y.
1933); Kowalsky v. Conreco Co., 260 N.Y.S. 688 (App. Div. 1932). Cf. Seldin v.
Nixon Realty Corp., 275 N.Y.S. 438, 442 (City Ct. 1934) (landlord's statutory duty
to a tenant to maintain electrical fixtures held nondelegable), rev'd on other
grounds, 280 N.Y.S. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
242. See Coleman v. A.L. Guidone & Sons Inc., 182 N.Y.S. 625 (App. Div.
1920).
243. See Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43 (1924); Cortez v.
Sladon Iron Works Co., 212 N.Y.S. 468 (App. Div. 1925).
244. See Kilmer v. White, 171 N.E. 908, 909-11 (N.Y. 1930). Outcomes in all
these cases turned on the issue of control. Thus when a lessor, who normally would
not be liable for injuries on property controlled by a lessee, retained control, the
lessor would be liable. See Tout v. Logan, 5 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1938).
Similarly a landowner who kept control over the activities of a contractor would be
liable for the contractor's negligence. See Gardner v. Carlson Hoist & Mach. Co.,
288 N.Y.S. 236 (App. Div. 1936).
245. Gochee v. Wagner, 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1931) (dictum), overruled by
Kalechman v. Dreue Auto Parts Rental Inc., 308 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1973). Cf. The
Lafayette, 269 F. 917, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1920) (holding that negligence of navigator of
ship not imputed to persons on board); Fischer v. Interl Ry. Co., 182 N.Y.S. 313
(Sup. Ct. 1920) (holding that a driver's negligence is no bar to an owner's suit
against a third party for damage to an auto).
246. See Budd v. John B. Southee, Inc., 85 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1936); Gochee
v. Wagner 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1931); overruled by Kalechman v. Dreue Auto Parts
Rental Inc., 308 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1973); Day v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
R.R. Co., 288 N.Y.S. 1029 (App. Div. 1936).
247. See Benurona Corp. v. Mulroney, 3 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1938);
McCrossen v. Moorhead, 200 N.Y.S. 581 (App. Div. 1923).
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was changed by a reform-oriented statute in 1924, which reflected
the concept that an automobile negligently operated upon a
highway is an inherently dangerous instrument, and that a person
who sends it upon the highway should not be permitted to escape
liability for its negligent operation, merely because the operator of
the automobile was not his servant, acting within the scope of his
authority.248

But the statute was construed narrowly so as not to authorize suit by a passenger against the owner of a negligently
driven auto" or by a third party when a driver used a
vehicle for some purpose other than one to which the owner
had consented.25
" After some initial doubts,251 the statute
was also construed to bar suits by the owner of a negligently driven vehicle against the owner of a second vehicle.52 Finally, the statute was applied only to automobiles
and thus did not alter the general common law rule that
parents were not liable for the torts of their children.253
248. Cohen v. Neustadter, 222 N.Y.S. 602, 604 (App. Div. 1927), rev'd on other
grounds, 160 N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1928).
249. See Cohen v. Neustadter, 222 N.Y.S. 602, 604 (App. Div. 1927).
250. See Thompson v. Morgan, 228 N.Y.S. 670 (App. Div. 1928).
251. See Shuler v. Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus, 246 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct.
1930), affd, 251 N.Y.S. 886 (App. Div. 1931); Swartout v. Van Auken, 228 N.Y.S.
671 (Sup. Ct. 1928), affd, 235 N.Y.S. 732 (App. Div. 1929); Darrohn v. Russell, 277
N.Y.S. 783 (City Ct. 1935).
252. See Lubell v. Annunziata, 9 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1938); Webber v.
Graves, 255 N.Y.S. 726 (App. Div. 1932); Nannes v. Ideal Garage, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.
777 (App. Term 1934); Applebaum v. New York Ry., 300 N.Y.S. 526 (Sup. Ct.
1937); Webb v. Elmira Water, Light & R.R. Co., 258 N.Y.S. 892 (Sup. Ct. 1932);
Goschar v. Bauer, 13 N.Y.S.2d 328, 334 (City Ct. 1939); Lax v. Union Ry. of New
York City, 255 N.Y.S. 63 (Mun. Ct. 1932). But see Plunkett v. Heath, 1 N.Y.S.2d
778, 782 (City Ct. 1938) (finding an owner liable if a borrower drives illegally).
253. See Frellesen v. Colburn, 281 N.Y.S. 471 (County Ct. 1935). A related set
of issues, which fell under the rubric of imputed liability, concerned the effect of a
driver's negligence upon suits for personal injuries by occupants of a vehicle. As a
general rule, a guest in an automobile could sue a driver for his negligence in
driving, see Ottmann v. Inc. Village of Rockville Centre, 9 N.E.2d 862 (N.Y. 1937);
Wormuth v. Wormuth, 299 N.Y.S. 380 (App. Div. 1937); Mencher v. Goldstein, 269
N.Y.S. 846 (App. Div. 1934); Wright v. Palmison, 260 N.Y.S. 812 (App. Div. 1932);
Atwell v. Winkler, 188 N.Y.S. 158 (App. Div. 1921); Wilmes v. Fournier, 180 N.Y.S.
860 (Sup. Ct. 1920), although not for his negligence in maintaining the vehicle, see
Galbraith v. Busch, 196 N.E. 36 (N.Y. 1935). The negligence of a driver was also
not imputed to a guest if the guest sued the driver or owner of another vehicle
involved in the accident, see Sturman v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 19 N.E.2d 679
(N.Y. 1939); Anderson v. Burkhardt, 9 N.E.2d 929 (N.Y. 1937); Kabosius v. State,
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If two or more people had control over an instrumentality and both acted negligently in operating it or if the
negligence of two or more people otherwise "concurred in
contributing to the accident,"" then all or both might be
liable. It was "established that there [might] be two proximate causes of an injury,"255 if "each was an efficient one
without which the injury resulting would not have been
sustained"256 and if the damages from the contributing
causes could not be separated.2 Even when "the wrongful
282 N.Y.S. 882 (App. Div. 1935); Wagner v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 204 N.Y.S. 843
(App. Div. 1924); Hardin v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 199 N.Y.S. 550 (App. Div.
1923); Sinica v. New York Ry., 180 N.Y.S. 377 (App. Div. 1920); Peek v. State, 244
N.Y.S. 543 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Blake v. Brown, 180 N.Y.S. 441 (App. Term 1920), unless
the guest was in control of the vehicle, see Anderson v. Burkhardt, 9 N.E.2d 929
(N.Y. 1937); but cf. Wegmann v. City of New York, 186 N.Y.S. 893, 896 (App. Div.
1921) (dictum) (holding that negligence of chauffeur not imputable to passenger);
or was otherwise actually at fault, see Nelson v. Nygren, 181 N.E. 52 (N.Y. 1932).
Thus, the negligence of a parent was not imputed to a child in a suit against a
third party for injuries, see Bustard v. Lunt, 284 N.Y.S. 56 (App. Div. 1935);
Spaulding v. Mineah, 268 N.Y.S. 772 (App. Div. 1933); Kupchinsky v. Vacuum Oil
Co., 265 N.Y.S. 186 (App. Div. 1933); Ouderkirk v. Boston & M.R.R., 253 N.Y.S.
805 (App. Div. 1931); Ciaramella v. Orr, 214 N.Y.S. 713 (App. Div. 1926); Cavaliere
v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 214 N.Y.S. 763 (App. Div. 1926); Regan v. Intl Ry., 199
N.Y.S. 601 (App. Div. 1923); Ryczko v. Klenotich, 198 N.Y.S. 473 (App. Div. 1923);
but see Nugent v. Jangaldi Bldg. & Constr. Co., 249 N.Y.S. 315, 318 (City Ct.
1931); cf. Lauer v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 277 N.Y.S. 12 (App. Div. 1935)
(holding that negligence of older sibling not attributable to younger); or that of a
husband to a wife, see Michelson v. Stuhlman, 5 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1936); Bustard
v. Lunt, 284 N.Y.S. 56 (App. Div. 1935); Burd v. Bleischer, 203 N.Y.S. 754 (App.
Div. 1924); Thompson v. State, 277 N.Y.S. 822 (Ct. Cl. 1935), unless the wife
consented thereto, see Bodin v. Bishop, McCormick & Bishop, 296 N.Y.S. 304 (App.
Div. 1937). The occasional cases in which a parent's negligence was imputed to a
child, mostly in wrongful death contexts, see O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 171 N.E.
694 (N.Y. 1930); Godwin v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 272 N.Y.S. 187 (App. Div. 1934);
DiCicco v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 202 N.Y.S. 716 (App. Div. 1923), were
overruled in 1935 by statute. See Blyer v. Hershman, 281 N.Y.S. 942 (City Ct.
1935) (holding statute not retroactive since it wrought a change in the common
law).
254. Murphy v. Rochester Tel. Co., 203 N.Y.S. 669, 672 (App. Div. 1924).
255. Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Hudson, 206 N.Y.S. 610, 614 (App. Div.
1924); see also The George H. Jones, 27 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1928).
256. William v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 288 N.Y.S. 778 (App. Div.
1936), rev'd on othergrounds, 6 N.E.2d 58 (N.Y. 1936); see also Golembeiski v. Am.
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 254 N.Y.S. 576, 577 (App. Div. 1932); Brush v. Lindsay, 206
N.Y.S. 304,309 (App. Div. 1924).
257. See Mateo v. Abad, 267 N.Y.S. 436, 439 (App. Div. 1933); Brush v.
Lindsay, 206 N.Y.S. 304, 309 (App. Div. 1924). If the damages were separable,
each defendant would be liable only for those he or she had caused. See Parchefsky
v. Kroll Bros., Inc., 196 N.E. 308 (N.Y. 1935).
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acts of... two defendants were not precisely concurrent in
point of time, the defendants ... [would] nonetheless be
joint tortfeasors" if "their several acts of neglect concurred
in producing the injury."25
However, absent "some sort of community in wrongdoing," parties could not be "joint tortfeasors."259 In many
cases community in wrongdoing was absent, and then
plaintiffs would have the burden of establishing how much
each unrelated defendant had contributed to their injuries.
Although the rules of joint liability were not as prodefendant as those of vicarious liability, landowner liability,
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, they too
underwent little alteration during the decades of the 1920s
and 1930s. They thus remained part of an archaic mass of
doctrine protective of the existing distribution of wealth and
resources and kept in place by stare decisis.

258. Hawkes v. Goll, 9 N.Y.S.2d 924, 925 (App. Div. 1939). Joint tortfeasors
"were all jointly and severally liable," Murphy v. Rochester Tel. Co., 203 N.Y.S.
669, 672 (App. Div. 1924), which meant that the plaintiff was entitled to sue and
recover damages from any one or all of the tortfeasors, see Lever Bros. Co. v. J.
Eavenson & Sons, Inc., 7 F.Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Neenan v. Woodside
Astoria Transp. Co., 184 N.E. 744, 745 (N.Y. 1933); Fidel v. Brooklyn & Queens
Transit Corp., 274 N.Y.S. 796 (App. Div. 1934); Kapossky v. Berry, 207 N.Y.S. 719
(App. Div. 1925), although the injured party could, of course, have only one
recovery, see Kinsey v. William Spencer & Son Corp., 300 N.Y.S. 391, 396 (Sup. Ct.
1937). Even where concert of action between two tortfeasors was lacking, each was
responsible for the entire result and the plaintiff could elect to sue either or both.
See Hancock v. Steber, 204 N.Y.S. 258 (App. Div. 1924). But see Fraser v. Copake
Lake Pure Ice Corp., 216 N.Y.S. 498 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (holding that liability of
wrongdoers is several if acting separately and not in concert). Judges had
discretion to permit joinder of tortfeasors in a single action (but ordinarily, such
discretion would not be exercised), see Warren v. May, 276 N.Y.S. 520 (App. Div.
1935); Haines v. Bero Eng'g Constr. Corp., 243 N.Y.S. 657 (App. Div. 1930),
provided those added to a suit were liable to plaintiff on the same cause of action
as the original defendant, see Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, Inc., 184 N.E.
729 (N.Y. 1933). If joinder were inappropriate or a trial court declined to exercise
its discretion in favor of joinder, the fact that one tortfeasor would not be held
accountable would not operate to discharge the other. Wold v. Elder, Dempster &
Co., 206 N.Y.S. 591 (App. Div. 1924).
259. The Ross Coddington, 6 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 1925).
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II. EFFICIENCY AS THE BASIS OF THE LAW OF TORT,
1940-1980
A. The New Awareness of Human Power over Accidents
During the 1920s and 1930s, as we have seen, much of
the law for remedying personal injuries reflected an accommodation between a traditional paradigm of tort liability,
which permitted compensation to be paid only when a
person was injured directly by another's wrongful act, and a
newly emerging reform paradigm, which held that victims
of injury should receive compensation from some source.
Although personal injury law moved during the 1920s and
1930s in the direction of the reform paradigm, the totality
of personal injury doctrine remained in equipoise. As the
1930s came to a close, much doctrine derived from the older
paradigm thus remained in place, despite the decades of
efforts by judges like Cardozo to change it.
The years of World War II marked a watershed in tort
law and ultimately in the elaboration of tort doctrine. A
random sample 60 extracted from trial court records in the
four federal districts of New York and in the four counties
of Erie, Tompkins, New York and Nassau 6 . shows that a
260. The sample was gathered by the author and a series of research
assistants working in the localities in which the records of the courts in
question were maintained. An effort was made to include 80 to 100 cases in the
sample for each year for each jurisdiction.
261. Erie is an upstate industrial county containing the city of Buffalo;
Tompkins is a rural upstate county; New York County is coextensive with
Manhattan Island; and Nassau County is a suburb of New York City located
immediately east of the City on Long Island. Data from Erie County are not
included in the statistics that follow since the Erie County records did not
adequately describe the nature of the cause of action in civil cases in the relevant
years under study.
Data was gathered for separate jurisdictions rather than for a single
statewide sample in order to facilitate comparisons between jurisdictions.
Conclusions were based upon statistical research methods of the author and a
series of research assistants. Superficially, the comparisons show that tort litigation was more prevalent downstate, where it amounted to 19.12% of all cases,
than upstate, where it amounted to only 9.51%, and was more prevalent in
federal courts, where it was 17.52% of all cases, than in state courts, where it
was only 12.10%. But these comparisons are misleading. In fact, tort cases were
23.64% of all filings in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and
only 10.98% in the two upstate districts. Indeed, in all jurisdictions other than
the Southern and Eastern Districts, tort constituted 11.68% of all civil cases.
Why was tort litigation so prevalent in federal courts in Manhattan and
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statistically significant increase in tort litigation began to
occur in 1946. Thus, tort litigation rose from 8.69% of all
civil filings in the sample for 1945 to 14.46% in 1946, and
from 12.71% of all filings in the ten-year period 1936-1945
to 18.30% during the ten years beginning in 1946.262 At the
same time, the sample shows that the median value of tort
verdicts stated in 1955 dollars rose from $2982 during the
earlier decade to $6000 during the later one.263
There does not appear to have been any equally sharp
increase in the number of injuries. Automobile highway
deaths in the United States in 1948, for example, were the
same as in 1930-about 32,000 per year.2 Nor can the
increase in the number of tort cases be explained on the
theory that plaintiffs sued more often because they were
more likely to win their cases after than before 1945. On
the contrary, plaintiffs enjoyed greater success during the
earlier decade, winning 79% of jury verdicts during the
1936-1945 decade and only 70% during the 1946-1955
decade.265 Changes in insurance law also seem not to have
been a determinative variable: the key change in New
York-a requirement that all operators of motor vehicles
have compulsory insurance or comparable financial securBrooklyn? The answer seems to lie in the large number of personal injury cases
brought by dock workers and seamen. In the last five years of this study, when
docks had become heavily mechanized, tort litigation in the two metropolitan
courts fell to 13.14% of all cases--quite close to the 10.98% rate in upstate
federal courts and the 12.10% rate in state courts-and quite far removed from
the earlier 24.46% rate in the two metropolitan federal courts.
262. Total populations were created by aggregating samples in each of the
seven jurisdictions counted, as per note 261 supra, and thereby creating a fraction
consisting of total sample tort cases in the numerator and total sample cases in the
denominator. Using standard statistical methods, see JOHN E. FREUND, MODERN
ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 341 (7th ed. 1988), it can be stated at a 95% level of
confidence that the tort population for the ten-year interval, 1936-1945, ranged
between 11.79% and 13.63%. In the following ten-year period, 1946-1955, tort
population ranged between 17.24% and 19.36% at the same level of confidence. At
the 95% confidence level, tort cases in 1945 ranged between 6.21% and 11.17% of
all cases, while in 1946 tort cases ranged from 11.39% to 17.53%.
263. Unfortunately, the random sample produced only 65 cases in which the
amount of the jury verdict was stated, out of a total population of over 800,000
filings. Thus, the sample is too small to perform any year-by-year calculations, and
the statistical reliability of the numbers stated in the text cannot be guaranteed.
264. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNrrED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 720 (1975) [HEREINAFrER HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES].

265. Again, the percentages stated in the text are derived from a total of only
111 cases, which is too small to make the percentages statistically reliable.
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ity-did not occur until 1956.266
Finally, the increase in tort litigation beginning in 1946
does not appear to have resulted from doctrinal changes
beneficial to plaintiffs. The great transformation of tort
doctrine resulting in a body of pro-plaintiff law occurred
chiefly during the 1960s and 1970s in New York. The proplaintiff doctrinal changes surely did not cause the postWorld War II increase in tort litigation. On the contrary,
the doctrinal changes occurred after the litigation rise and
may even have been produced by it, as judges brought
formal rules into harmony with broad public and professional attitudinal changes. There is good reason to think
that the experience of the war itself contributed to the
increase in tort litigation.
Throughout the long course of human existence, death,
illness and injury were a random part of life that could
strike tragically at any time. In 1900, for example, nearly
one in every two hundred people in the United States died
from influenza and pneumonia, while another one in every
two hundred died from tuberculosis.267 Even more devastating was a well-recorded 1878 yellow fever epidemic in
Memphis, Tennessee, in which death came to 5150 people
out of a total population of 38,500, while 20,000 deserted
the city. 68 As one family was starkly described, the mother
was dead "with her body sprawled across the bed.., black
all over.., the children
vomit like coffee grounds spattered
2 69
rolling on the floor, groaning."
Accidents were even more devastating than disease. In
the nineteenth century, approximately 10% of all coal
miners died in mine accidents during the course of their
careers,"' while at the turn of the century one in every 5000
factory employees died annually from accidents.2 7' The
worst victims of all were railroad employees: in 1901, one
out of every 399 railroad employees was killed in an

266. See Motor Veh. Fin. Sec. Act, 1956 N.Y. Laws, ch. 655.
267. See FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE: AMERICA TRANSFORIS
ITSELF, 1900-1950, at 202 (1952).
268. See OTo L. BETMANN, THE GOOD OLD DAYS-THEY WERE TERRIBLE 136
(1974).

269. Leslie's Weekly, quoted in id.
270. The annual rate of fatal accidents in British mines in the 1850s was 4 per
1000 employees. See YAJR AHARONI, THE NO-RISK SOCIETY 47 (1981). Over a 25year career, a miner would thus have a 10% chance of death.
271. See id. Today mines are ten times safer and factories are four times safer.
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accident, while one out of every 26 was injured. For train
crews in that year, one out of every 137 was killed,272 which
translated into a nearly 20% probability of accidental death
over a twenty-five year career. These high accident rates
resulted from coupling industry's "cavalier attitude" that
"'[there's a dozen [new workers] waiting when one drops
out"' as a result of "'his own bad luck,""273 with the real
"hazards of axles, mules, stinging insects, boiling laundry
kettles, tetanus-inducing rusty implements and barbed
wire, impure water, and spoiled food." 274 Given the pattern
of accidents and illness, it is not surprising that as late as
1920 average life expectancy in the United States was only
54.1 years."
Against the background of these realities, New York
tort law had adhered during the 1920s and 1930s mainly to
inherited doctrine granting compensation to victims only of
physical injuries resulting directly from wrongdoing on the
part of the defendant; this inherited rule was designed to
limit, and did limit, the capacity of judges to redistribute
wealth as part of the tort compensation process. Judges did
give some effect to a new popular paradigm of causation,
which recognized that actors not at the site of an injury
could create the conditions that caused it and thus should
be liable for it, but this new reform conception did not
become dominant. Judges also recognized the need for legal
rules that facilitated the smooth functioning of business
and thereby preserved economic opportunity for upwardly
mobile entrepreneurs. But this concern for business
efficiency had even less impact on tort doctrine as a whole.
Prior to the 1940s, the dominant motif of tort was limited
recovery only for injuries resulting directly from
wrongdoing, with the goal of preventing judicial redistribution of wealth.
World War II inaugurated a new era. War had always
been a most opportune occasion for illness, injury, and
death, but the American military, "believ[ing] that American soldiers were sustaining avoidable casualties, "276
272. See ALLEN, supranote 267, at 56.
273. BETTMANN, supranote 268, at 71.
274. WILLIAM W. LOWANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE thsi
SCIENCE IN THE
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 5 (1976).
275. See AHARONI, supra note 270, at 47.
276. ROBERT R. PALMER ET AL., THE PROCUREMENT AND TRANNG OF GROUND
COMBAT TROOPS 4 (1947) [hereinafter PROCUREMENT].
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changed all this in World War II, reducing deaths from
approximately one in every ten men under arms during the
27
Civil War to about one per hundred in the 1941-1945 war. 1
More important for present purposes than the reality of this
accomplishment was popular awareness of it resulting from
a comprehensive public information campaign focused around two main themes: (1) that with proper training few
men would be injured, and (2) that with proper medical
treatment, death could be largely eliminated and most of
the injured could be nursed back to health.
The military, believing that an "army... [was] most
sparing of human lives when its training [was] soundest,"
continually reiterated its "determin[ation] that if combat
should ever come, the soldier of today will be prepared for
it, and will not be a needless casualty."2 7' Thus, it told

soldiers that when they got "to the front," they would "be so
well trained that" they could "count" their "chances of
survival very high."2 79 In addition to teaching basic skills,

two objectives were an especially important part of military
training.
The first was to teach every soldier to be part of a team.
"During World War II many sociologists in the armed forces
were impressed with the crucial contribution of cohesive
primary group relations" to "combat effectiveness."28 In
particular, the army focused on "[tlhe 'buddy'
relationship"--a cohesive unit built around the minimization of risk; a buddy was a person a soldier felt he could
rely on in case of danger." 28 Aware, however, that "cohesive

primary groups [did] not just occur but [were] fashioned
and developed" through indoctrination and training, 282 the
army undertook "[i]n the early stages of training" to
emphasize
importance
of this
at
. "the
tw
mit
es
a v,,2
11 kind of relationship...
at times... with a vehemence.
Soldiers were taught "oy277. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 264, at
1140.
278. MAJOR JOHN D. KENDERDINE, YOUR YEAR IN THE ARMY: WHAT EVERY NEW
SOLDIER SHOULD KNOW 134, 178 (1940).
279. Id. at 3.
280. MORRIS JANOWICZ, SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY ESTABLiSHmENT 77 (rev.
ed. 1965).
281. Id. at 93.
282. Id. at 78.
283. David H. Marlowe, The Basic Training Process, in THE SYMpTOM AS
COMMUNICATION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 92, (Kenneth L. Artiss ed., 1959).
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alty to the squad as a whole and to each member of it;" they
learned to be "[o]ne for all, and all for one."284 They gained
"espritde corps" that enabled them "to fight effi-ciently and
285
with greatest security to yourself."
The second objective of military training was to teach
soldiers "to act calmly with sound judgment regardless of
noise, confusion, and surprise."286 The military had learned
through experience that raw "trainees" had a "tendency...
to neglect" their duty "during the excitement" of battle,8 7 it
set out to correct the tendency, in part through realistic
training simulations but also through explicit teaching of a
training course entitled "Protection against Carelessness." 8
The military knew that 'Uncle Sam's soldiers must be
alert" members of "an alert team"2 9 to function efficiently
and avoid casualties. The twenty-two million veterans of
the wartime and postwar military,29 ° along with some
significant portion of the American public, accordingly
learned when soldiers "et careless, ... there are tremendous.., casualty rates. '
The military made a determined effort to reduce not
only battle injuries but also the number of deaths resulting
from injuries and illness. It promised that "hundreds of
thousands of men, who would have died in any previous
war, won't die in this one,"292 and new medical developments, in the form of drugs such as sulfa and penicillin, of
blood transfusions, of new surgical techniques, and of new
methods for delivering medical help, made the promise
come true.29 3 Military men had the opportunity and used it
284. KENDERDINE, supra note 278, at 36.
285. Id. at 60.
286. BELL I. WILEY, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, in
PROCUREMENT, supranote 276, at 449.
287. William R. Keast, The Training of Enlisted Replacements, in
PROCUREMENT, supra note 276, at 365, 387; see also JANOWIrZ, supra note 280, at
91.
288. William R. Keast, The Training of Enlisted Replacements, in
PROCUREMENT, supranote 276, at 389.
289. U.S. INFANTRY ASSOCIATION, OUR ARMED FORCES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE
Alu'IYAND NAVY FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS 14-15.

290. See ALAN GREGG, CHALLENGES TO CONTEMPORARY MEDICINE 68 (1956).
291. Letter from Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers to Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair,
February 4, 1944, quoted in PROCUREMENT, supranote 276, at 227.
292. ALBERT Q. MAISEL, MnRACLES OF MniTARY MEDICINE x (1943).
293. See generally id.; JOSEPH R. DARNALL & V.I. COOPER, WHAT THE CITIZEN
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT WARTIME MEDICINE (1942); MEDICINE AND THE WAR (William

H. Taliaferro ed. 1944); Gerald Wendt, What Happened in Science, in WHILE You
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"wonderfully ... to demonstrate the value of... medical
measures. 2 4 cThe experience of World War II, when the
whole matchless armory of American medicine, surgery,
and dentistry were put at the disposal of the humblest private" proved decisively that Americans were living "in an
age and land of medical miracles." 295 "[M]edicine ha[d] made
progress to a degree... that it offer[ed] the means for modem man to have life ...abundantly." 296 Thus, whenever
illness persisted or premature death occurred, there was
reason to conclude that the "loss" could have been "either
prevented,2 97alleviated, or cured... [or] at least shared financially."
The lessons learned from World War II were readily
transferable from military to civilian contexts. It seemed
obvious, for example, that "[o]ur new knowledge of war
medicine [would] prove immeasurably helpful... in fighting industrial accidents."298 Such hopes led "[i]nevitably" to
"the demand that the great scientific problems of peacetime
be... attacked," as the problems of war had been, "under
government leadership." 9' In short, the remarkable victories of World War II, not only over military enemies but
over illness, injury and even death, convinced the American
people that their "destinies" were not "written in the stars
and beyond mortal control," but were, "in large part, subject
to [their] own volition." Americans had learned that they
were "not the passive objects" of fate "but the active manipulators of... [the] forces" of nature and that they could control those forces if they faced them "with courage, determination, and calm intelligence."3 0
World War II transformed Americans' vision of society
from one where "insecurity was inherent" and perhaps even
"useful, for it drove men.., to render their best and most
efficient service" by visiting "severe punishment on those

WERE GoNE: A REPORT ON WARTIE LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES 249, 264-70 (Jack

Goodman ed., 1946).
294. See GREGG, supra note 290, at 36.
295. MAX LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILZATION: LIFE AND THOUGHT IN THE
UNITED STATES TODAY 124 (1957).

296. GREGG, supra note 290, at 4.
297. Id. at 38.
298. ALBERT Q. MAISEL, MIRACLES OF MILITARY MEDICINE 372.

299. See Wendt, supranote 293, at 272.
300. David Sarnoff, The FabulousFuture, in THE FABULOUS FUTURE: AMERICA
IN 1980 13, 14 (Fortune ed. 1955).
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who did not,""' to one backed by "a complete system of governmental security." 2 "Social fatalism.., vanished" with
the war, as Americans grew "less willing to suffer hardship,
whether the risks of unemployment, pollution, or inadequate health care," and more "confident... that these problems can be solved and risks can be avoided." "In the postWorld War II period," the received societal wisdom came to
be that "no individual [should be] allowed to suffer the consequences of... personal disaster;" if "an ever growing
array of untoward events" arising from "faulty products,...
criminals,... acts of nature,... misconcocted serums" and
the like could not be prevented, they ought at least to be the
subject of insurance and, if they occurred, compensation. 3
This faith that calm intelligence could reduce personal
disasters and injuries to an optimal level did not seem
absurd to a generation which had entered World War II
"drifting about aimlessly" in "an environment marked by
hopelessness, lack of opportunities and a sense of failure"
but had come out of the war convinced that it had "faced the
test of mastering a historic challenge-and succeeded."" 4
Americans of the postwar era "felt themselves to be
standing at the threshold of a promising new era"0 5 in
which the "sense of wonderful possibilities ahead kept
breaking into every part of living. In the language of the
future Chief Justice, Fred Vinson, who in 1945 was Director
of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the American people
were "in the pleasant predicament of having to learn to live
50 percent better than they have ever lived before, "37 while

Chester Bowles, the last wartime director of the Office of
Price Administration, promised that Americans had to "all
learn to live constantly better, a lot better" with "unlimited
opportunity for health, recreation and good living.., an
end to poverty and insecurity." 3 Using tort law not to make

301. JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, THE AFFLUENT SociETY 98 (1958).
302. LERNER, supra note 295, at 129.
303. See AHARONI, supranote 270, at 47-50.
304. GEOFFREY PERRETT, DAYS OF SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMPH: THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE, 1939-1945, at 442-43 (1973).

305. Id. at 408.
306. ERIC F. GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE--AND AFTER: AMERICA, 19451960, at 13 (1973).
307. Id. at 14.
308. JOHN MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND AMERICAN
CULTURE DURING WORLD WAR 11, at 326-27 (1976).
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a statement of justice but to provide people with the
optimal balance of health and good living was but a small
part of the postwar American dream.
The New York Court of Appeals on a number of occasions gave explicit verbal expression to these emerging
cultural values of the postwar era, which on a superficial
analysis appeared to mirror the goal of prewar reformers of
increasing compensation for injuries. In Philpot v. Brooklyn
National League Baseball Club, Inc.,39 for example, the

court reiterated an old dictum that "[o]ne who collects a
large number of people for gain or profit must be vigilant to
protect them" 1' and held that the Dodgers had not been
sufficiently vigilant in protecting a spectator from being
struck by a broken glass bottle. In later years, the court
declared that "the policy of this State has been to reduce
rather than increase the obstacles to the recovery of
damages for negligently caused injury or death"1 and took
note of "the broadening of tort liability concepts to reflect
economic, social and political developments."31 Lower court
judges echoed similar thoughts. Thus, one trial judge took
note of the State's "public policy that one injured through
negligence should have recourse to a financially responsible
defendant,"" 3 while the Appellate Division wrote that "in
many instances, the tort-feasor who is at fault may be
unable to recompense the victim for the injuries that he has
caused" and that "[therefore, as a means of social insurance, in certain situations liability ha[d] been imposed
irrespective of fault."3
Concerns that injuries be reduced and that victims of
injury receive recompense also produced important changes
in specific legal doctrines. For example, traditional
doctrines of municipal and charitable immunity were
overruled, and municipalities3 5 and charities, such as hos309. 100 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1951).
310. Id. at 166. See also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir.
1978); Seligson v. Victory Pool, Inc., 66 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (App. Term 1946); Covey
v. State, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18,20 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
311. Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 288, 390 (N.Y. 1969).
312. Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., 402 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (N.Y. 1980).
313. Bibergal v. McCormick, 421 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
314. Mauro v. McCrindle, 419 N.Y.S.2d 710, 714 (App. Div. 1979).
315. See Bernardine v. City of New York, 62 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1945). One
consequence of the end of municipal immunity was that a series of cases came up
to the Court of Appeals in which municipalities were held liability for police
insensitivity and brutality. See Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y.
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pitals,316 were held fully liable for the torts of their servants.
Another change in doctrine instituted by the Court of
Appeals was to hold parties strictly liable for blasting317 and
other ultrahazardous activities."' The Court of Appeals also
facilitated recovery of damages for injuries by ruling that
wives as well as husbands could sue for loss of consortium 1
and by easing the procedural process by which plaintiffs
who had recovered judgments could collect them from
companies that had insured defendants. 2 '
Most of the doctrinal changes just noted were achieved
quickly and easily, usually through the medium of a single
Court of Appeals decision. Other changes in the law
facilitating recovery for injuries, in contrast, occurred much
more slowly and through complex processes. It is to these
more gradual changes that we must next turn, beginning
with the discrete areas of product liability law and the law
of landowners' liability to entrants on their property. Then,
we shall turn to various doctrines associated more generally
with the law of negligence.
B. The Law of ProductLiability
During the middle of the century, the New York Court
of Appeals did not assume a leadership role like that of the
California Supreme Court in expanding consumers' remedies for product defects. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,321
authored by Cardozo in 1916, had placed New York in the
forefront of remedial expansion, but during the next four
1977); Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 127 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1955); Dunham v. Village
of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1952); McCrink v. City of New York, 71 N.E.2d
419 (N.Y. 1947). Cf. McCormick v. State, 229 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (holding
state liable for brutality of state police). Another case of state liability was Foley v.
State, 62 N.E.2d 69 (N.Y. 1945) (holding state liable for failure to replace burnt out
bulb in traffic signal).
316. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); Dillon v. Rockaway Beach
Hospital & Dispensary, 30 N.E.2d 373 (N.Y. 1940).
317. See Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969).
318. See Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1977); see
also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding strict
liability under federal law for death of birds from highly toxic pesticide
manufactured by defendant).
319. See Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968).
320. See Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 225 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1967).
For a lower court decision similarly upholding the responsibility of an insurance
company, see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Shore, 404 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
321. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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decades the New York courts engaged in 'judicial curtailment of the... [MacPherson] doctrine" and were "shackled
by meaningless technicalities."322 As a result, little in the
way of liberalization of product liability law occurred in
New York until the years around 1960.
Many of the old limitations on MacPherson were
restated and reaffirmed in the leading 1950 case of Campo
v. Scofield,23 where a farm worker using an onion topping
machine had his hands mangled when they were drawn
into steel rollers that were without any guard and could
only be stopped by a switch that was inaccessible to
someone using the machine. In affirming the Appellate
Division's dismissal of the complaint, the Court of Appeals
first reiterated the rule that, in the absence of "privity of
contract between the defendant manufacturer and plaintiff," suit could not "be sustained on any theory of implied
warranty" but only on a theory of "negligence."324 This
meant that, if a manufacturer did "everything necessary to
make the machine function properly for the purpose for
which it [was] designed, if the machine [was] without any
latent defect, and if its ftnctioning create[d] no danger or
peril that [was] not known to the user, then the
manufacturer ha[d] satisfied the law's demands." A
manufacturer did not have a "duty of producing an
accident-proof product"325 or "a machine" that would not
"wear ...

out after long use." 2 ' "All that the manufacturer

322. Hyams v. King Kullen Grocery Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 263, 269 (Mun. Ct.
1961).
323. 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), overruled by Micallef v. Meihle Co., Div. of
Neihle-Gross Dexter, Inc., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976); see also Messina v. Clark
Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959). Existing law was also reaffirmed in
Prokopowicz v. 11 W. Forty-Second St. Corp., 45 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1942), which
held that the need for safety devices was normally a question of fact to be
determined by a jury. On the fact-finding powers of juries, see Mazzi v. Greenlee
Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1963); Beckhusen v. E.P. Lawson Co., 174
N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1961).
324. 95 N.E.2d at 803; see Bernstein v. Remington Arms Co., 227 N.Y.S.2d 802,
804 (App. Div. 1962); Cerkowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542 (Sup.
Ct. 1951).
325. 95 N.E.2d at 804; see Stiefv. JA Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453, 459-60
(2d Cir. 1967); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 989, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
O'Neil v. Am. Radiator Co., 43 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Lucette
Originals, Inc. v. Gen'l Cotton Converters, Inc., 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (App. Div. 1959);
O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co., 24 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (App. Div. 1940);
Halpern v. JAD Constr. Corp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
326. Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (App. Div. 1941); see
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was required to do [was] to guard against injury that [was]

reasonably probable."327 Desirable as it might be "to equip
complicated modern machinery with all possible protective
guards or other safety devices," the effectuation of "so fundamental a change" was "the function of the legislature
rather than of the courts."328
In order to establish negligence, a plaintiff had to prove
that the defendant's conduct "'had possibilities of danger.., apparent' to a person of ordinary foresight. 29 Thus,
a common carrier that improperly handled or stored drums
of caustic soda without being aware of their contents was

not liable for damage resulting from leaks.3

Likewise,

wholesalers, retailers and other middlemen through whose
hands a product passed were not liable for injuries that the
product caused when they had no reason to know of its

potential dangerousness,

unless they had held themselves

out as manufacturers of the product.3 2 Since product
liability cases required proof of negligence, evidence of the
customary practice of the industry was relevant to establishing due care or want thereof.33 Custom was equally
relevant in determining the adequacy of warnings about a
product's potential dangers. 4 None of this was new law. 5
Gomer v. E.W. Bliss Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
327. Cleary v. John M. Mars Co., 19 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
328. 95 N.E.2d at 805.
329. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge S.A., 107 N.E.2d 463, 469 (N.Y.
1952); see also Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1960).
330. See Blumetti v. Carman & Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
331. See Bergenfeld v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 134 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App.
Term 1954); Sparling v. Podzielinski, 223 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Outwater v. Miller, 155 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
332. See Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 42 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div.
1943); Dysko v. Mack Intl Motor Truck Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Cf. Santise v. Martins, Inc., 17 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1940) (holding
department store liable for negligence of shoe department whether or not it owned
and controlled it, if it held itself out as such). But see Monahan v. Ford Motor Co.,
231 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (holding a manufacturer liable only for active
negligence).
333. See Smolen v. Grandview Dairy, Inc., 93 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 1950); Luciano
v. John Morgan, Inc., 45 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1943). Cf. Curley v. Ruppert, 71
N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (App. Div. 1947) (holding that a bottler must "make such
appropriate inspection and tests of the bottles used as those in the business would
recognize as reasonably necessary").
334. See Phillips v. Roux Labs., Inc., 145 N.Y.S.2d 449 (App. Div. 1955). On the
duty to warn, see Howard Stores Corp. v. Pope, 134 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 1956); Marcus
v. Specific Pharm., Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Lehner v. Proctor &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 121 (City Ct. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 143
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The first small sign of change occurred in 1957, when
the Court of Appeals in Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority33 declared that "there is no visible reason for any
distinction between the liability of one who supplies a
chattel and one who erects a structure" 37 and accordingly
authorized suits even in the absence of privity against those
who had designed or constructed buildings as long as negligence on their part could be shown. The authorization was
mere dictum, however, since the court dismissed plaintiffs
complaint for failing to allege facts required to make out a
claim of negligence.
A more important extension of doctrine occurred in
Mueller v. Teichner.33 There a middleman was held liable to
a plaintiff injured by an exploding soda bottle even though,
as the dissent observed, the middleman "was neither the
manufacturer nor the assembler of the finished product,
which was not sold to the public on his name or reputation,"
and the operation which the middleman performed "had
nothing to do with the accident."339 Mueller had little precedential impact, however, since it merely affirmed without
opinion an Appellate Division order,34 which, in turn, had
without opinion affirmed a trial court judgment rendered
without opinion.
Lower courts also got away with a few hesitant small
steps. For example, a divided Appellate Division held that a
plaintiffs misuse of a product did not bar recovery against
its manufacturer if the misuse occurred under orders of the
plaintiffs foreman. 4' A Supreme Court judge allowed a victim of a soda bottle explosion to serve a complaint against
three retailers and six firms engaged in distribution and/or
bottling of the soda when the plaintiff did not know which
of the nine defendants was responsible for her injury.34
The causes of this judicial hesitancy emerged with
N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
335. A case that did establish restrictive new law was A Ancelmo Trucking Co.
v. Durkee, 203 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (App. Div. 1960), which held that product liability
law applied only to cases where damage occurred through accidental means.
336. 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957).
337. Id. at 898.
338. 161 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 1959).
339. Id. at 15.
340. 167 N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div. 1957).
341. See Boerio v. Haiss Motor Trucking Co., 181 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div.
1959).
342. See Tarallo v. Grossman, 218 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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sharp clarity in Greenberg v. Lorenz,3 43 where a fifteen-yearold girl had been injured by a metal sliver packed in canned
salmon which her father had purchased for her at her
request. She brought suit against the retailer who had sold
the can of salmon. Established law made it clear that the
girl could not recover against the retailer on a negligence
theory, since the retailer was not negligent. Nor could she
recover for breach of implied warranty, since she had no
privity of contract with the retailer. Nonetheless, the
"injustice of denying damages to a child because of nonprivity" seemed to the court "too plain for argument."
Indeed, the "unfairness of the restriction ha[d] been argued
in writings so numerous as to make a lengthy
bibliography," and some "20 States ha[d] abolished... privity." Greenberg v. Lorenz was as "convincing a showing of
injustice" as could be imagined. Still the court wanted to "be
cautious and take one step at a time,"3" since there were
"two sides to the problem" and any broadening of liability,
as the court had decided only a decade earlier in Campo v.
Scofield,345 "must be left to the Legislature." It was "just as
unfair to hold liable a retail groceryman... innocent of any
negligence.., for some defect in a canned product which he
could not inspect and with the production of which he had
nothing to do" as to deny relief to an innocent consumer.
Only the legislature could "determine the policy of accommodating those conflicting interests," and it would be
inappropriate for the court to "assume their powers and
change the rules," especially since the Legislature had in
three separate years refused to enact bills that would have
extended the benefit of implied warranties to members of
buyers' households.346 All things considered, the court found
it best to "be cautious and take one step at a time," 47 and
accordingly it held only that lack of privity did not bar a
child's cause of action merely because her parent had purchased the defective product on her behalf.
Further steps toward the liberalization of doctrine
produced division on the court and shifting majorities.
Thus, in Langner v. Jessup Holding Co. 348 three dissenters
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

173 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1961).
Id. at 775-76.
95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950).
Id. at 776 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 775-76.
175 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1961).
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were prepared to hold an elevator maintenance company
liable for an elevator accident on the ground that it was
negligent for not warning the elevator's owner of the elevator's unsafe condition, but the majority would not go
along since the case had not been tried or presented to the
jury on that theory. Similarly, in McLaughlin v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co.,"' two judges on the Court of Appeals
were prepared to hold a manufacturer of a heating device
liable for failing to warn of its propensity to burn users, but
four judges were not since the injury in question had been
brought about by the gross negligence of an intervening
agent. In contrast, a four-judge majority in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co."' was prepared to declare broadly that, since manufacturers placed their "product[s] upon the market and, by advertising and labeling"
them, represented their "quality to the public in such a way
as to induce reliance," the "policy of protecting the public
from injury.., resulting from misrepresentations outweigh[ed] allegiance to [the] old and out-moded technical
rule" requiring privity to maintain a strict liability breach
of warranty suit.35' But a three-judge minority "concur[red]
in result only" and did "not agree that the so-called 'old
court-made rule' should be modified to dispense with the
requirement of privity without limitation."352
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. a 4-3
majority took "another step toward a complete solution of
the problem partially cleared up in Greenberg v. Lorenz...
and Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co.," which
"at least suggested that all requirements of privity ha[d]
been dispensed with in our State." It was clear, according to
the majority, that a breach of warranty was "not only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises
but.., a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party
whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer." 54 Thus, the
majority held the manufacturer of an airplane strictly liable
to the estate of a passenger killed in a crash, although it
refused "for the present.., to extend this rule" to the
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

181 N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1962).
181 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1962).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 404-05.
191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963).
Id. at. 81-82.
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conceptual limit to which negligence liability had extended
in the 1930s, 355 so "as to hold liable the manufacturer... of a
[defective] component part" which caused the crash. Its
reason was an efficiency judgment that "[a]dequate protection [was] provided for the passengers by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer. "
The three dissenters in Kollsman argued that "the
counsel of prudence" required them "to be slow to cast aside
well-established law in deference to a theory of social
planning that is still much in dispute." The dissent observed that prior to Kollsman, a suit could be brought for
death or injury arising out of a plane crash only on a theory
of negligence. It wondered whether "the additional risk"
resulting from the imposition of strict liability on airplane
manufacturers could "be effectively distributed as a cost of
doing business"--a question that could "be intelligently resolved only by analysis of facts and figures compiled after
hearings in which all interested groups have an opportunity
to present economic arguments" and "classically within the
special competence of the Legislature to ascertain." Any
such displacement "of the law of negligence from its ancestral environment involve[d] an omniscience not shared by"
the dissenters, and the decision to impose strict liability on
the manufacturer of the airplane rather than either the
airline or the manufacturer of the defective component part
"involve[d]3 57a principle of selection which [was] purely
arbitrary."
Both the Kollsman majority and the three dissenters
were advocating positions derived from the World War II
era assumption that human effort could reduce personal injuries. The majority was closely attuned to the postwar
faith that injuries could be reduced by requiring those with
the capacity to prevent them to take action to do so. The
dissenters, on the other hand, had begun to articulate what
would soon emerge as a competing value-a desire for efficiency. As better efficiency calculators, the dissenters knew
that injuries could not be eliminated entirely, but only
reduced to some optimal level. They recognized that courtmandated product safety would eventually increase product
costs and that the increased costs, at some point, might
355. Id. at 83.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 86-87.
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exceed the benefits from increased safety. But the
dissenters did not know how that point could be identified
and, indeed, were convinced that, as judges, they were ill
equipped to make the required cost-benefit analysis.
While both the majority and dissenting judges in
Kollsman derived their approaches from the World War II
assumption that injuries could be reduced, their ideologies
related very differently to the prewar struggle between
those who had sought to increase compensation for injuries
and those who had striven to protect the existing distribution of wealth. The majority's approach of requiring manufacturers to pay for all product-related injuries overlapped
the prewar reform paradigm, which required compensation
by anyone even remotely causing harm. Although the prewar paradigm rested on a conception of social justice and
the postwar approach grew out of concerns for efficiency,
both led to the same practical result.
In contrast, there was much less overlap in the
dissenters' approach. The nineteenth century tort paradigm, which authorized compensation only if harm resulted
from someone's moral fault, led to very different results
from those produced by a law and economics standard,
which authorizes compensation up to the point that costs
begin to exceed benefits. At least in terms of the language
used in Kollsman, the dissenters linked themselves to an
efficiency rather than a wealth-protective view.
As these two camps on the Court of Appeals mobilized,
even narrow holdings on insignificant issues that made little new law led to disagreement. Thus, when the court held
that a seller of an air conditioning unit who delegated to a
subcontractor its express contractual duty to keep the unit
in repair was responsible for any negligence by the subcontractor, two judges dissented.3"' Likewise a holding that
a manufacturer of a malfunctioning oxygen mask was liable
for the death of a co-worker who attempted to rescue the
wearer of the mask produced an opinion by two judges
"concur[ring] in result only," since they "envision[ed] a
myriad of situations where the application of the doctrine
[announced by the majority]
359
would result in unjustified liamanufacturers."
to
bility
358. See Miles v. R & M Appliance Sales, Inc., 259 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. 1970).
359. See Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 255 N.E.2d 173, 176 (N.Y.
1969).
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Lower court and federal judges, who took their law from
the Court of Appeals, sensed the ambivalence of its judges
and behaved accordingly. Occasional cases eased the burden of plaintiffs in product liability- cases. One trial judge,
for example, after concluding that a "monumental trilogy of
cases [Greenberg, Randy Knitwear, and Kolisman] ha[d]
revolutionized this area of the law," '6° held that a manufacturer of nails which shattered when struck was strictly
liable to an injured user, 6' while the Appellate Division
reached a comparable result in regard to a pair of fence pliers that chipped and became imbedded in a user's hand."2
Bolm v. Triumph Corp.,36 the first design defect case deci-

ded in New York in favor of a plaintiff, permitted a motorcyclist who suffered genital injuries when he was thrown
forward in an accident over a luggage rack placed several
inches higher than the front seat to present to the jury his
claim of negligent design.
Most judges, however, continued to apply older, more
pro-defendant rules. Bolm, in particular, was unusual, as
most New York judges rejected design defect claims.'64 New
York and federal judges were equally hostile to the imposition of a duty to warn, observing that a manufacturer did
not need to warn "against every injury which may ensue
from mishap in the6 use of his product," especially against
"common dangers." ' New York judges also resolved cases
in a pro-defendant direction when they held that a product
was not defective if it caused allergic reactions in only twenty-five out of 270,000 users,'66 that a product manufacturer
360. Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 270 N.Y.S.2d 875, 885 (Sup. Ct.
1966), rev'd on other grounds,287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. Div. 1968), affd, 248 N.E.2d
920 (N.Y. 1969).
361. Id.
362. See Kross v. Kelsey Hayes Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 1968).
363. 341 N.Y.S.2d 846 (App. Div. 1973), affd, 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973); see
also Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1964).
364. See Edgar v. Nachman, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1971); Walk v. J.I.
Case Co., 318 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 1971); DiPerna v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Albany, 292 N.Y.S.2d 177 (App. Div. 1968); McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 284
N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Cf. Clohessy v. Felle, 319 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div.
1971) (setting aside a plaintiffs verdict in a design defect case because of improper
admission into evidence of an inapplicable regulation).
365. Stief v. J.A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1967); see also
Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Brownstone v. Times Square Stage Lighting Co., 333 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div.
1972).
366. See Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 1970); Kaempfe
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was not liable for a defect unless it existed when the
product left the manufacturer's hands367 and the manufacturer had notice of it,36 and that a retailer ordinarily had no
duty to inspect merchandise for latent defects.6 9
By the early 1970s, however, a new Court of Appeals
majority had become dissatisfied with the laggardness of
the New York judiciary in adopting modern product liability
standards. In its next major foray into the field-Codling v.
Paglia37 -it indicated its dissatisfaction with clarity and
unanimity. Codling differed from earlier Court of Appeals
decisions in two respects. The first was that the court no
longer believed strongly in the superiority of legislative over
judicial law reform: the court had become willing to engage
in social engineering. The second was that the judges in
Codling had finally come to a unanimous agreement about
the efficiency policies product liability law should be advancing and were prepared to act to advance those policies.
No one in Codling questioned the appropriateness of a
judicial imposition of strict liability standards in product
cases. A second issue in the case, however, was whether the
judiciary should abolish contributory negligence as a defense in product liability suits and in its place substitute
the doctrine of comparative negligence. The majority was
unwilling "at this time" to make such a substitution,
apparently because the legislature was then considering the
large issue of comparative negligence and the court did not
want to get in its way.37' Two judges bristled at even this
limited level of judicial deference, though, with the observation that "examination of the record in other jurisdictions
reveals that the assumption of legislative superiority is too
patently a theoretical one" and that "courts are at least as
well situated as Legislatures to inform themselves about
the factors that should be taken into account in promulgating a rule of comparative negligence."372
Even more important than the new disinclination of the
v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Div. 1964).
367. See Rosenzweig v. Arista Truck Renting Corp., 309 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div.
1970).
368. See Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 333 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1972).
369. See Naples v. City of New York, 309 N.Y.S.2d 663 (App. Div. 1970).
370. 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
371. Indeed, two years after Codling, new legislation on comparative
negligence actually went into effect. See infra notes 476-82 and accompanying text.
372. 298 N.E.2d at 631 (concurring opinion).
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judges to defer to the legislature was their sense that "the
erosion of the citadel of privity ha[d] been proceeding...
even more rapidly in other jurisdictions" than in New York,
"all with the enthusiastic support of text writers and the
authors of law review articles." As a result, all seven judges
agreed "that the time ha[d] now come when our court, instead of rationalizing broken field running, should lay down
a broad principle" that would impose pressure "on the manufacturer... , who alone has the practical opportunity, to
turn out useful, attractive, but safe products." The judges
added that this imposition "on the manufacturer should
encourage safety in design and production; and the diffusion of this cost in the purchase price of individual units
should be acceptable to the user if thereby he is given added
assurance of his own protection."37 With this agreement on
policy, a unanimous court held manufacturers strictly liable
to anyone who came into contact with their products, even
mere bystanders.
Codling also marked a turnaround in the Court of
Appeals' jurisprudence in a third respect. Whereas the
Court after Kolisman had left the elaboration of product
liability law to inferior courts, deciding only three cases in
the decade between 1963 and 1973, the Court after Codling
remained an active force, deciding nine cases over the next
seven years. To insure that the lower courts would not
subvert Codling as they had ignored Kollsman, the Court of
Appeals assumed a direct supervisory role over product
liability cases.
It began that role when only months after deciding
Codling it reinstated a jury verdict against an elevator
maintenance company which the Appellate Division had set
aside. The court's theory was that, once the company had agreed to maintain the elevator, it had a duty to use reasonable care to discover and correct dangerous conditions and
could be held to that duty even in the absence of direct
evidence of negligence. 4 In short, manufacturers of potentially dangerous instrumentalities and other comparable
defendants were strictly liable for their safety. Next, in
Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp.75 the court ruled that

373. Id. at 626-28.
374. See Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 300 N.E.2d 403, 403-04 (N.Y. 1973).
375. 305 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1973); see also Tucci v. Bossert, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328
(App. Div. 1976).
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a disclaimer of warranties would not bar a strict liability
suit by users of a product who were strangers to any contract of purchase and sale. Two years later, in Victorson v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co.176 the court made it clear "that

strict products liability sound[ed] in tort rather than in contract""' and thus that the statute of limitations began to
run not when a product was placed on the market but at
the subsequent date when injury occurred.37
The march continued with Micallef v. Miehle Co.,"'
which overruled Campo v. Scofield38 ° and held that a
manufacturer, "who stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects," is "obligated to exercise that degree
of care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable
risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to ...
danger when the product is used in the manner for which
the product was intended," even if the user was contributorily negligent.38 ' Next, Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals,
Inc., 82 after noting that the "issue merits little discussion,"
held that
[iun a products liability case it is now established that, if plaintiff

376. 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975).
377. Id. at 278. Cf. American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418
F. Supp. 435,449 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cardona v. South Bend Lathe Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d
373, 374 (App. Div. 1979) (stating strict liability distinct theory from negligence);
Tirino v. Kenner Prods. Co., 341 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (stating implied
warranty distinct theory from express warranty). But see Dickey v. Lockport
Prestress, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 609 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that strict liability and
breach of warranty "are, in effect, the same cause of action"); DeCrosta v. A.
Reynolds Constr. & Supply Corp., 375 N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 1975) (barring
plaintiffs suit on strict liability theory after judgment for defendant on prior suit
claiming negligence and breach of warranty); Jerry v. Borden Co., 358 N.Y.S.2d
426 (App. Div. 1974) (allowing plaintiff to prove strict liability under complaint
alleging negligence and breach of warranty).
378. See also Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1980);
Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 397 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979); Ribley v. Harsco
Corp., 394 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (App. Div. 1977); Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash,
Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (App. Div. 1974).
379. 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
380. 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950).
381. Id. at 577. Cf. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 597-98
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Langford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 373 F. Supp. 1251, 1255
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that failure to wear seatbelt no bar to recovery but could
provide basis for mitigation of damages). For an earlier case that reached the
opposite result from Micallef, see Bass v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 497 F.2d
1223 (2d Cir. 1974).
382. 361 N.E.2d 991 (N.Y. 1977).
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has proven that the product has not performed as intended and
excluded all causes of the accident not attributable to defendant,
the fact finder may, even if the particular defect has not been
occurred due to
proven, infer that the accident could only3 8 have
3
some defect in the product or its packaging.

With doctrine such as this "'predicated largely on
considerations of sound social policy.... including consumer reliance, marketing responsibility and the reasonable-

ness of imposing loss redistribution" 384 and designed to
make "unnecessary the distortions previously required to
permit injured plaintiffs to recover from those who put
defective products into the stream of commerce, " "' product
manufacturers became virtual insurers who could avoid
liability only by convincing the fact finder that something
other than a defect in their product, such as a subsequent
modification made by someone after the product left the
manufacturer's possession and control,"6 caused the plaintiffs injury.
The Court of Appeals' support for the expansion of
product liability law after Codling was so strong that it
even induced lower courts to expand doctrine in some respects. For example, the lower courts recognized the existence of a duty to warn, 388 allowed business entities as well
383. Id. at 993. See also Alfa Romeo, Inc. v. S.S. "Torinita," 499 F.Supp. 1272,
1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (App. Div.
1979); Tittlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 1978); Jackson v.
Melvey, 392 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1977); Contra, Portnoy v. Capobianco,
355 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
384. Milau Assoc., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (N.Y.
1977); see also Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
385. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 374 N.E.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. 1978).
386. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440
(N.Y. 1980). See also Mazzola v. Chrysler France, S., 470 F. Supp. 24, 27
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
387. For a Court of Appeals case upholding a jury verdict in favor of a
manufacturer, see Torrogrossa v. Towmotor Co., 376 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1978).
388. See Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1014-15 (App. Div. 1980); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 373
N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (App. Div. 1975) (dictum); see also Billiar v. Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980). But cf Emrich v. Kroner, 434 N.Y.S.2d
491 (App. Div. 1980) (finding that a successor corporation which assumed tort
liabilities of prior corporation did not assume its duty to warn); Heller v. Encore of
Hicksville, Inc., 429 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that there is no duty to
warn of obvious risks), rev'd on othergrounds,421 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1981). In cases
of prescription drugs, warnings had to be given to doctors rather than to patients.
See Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (App. Div. 1979).
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as natural persons to bring product liability suits,"9 and
held used car dealers liable for safety defects in their cars
in violation of "the policy of this state to protect purchasers
of used vehicles from being sold defective vehicles."39 The
lower courts also resolved an important evidentiary issue in
favor of plaintiff users by holding admissible in evidence a
defendant's recall of a product39' or modification of a
design392 after a plaintiff suffered injury.393
C. The Law of Landowners'Liabilities
Another area that developed gradually in the direction
of increased compensation for injuries, with the development coming to final fruition in the 1970s, was the law
dealing with landowners' liability to people entering on
their land. Until the final fruition, many cases continued to
reiterate the traditional New York rule that a landowner
389. See Potsdam Welding and Mach. Co. v. Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 394
N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1977).
390. Maure v. Fordham Motor Sales, Inc., 414 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885 (Civ. Ct.
1979); see also Elkan v. Arredondo, 468 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 1984) (finding that
a dealer that installed replacement seat belts upon sale of a used car and not the
manufacturer is liable for the seat belt's failure).
391. See Barry v. Manglass, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div. 1976).
392. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (App. Div. 1979);
Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 969,974-75 (App. Div. 1979).
393. At the same time, the lower courts also decided at least some cases in
favor of defendant producers. On occasion, they even reached pro-defendant
decisions without having any principled basis for doing so, as in the cases where
they ruled that suppliers of blood would be held only for negligence but not to a
strict liability standard for any contamination. See Iannucci v. Yonkers Gen. Hosp.,
399 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1977); Jennings v. Roosevelt Hosp., 372 N.Y.S.2d 277
(Sup. Ct. 1975); Steinikv. Doctors Hosp., 368 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1975); see also
Samuels v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 591 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1979). In other cases,
lower courts upheld the government contract defense, see In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 792-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Casablanca v.
Casablanca, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), ruled that a plaintiff could not
recover purely economic loss in a product liability action, see Steckmar Nat'l Realty
& Inv. Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1979), and decided that
the duty to warn was satisfied when a manufacturer offered to sell an optional
safety feature to a user but the user declined to spend the extra money, see Biss v.
Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (App. Div. 1978). Finally, lower courts held
that strict liability would not apply in cases involving principally the rendition of a
service rather than a sale, such as the repair of a truck, see Nickel v. Hyster Co.,
412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1978), the performance of architectural services,
see Queensbury Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 83435 (Sup. Ct. 1977), or the isolated lease of an airplane by a lingerie manufacturer,
see Nastasi v. Hochman, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 1977).
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was not liable for injuries inflicted on a trespasser or a
licensee as a result of mere negligence,394 even if that trespasser was a child.9 At the same time, however, received
doctrine was being slowly undermined as the courts made it
incrementally easier for those injured on the land of
another to recover damages.
One way in which the courts broke down traditional
doctrine was by establishing special categories of people entitled to relief after being injured on another's land even
where they were present without the landowner's permission and for purposes other than those of the owner. The
first such special category was created for public officials.
Classically, officials were regarded as mere licensees to
whom a landowner, at most, owed a duty first, to refrain
from creating traps and second, to warn of hazards known
to the owner into which the official might "unknowingly
walk[

...

,,396

With the onset of World War II, however,

courts dealt with a series of cases involving injuries to airraid wardens-civilian volunteers who at times suffered injury in their efforts to insure "complete compliance with
black-out regulations." "The protection afforded to life and
property by the air raid warden service [was] a community
enterprise," which had to be performed "with thoroughness
394. See Wilder v. Ayers, 156 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (App. Div. 1956); LeRoux v.
State, 121 N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 121 N.E.2d 386
(N.Y. 1954); Sher v. State, 86 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268-69 (Ct. Cl. 1949). Cf. Aucock v.
Neisner Bros., Inc., 123 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 1954) (finding insufficient evidence of
negligence toward invitee); Schwartz v. Cohen, 119 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (Sup. Ct.
1953) (finding that a defendant could not foresee harm to a business invitee).
395. See Merriman v. Baker, 313 N.E.2d 773, 775-76 (N.Y. 1974); Beauchamp
v. New York City lious. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 412, 415 (N.Y. 1963); LoCasto v. Long
Island R.R., 160 N.E.2d 846, 848 (N.Y. 1959); Kimbar v. Estis, 145 N.E.2d 708, 709
(N.Y.1956); Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 71 N.E.2d 447, 448-49 (N.Y. 1947);
Goldstein v. Bd. of Educ., 266 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1965); Flynn v. City of New
York, 216 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (App. Div. 1961), affd, 179 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1961);
Meyers v. 120th Ave. Bldg. Corp., 195 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (App. Div. 1959), af/'d,
182 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1962); Stinnett v. Liberty Aircraft Prods. Corp., 77 N.Y.S.2d
357 (App. Div. 1948); Moore v. State, 248 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21-22 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Harrow
v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1962), affd, 216 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1966). Cf.
MacKinnon v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1964) (holding
that a landowner owes no duty to child even on public road if injury not
foreseeable); Korzenski v. Dunkirk Radiator Corp., 241 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div.
1963), affd, 203 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1963) (holding that a landowner is not liable for
injury resulting from an unforeseeable intervening act); Quinones v. Hotel Robert
Burns, Inc., 200 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
396. Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 31 N.E.2d 503, 505 (N.Y. 1940); see
also Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 37 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1941).
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and speed" and with which failure "to cooperate" was
"incomprehensible." 97 Voluntary performance of this
patriotic duty transformed a warden into "more than a bare
licensee on defendant's premises; his relationship bordered
on that of an invitee, to whom defendant owed the duty of
reasonable care under all the circumstances." 398
After the war, the principle of the air-raid warden cases
was extended to the entire "sui generis class of persons privileged to enter upon the land for a public purpose, " 399 such

as ambulance corps members,. 0 police officers,40 ' fire personnel 2 and even census takers." 3 A public official within
this sui generis class, "being neither a trespasser nor a bare
licensee was, nevertheless, rightfully there, engaged in the
business of the public," and the landowner "[u]nder such
circumstances.., was under a duty.., to keep and
0 4 maintain" its premises "in a reasonably safe condition."'
Laborers were another group given sui generis treatment and authorized to recover from landowners for their
injuries whether they came on the land as invitees, licensees or trespassers. Much of this special law was created by
statute. One statute that was a subject of frequent litigation imposed on owners a nondelegable duty to furnish a
safe workplace to anyone engaged in constructing, repairing, painting or cleaning a building. 45 The purpose of this
397. Rashid v. Weill, 46 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713-14 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
398. Klein v. Herlim Realty Corp., 54 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd,
58 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. Div. 1945). But cf. Field v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 62
N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 1946), affd, 73 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1947) (finding that a
building owner complying with blackout order is not liable for injury occurring
solely as a consequence of compliance).
399. Miller v. Roman Catholic Church of St. Stephen, 262 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363
(App. Div. 1965), rev'd on othergrounds, 224 N.E.2d 720 (N.Y. 1966).
400. Id.
401. See Skupeen v. City of New York, 287 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (App. Div. 1968);
Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (App. Div. 1957).
402. See McCarthy v. Port of New York Auth., 290 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (App.
Div. 1968).
403. See Glassbrook v. Mahni Realty Corp., 108 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 1951).
404. Id. at 652.
405. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1988). For cases holding owners and
general contractors liable under this and related sections, see Sarnoff v. Charles
Schad, Inc., 239 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 1968); Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., 216 N.E.2d
317 (N.Y. 1966); Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 93 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1950);
Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 83 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 1948); Semanchuck v. Fifth
Ave. & Thirty-Seventh St. Corp., 49 N.E.2d 507, 508 (N.Y. 1943); Lowenhar v.
Commercial Outfitting Co., 260 A.D. 211 (N.Y. 1941); Rocha v. State, 360 N.Y.S.2d
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statute was "not alone to provide remedies for laborers but
more particularly to prevent accidents causing the injuries
by "compel[ling] a high standard of care.""8 Another statute
required owners of factory buildings to provide all stairways
with handrails."7 In addition to statutory duties, a "common-law duty rest[ed] on an owner.., to provide a safe
place to work" for any laborer."'
The courts also developed other techniques to expand
the liability of landowners for injuries occurring on their
premises. One such technique was to hold owners who
transferred title to their property liable for injuries occurring after such transfer until such time as the transferee
had the opportunity to assume control of the land.4"9

484, 487-88 (App. Div. 1974); Horan v. Dormitory Auth., 349 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451-52
(App. Div. 1973); Moore v. Suburban Fuel Oil Serv. Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232
(App. Div. 1964); Duncan v. Twin Leasing Corp., 131 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div.
1954). But see Whelan v. Warwick Valley Civic & Soc. Club, 393 N.E.2d 1032 (N.Y.
1979) (finding that a statutory duty is not applicable if work is performed by an
unpaid volunteer); Bidetto v. New York City Hous. Auth., 250 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y.
1969) (owner not liable if contractor controls work); see also Avesato v. Paul
Tishman Co., 142 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (holding that the burden of proving
lack of safe place to work is on the plaintiff).
406. Rufo v. Orlando, 130 N.E.2d 887, 890 (N.Y. 1955). Thus, an owner could
not recover indemnification against a general contractor, nor a general contractor
against a subcontractor, see Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Di Cesare &
Monaco Concrete Constr. Corp., 194 N.Y.S.2d 103, 109-110 (App. Div. 1959),
unless the party seeking indemnification was guilty only of passive negligence and
the party from who it was sought was guilty of active negligence, see McManus v.
Bd. of Educ., 106 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Similar rules applied when
owners sought indemnification against active tortfeasors for injuries to persons
other than laborers. Compare Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 297 N.E.2d 80,
83 (N.Y. 1973); Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 192 N.E.2d 167, 169 (N.Y.
1963), with Colon v. Bd. of Educ., 184 N.E.2d 294,297 (N.Y. 1962).
407. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 272 (McKinney 1988); DeCasiano v. Morgan, 127
N.E.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. 1955).
408. Rusin v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., 261 N.E.2d 635, 636
(N.Y. 1970) (dictum); see also De Clara v. Barber S.S. Lines, 132 N.E.2d 871, 87677 (N.Y. 1956); Steeley v. City of New York, 157 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd
on othergrounds, 148 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1958); Cf. In re Sabbatino & Co., 150 F.2d
101, 105 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that a union officer is an invitee). But see
McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 228 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that an owner
is not liable for work of contractor which is inherently dangerous).
409. See Pharm v. Lituchy, 27 N.E.2d 811, 812 (N.Y. 1940); Capasso v.
Rosenblum, 375 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. Div. 1975); Farragher v. City of New York, 275
N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 1966). Cf. Horn v. State, 357 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div.
1974). But see Torres v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(finding no liability if an owner has "completely parted with possession and
control").
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Another technique was to bar a mere user of land, who
lacked a full possessory interest, from asserting the rights
of a landowner against trespassers.41 Observing that "the
common law of this State is not an anachronism, but.., a
living law which responds to the surging reality of changed
conditions," judges even expanded the liability of landowners to invitees, overruling old cases that did not require
outdoor lighting on public buildings and holding that even a
church had a duty to provide such lights.41'
The most important change occurred, however, when
judges manipulated the rule that a landowner could not impose intentional or wanton injury or act in an affirmatively
negligent fashion toward licensees and trespassers."' Arguing that the "rigid rules of an action at law for negligence
bend before a situation where the life of a person is
imperilled,"' one court held that leaving a car parked on
an incline was active rather than merely passive negligence
that rendered a landowner liable to a social guest struck by
the car.414 Similarly, leaving a pool of oil on a driveway was
held to be an act "of an affirmative nature, in the sense that
the pool of oil was not a danger inherent in any defect in the
property, but was placed there by an affirmative act.""
Under such an approach, all that was necessary to hold a
landowner liable, at least to a licensee, was the existence of
"a dangerous condition on the premises, which was known
to him, but not to plaintiffs."4 Licensees and trespassers
were also aided in their suits against landowners by procedural rules that construed allegations in their complaints
410. See Bain v. New York Cent. R.R., 342 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1965).
411. Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman Catholic Church, 236 N.E.2d 632, 634
(N.Y. 1968), overruling Boyce v. 228th & Carpenter Ave. Holding Co., 64 N.E.2d
282 (N.Y. 1945) (by implication); Hirschler v. Briarcliff Management Corp., 91
N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1950); Landes v. Barone, 122 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1954). For other
cases holding landowners liability for injuries to invitees, see Betzag v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 83 N.E.2d 833 (N.Y. 1949); Bishop v. Hamad, 350 N.Y.S.2d 270 (App. Div.
1973); Bergmann v. Daino, 274 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 1966); Abrash v. Long
Island Univ., 255 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div. 1964); Sardo v. LaScalza, 236 N.Y.S.2d
650 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For cases in which verdicts for invitees were set aside, see
Ferrara v. Sheraton McAlpin Corp., 311 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1962); Halverson v. 562
W. 149th St. Corp., 47 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1943).
412. For a statement of the rule, see Carney v. Buyea, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905
(App. Div. 1946).
413. Id. at 907.
414. Id.; see also Mangione v. Dimino, 332 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1972).
415. Friedman v. Berkowitz, 136 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (City Ct. 1954).
416. Farber v. Meiler, 104 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 1951).
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broadly4 17 and left all fact questions about a plaintiffs
status and a defendant's negligence to the jury.418
Comparable developments occurred in cases involving
infant plaintiffs. Despite an occasional judgment for a landowner and an awareness by judges of "the statements
contained in much of our case law.., as to the degree of
care owing to those stated to be trespassers, invitees, and
bare licensees," which had grown out of "the necessities of
industry and enterprise, and also perhaps the preservation
of a freedom for one to do as he pleases with his own,"
judges knew that "facts made the law."42 ° Accordingly the
general approach of the courts was that, as long as juries
were properly instructed,"1 they had a free hand in deciding
questions of status and negligence. 22
It was easy to transform this approach into a new body
of doctrine allowing children to recover from landowners on
whose premises they suffered injury. The case of Mayer v.
4 wherein a jury returned a verdict for a
Temple Properties,
child who fell into a fifty-five-foot-deep pit, will illustrate. In
sustaining the jury's verdict, the Court of Appeals declared
that:
to cover a hole... with "flimsy" pieces of wood that quickly
crumbled under the feet of the infant decedent, plunging him to
his death in the boiler room far below, constitutes an affirmative
creation of a situation pregnant with the gravest danger to life or
limb, and a deceptive trap to the unwary, as perilous as an explosive bomb, highly inflammable material, a spring gun, or kindred devices. This bringing about of an inherently hazardous

417. See Curren v. O'Connor, 109 N.E.2d 605, 606 (N.Y. 1952).
418. See Velez v. City of New York, 358 N.Y.S.2d 18 (App. Div. 1974); see also
Cesario v. Chiapparine, 250 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App. Div. 1964) (holding a social guest
of a landowner as an invitee of a neighboring landowner over whose property the
first landowner had an easement).
419. See Eason v. State, 104 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
420. Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 63 N.Y.S.2d 597, 601-02 (App. Div.
1946).
421. For reversals on the ground of incorrect instructions, see Hetzel v. Buffalo
Cemetery Ass'n, 229 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. Div. 1962); Molnar v. Slattery Contracting
Co., 185 N.Y.S.2d 449 (App. Div. 1959).
422. See Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 41 N.E.2d 161, 162 (N.Y.
1942); Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 26 N.E.2d 970, 972 (N.Y. 1940);
Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 59 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds 71 N.E.2d 447 (N.Y. 1947); Hawkins v. E. New York Sav. Bank, 22
N.Y.S.2d 905 (App. Div. 1940).
423. 122 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1954).
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situation... is tantamount to a reckless disregard of the safety of
human life equivalent to willfulness, and an
4 24 utter heedlessness of
care commensurate with the risk involved.

Other cases in which the courts found landowners to
have created perilous traps or to be guilty of affirmative
negligence that rendered them liable to youthful licensees
or trespassers, involved drip pails containing flammable
liquids, 25 a wooden garage door barrier,426 a conveyer belt,
a building that was "decayed, rotted, [and] without doors
windows or barricades,428 and an unattended lawnmower.2 '

As the Court of Appeals summarized doctrine, "the 'trespass' theory... ha[d] lost force .. as a rigid concept by
which all such cases are to be at once dismissed," 4' and

landowners now owed children whom they knew to be
present on their land a duty "to disclose .. dangerous
defects known to defendant and not likely to be discovered
by plaintiff."'
Other cases decided between the 1950s and the early
1970s continued to muddy the waters. For example, one
case held that a ten-year-old boy who placed fish which he
was buying for his mother into a grinder was protected by
the child labor laws;432 a second case stated that evidence of
a landowner's acquiescence in a pattern of trespasses could
turn the trespassers into licensees;4 3 a third case ruled that
a child who was playing in a residential swimming pool
while his father discussed business with the residence's
owner was an invitee rather than a social guest;43 4 and a

fourth case determined that the duty of homeowners toward
an elderly woman whom they were nursing in their home
"was not measured by what their duty would have been to a

424.
425.
426.
427.
1962).
428.
429.
430.
1968).
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 915.
See Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 235 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1968).
See Krause v. Alper, 151 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1959).
See Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 464 (App. Div.
Runkel v. City of New York, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485,487 (App. Div. 1953).
See Popkin v. Shanker, 232 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 235 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y.
Krause v. Alper, 151 N.E.2d 895, 897 (N.Y. 1959).
See Genud v. Tauber, 325 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
See Stanton v. Tami Ami Realty Co., 132 N.E.2d 324 (N.Y. 1956).
See Shapiro v. Silverstein, 331 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 1972).
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social guest as a mere licensee."" 5 Two other cases declared
that "[o]ne in control or possession of... premises has the
duty to control the conduct of those permitted.., to enter
upon the premises,"436 while an earlier case had taken the
view, without focusing on the categories of invitee, licensee,
or trespasser, that "the owner of property who expressly or
by implication invites an individual or the public generally
upon his land.., must see that the property itself and the
facilities thereon do not subject those invited to foreseeable
harm."437 A leading Court of Appeals case similarly held
"that the proper standard of care owed [even] to trespassers
by a property owner, in refraining from willful, wanton or
intentional acts or their equivalents, [was] to be determined
from the pertinent facts and relevant circumstances of each
case.'438 Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the "classical com-

mon law distinctions as they relate to the duty owing to
trespassers, licensees and invitees" had been transformed
into matters "of degree and not of substance!"S'

0 the Court of Appeals "pause[d] ...
In Basso v. Miller,4

to reflect" 1 on the doctrinal transformation that occurred
in the law of landowners' duties toward trespassers, licensees and invitees, "reconsider[ed] the necessity for such
classification," and held "that the distinctions need no longer be made." 2 "Rather than to demand continued attempts to fit a plaintiff into one of the three rigid categories," the Court of Appeals "abandoned the classifications
entirely and announced [its] adherence to the single standard of reasonable care, under the circumstances"--a standard "no different than that applied in the usual negligence
action." 3 When the Court of Appeals reiterated "the all-

435. Thibault v. Franzese, 264 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div. 1965).
436. Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 340 N.Y.S.2d
137, 142 (App. Div. 1973); see also Pond v. Regis, 270 N.Y.S.2d 121 (App. Div.
1966), rev'd on other grounds,282 AD.914 (App. Div. 1953).
437. Smyke v. State, 117 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (Ct. C1. 1952); see also Caldwell v.
Village of Island Park, 107 N.E.2d 441, 443 (N.Y. 1952).
438. Carradine v. City of New York, 196 N.E.2d 260, 264 (N.Y. 1963)
(emphasis in original).
439. Hirsch v. Hade, 304 N.Y.S.2d 40, 42, 46 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (emphasis in
original), rev'd on other grounds,310 N.Y.S.2d 14 (App. Div. 1970).
440. 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976).
441. Id. at 871.
442. Id.

443. Id.

202

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

embracing standard of reasonable care"444 and the lower
courts followed along,445 the special rules holding landowners to a lower than ordinary standard of care toward
trespassers and nonbusiness guests were eliminated. Instead, everyone received the benefit of the same broad
standard of liability which, at one time, only invitees had
enjoyed. The only exceptions remaining to the standard of
reasonable care were the special situations, generally created by statute, where landowners
were held to a higher
446
standard of strict liability.
D. Assumption of Risk and ContributoryNegligence
The law of negligence constituted a third area of
doctrinal change, much of it facilitating easier recovery of
damages, during the decades after World War II. The most
important developments occurred through the amelioration
of the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses.
Significant amelioration occurred in the assumption of
risk doctrine, which came to be viewed as a valid defense
only in cases where a plaintiff made a thorough investigation and with full knowledge made a decision to engage
in activity for some economic profit.447 The defense was
eliminated, however, in certain statutory areas, such as
FELA cases" 8 and suits by firemen.449 Moreover, its scope
was constricted in other areas by procedural rules, such as
one requiring that a defendant wishing to raise the defense

444. Quinlan v. Cecchini, 363 N.E.2d 578, 581 (N.Y. 1977); see also Scurti v.
City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794 (N.Y. 1976).
445. See Eddy v. Syracuse Univ., 433 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1980); Skelka v.
Metro. Transit Auth., 430 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (App. Div. 1980); Goodman v. Vizsla
Club of Am., Inc., 422 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1979); Meyer v. State, 403 N.Y.S.2d
420, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
446. See Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 1276 (N.Y. 1978).
447. See Monacelli v. State, 67 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1946) (involving the removal
of a wall which resulted in flooding); Eufemia v. Pacifico, 261 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App.
Div. 1965) (dealing with the rescue of property from a burning house); Papke v.
Cushing Stone Co., 215 N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1961) (involving the purchase of
property after a full study of a neighborhood).
448. See Palum v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 165 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1948); Olinski v.
New York Cent. R.R., 162 F. Supp. 23, 27 (W.D.N.Y. 1956); Sadowsld v. Long
Island R.R., 55 N.E.2d 497,498 (N.Y. 1944).
449. See Carroll v. Pellicio Bros., Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd
on othergrounds, 271 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Div. 1966).
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"must specifically allege... [it] as an affirmative defense.""' Even more important were emerging rules stipulating that assumption of risk could not be found if a
plaintiff "did not fully perceive the risk involved"45 ' and,
even where the risk was perceived, could not be upheld if
the plaintiff was merely acting as the defendant had instructed or expected him to act. 2
Even more remarkable was the judiciary's effort to
ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence
doctrine. Certain courts continued to bar plaintiffs from recovering damages on the basis of contributory negligence,453
as they ruled that one who chose a foreseeably risky approach over an approach that was comparatively risk-free
was guilty of contributory negligence.454 As one judge said, it
was a "general rule that a plaintiff who has equal knowledge with
a defendant.., is guilty of contributory negli455
gence.
Far more significant, however, were the cases rejecting
or limiting the doctrine. For example, a long line of cases
held that contributory negligence was inapplicable in cases
where plaintiffs' rights were grounded in a statute making
a defendant strictly liable,4 6 as was true in the case of much

450. Valder v. Weston, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 1977).
451. Wolf v. City of New York, 349 N.E.2d 858, 860 (N.Y. 1976); see also
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Lopez v. Resort Airlines, 18 F.R.D. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Jackson v.
Livingston Country Club, Inc., 391 N.Y.S.2d 234 (App. Div. 1977) (participant in
sport assumes risks inherent in sport but not unknown negligence by other
participants).
452. See Porter v. Alvis Contracting Corp., 394 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (App. Div.
1977); Sauer v. Hebrew Inst. of Long Island, Inc., 227 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (Sup. Ct.
1962), rev'd on othergrounds, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (App. Div. 1962).
453. See, e.g., Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 466 F. Supp. 1133, 1147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Moon v. Finkle, 159 N.E.2d
701 (N.Y. 1959); Cosby v. City of Rochester, 135 N.E.2d 706 (N.Y. 1956); Terry v.
Midvale Golf& Country Club, 425 N.Y.S.2d 900 (App. Div. 1980). Some rules were
also stable, such as the rule that provided that contributory negligence was an
issue of fact for the jury. See McDowall v. Koehring Basic Constr. Equip., 404
N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1980); Christianson v. Breen, 43 N.E.2d 478, 479 (N.Y. 1942);
Andross v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 38 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1941).
454. See Nucci v. Warshaw Constr. Corp., 186 N.E.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. 1962);
McAllister v. New York City Hous. Auth., 175 N.E.2d 449, 450 (N.Y. 1961); Owen
v. Westchester Country Club, 47 N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1943).
455. Bach v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 600, 604 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
456. See Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. Sch. Dist., 234 N.E.2d 243, 245
(N.Y. 1967).
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labor legislation guaranteeing a safe place to work4 1 7 and
legislation giving firemen a right to recover for injuries.4"8
Courts also held that infants of tender years, 59 as well as
others of similarly limited mental capacity, 460 could not be
contributorily negligent and thereby barred from recovery
for injuries.
Three additional "common-law attempt[s] to alleviate
the harsh consequences of strict adherence to the traditional contributor~y negligence rule" were the doctrine of
last clear chance, 4 1 the doctrine allowing a person to place
him or herself in danger to rescue another in imminent

457. See Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 83 N.E.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. 1948);
Pollard v. Trivia Bldg. Corp., 50 N.E.2d 287, 290 (N.Y. 1943); Long v. ForestFehlhaber Joint Venture, 427 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651 (App. Div. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 433 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 1982); Koploff v. St. Vincent Ferrer Church, 331
N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 1972); Melzer v. 195 Broadway Corp., 230 N.Y.S.2d 479
(App. Div. 1962); Hunter v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 181 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
Cf. Gould v. State, 92 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (holding State bound by
"standards which it has created for others" and hence cannot assert contributory
negligence of its construction employees). But see DiLeo v. Lincoln Center for the
Performing Arts, Inc., 329 N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1972); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Paul Mancini & Sons, 192 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92 (App. Div. 1959) (holding that
contributory negligence remains a defense if case is grounded in violation of
regulation rather than of statute itself); Kluttz v. Citron, 141 N.E.2d 547, 549 (N.Y.
1957) (holding that an employee who remodels a tool provided by his employer is
barred from recovering for injury caused by the tool).
458. See Carroll v. Pellicio Bros., Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
459. See Woods v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (involving a
four-year-old child); Smiel v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 835, 837 (N.D.N.Y. 1957)
(involving a three-year-old child); Stein v. Palisi, 125 N.E.2d 575, 576 (N.Y. 1955)
(dealing with a nineteen-month-old child); Verni v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y.
1946) (involving a three-year-old child). Cf Schuvart v. Werner, 50 N.E.2d 533
(N.Y. 1943) (holding that a case involving a nine-year-old child presents an issue of
fact for the jury). See also DeMarco v. City of Albany, 234 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (App.
Div. 1962).
460. See Padula v. State, 398 N.E.2d 548 (N.Y. 1979) (involving drug addicts at
a rehabilitation center); Young v. State, 401 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (involving
a mental patient at a state hospital); Zajaczkowski v. State, 71 N.Y.S.2d 261, 264
(Ct. Cl. 1947) (involving a patient at a state institution "with a mental age of two
and one-half years").
461. Dominguez v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 388
N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (N.Y. 1979). CompareKlepal v. Pennsylvania R.R., 129 F. Supp.
668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 229 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1956) (applying the doctrine),
Kumkumian v. City of New York, 111 N.E.2d 865, 867 (N.Y. 1953) (applying the
doctrine), and Chadwick v. City of New York, 93 N.E.2d 625, 628 (N.Y. 1950)
(applying the doctrine); with Mulberg v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 157 F.2d 805 (2d
Cir. 1946) (rejecting the doctrine); Hernandez v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp.,
32 N.E.2d 542, 545 (N.Y. 1940) (rejecting the doctrine).
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peril,462 and the rule that contributory negligence would not
bar a plaintiffs recovery if it was not a proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injuries.4 Yet other cases held that when a
superior directed a workman on a job "to proceed under
circumstances recognizable as dangerous, the subordinate
workman ha[d] little, if any, choice in the matter but to
obey" and would not be contributorily negligent;46 that a
plaintiff whose life had been threatened did not become
contributorily negligent by appearing in a location where he
had no particular reason to believe the threat would be
carried out;465 that failure to discover a hidden defect did not
constitute contributory negligence;466 that having three

drinks of scotch by itself was not contributory negligence; 6

and that ordinary contributory negligence would not bar
recovery for wanton negligence.46 A final line of cases held
that, even when a person's negligence barred his or her own
recovery, it would not be imputed to others with whom the
negligent individual had a relationship so as to bar their

462. See Rossman v. LaGrega, 270 N.E.2d 313, 315 (N.Y. 1971); Orwat v.
Smetansky, 239 N.E.2d 749 (N.Y. 1968); Paul v. Flag Fish Co., 180 N.Y.S.2d 73
(App. Div. 1958); Breslin v. State, 72 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65-66 (Ct. C1. 1947); Talbert v.
Talbert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Landby v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 105 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Malone v. Liss, Inc. Serv. Station,
162 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639 (City Ct. 1957). Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y.
1968), extended the doctrine of rescue from cases where a plaintiff came to the aid
of a third party in peril to cases in which a plaintiff attempted to rescue himself
from a peril he had created, and later cases applied the doctrine for the benefit of
any plaintiff acting in an emergency. See Johnson v. Hickson, 374 N.E.2d 616, 617
(N.Y. 1978); Amaro v. City of New York, 351 N.E.2d 665, 669 (N.Y. 1976);
Raimondo v. Harding, 341 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1973). The existence of the
rescue doctrine was recognized but held inapplicable to business torts in Trott v.
Dean Witter & Co., 438 F. Supp. 842,845-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
463. See Bazydlo v. Placid Marcy Co., 422 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1970); Noth v.
Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Ortiz v. Kinoshita & Co., 292
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (App. Div. 1968). It followed that failure to use a seat belt would
not save a defendant from liability, although it might reduce the amount of
recoverable damages. See Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974); Dillon
v. Humphreys, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17-18 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
464. See Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 93 N.E.2d 629, 632 (N.Y. 1950);
Kaplan v. 48th Ave. Corp., 45 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (App. Div. 1943).
465. See Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451,457 (N.Y. 1980).
466. See Fredericks v. Am. Export Lines, 117 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
affd, 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1954).
467. See Coleman v. New York City Transit Auth., 332 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y.
1975).
468. See Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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recovery for any injuries they may have suffered.469
These various ameliorations "of the recognized harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine" 47 -led one judge
as early as 1957 to urge the legislature to "recognize the
need for a rule of comparative negligence. ' 71 By the early
1970s, judges were more strongly suggesting "that a view of
contributory negligence which makes it an absolute bar to a
plaintiffs recovery cannot survive" and that "the applicability of the comparative negligence rule... [should] be ex-

amined" by the courts.7 2 Other judges went even further

and held "that contributory negligence doctrine is no longer
the law of this state,4 73 while the Appellate Division expressed concern that trial judges might "misle[ald the jury
into employing a standard of comparative negligence."4 4 In
the end, however, the change to comparative negligence
was finalized not through common law adjudication but by
legislation.7 5
A new statute, which despite lower court holdings to
the contrary did not apply retroactively and did not take
effect until 1975, 476 sought "to ameliorate the harsh result
when a plaintiff is slightly negligent and fairly to apportion
damages among the parties." ' Resting on a view that
469. See Jayne v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 124 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1941);
Marino v. Kane, 131 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1956); Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 308 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1973); Molino v.
County of Putnam, 272 N.E.2d 323, 325 (N.Y. 1971); Continental Auto Lease Corp.
v. Campbell, 227 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1967); Searles v. Dardani, 347 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664
(Sup. Ct. 1973); McLaughlin v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B, 408 F.2d 1334, 1336-37
(2d Cir. 1969). But see Halpern v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 326, 330 (E.D.N.Y.
1955) (ruling that the contributory negligence of driver attributable to passenger
who has control of vehicle); Schumann v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 107, 109
(E.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that the contributory negligence of husband-driver
imputed to wife-owner when she was present in vehicle).
470. Wartels v. County Asphalt, Inc., 278 N.E.2d 627, 632 (N.Y. 1972).
471. Condon v. Epstein, 168 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (Civ. Ct. 1957).
472. Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
473. Long v. Zientowski, 340 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (City Ct. 1973); see also Dixon
v. Knickerbocker Drivurself, Inc., 341 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (City Ct. 1973); Berenger
v. Gottlieb, 338 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323-24 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
474. Binder v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 370 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (App. Div.
1975); see also Gill v. Anderson, 333 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1972).
475. See Laws of 1975, ch. 69 (1975), codified in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411-13
(McKinney 1997).
476. See Binder v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 370 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (App. Div.
1975).
477. Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14
(App. Div. 1980); see also Abbate v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 821,
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"'fundamental fairness does not require an all-or-nothing
rule which exonerates a very negligent defendant for even
the slightest fault of his victim,""'78 the 1975 legislation
"melded contributory negligence and assumption of risk
into the term 'culpable conduct' and determined that such
conduct" would not bar a plaintiffs suit but only result in
"diminution of any damages a plaintiff might otherwise be
entitled to recover." 79 Courts read the legislation broadly
and applied it to a wide variety of suits including commer48 ° derivative causes of action 481 and bailment
cial cases,
482
cases.

E. Joint Liability
Corresponding to the supplanting of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk with the less harsh doctrine of comparative negligence was a change in New York
law regulating contribution among joint tortfeasors. As late
as the middle of the twentieth century, New York's courts
severely limited a tortfeasor's ability to obtain contribution
against joint tortfeasors in the absence of a contract of
indemnification. 48 3 A starting rule was that, "[wihere separ-

ate acts of negligence combine[d] to produce directly a single injury each tortfeasor was responsible for the entire

result."84 A plaintiff was free to sue whichever tortfeasor he
or she wished,485 and the ability of a defendant "held liable
823 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
478. Lippes v. Atlantic Bank of New York, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (App. Div.
1979).
479. Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (App. Div.
1980), rev'd on othergrounds,424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981).
480. See Lippes v. Atlantic Bank of New York, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505, 512-13 (App.
Div. 1979).
481. See Lieberman v. Maltz, 415 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
482. See Mannis v. Pine Hills Taxi Co., 386 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (City Ct. 1976).
The statute gave rise to several novel procedural issues which the lower courts
resolved. See Noga v. Monroe Medi-Trans, 433 N.Y.S.2d 927 (App. Div. 1980);
Koehler v. City of New York, 423 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Bycel v. Freeman,
406 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Smart v. Wozniak, 385 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
483. Such contracts would "not be construed to indemnify a party against his
own negligence unless such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms." Margolin
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 297 N.E.2d 80, 82 (N.Y. 1973). See also Kurek v. Port
Chester Hous. Auth., 223 N.E.2d 25, 27 (N.Y. 1966).
484. Hill v. Edmonds, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1021 (App. Div. 1966).
485. See Robbins Music Corp. v. Alamo Music, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 29, 31
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for negligence... [to] pass that liability on to another
negligent party [was] closely circumscribed."486 One requirement was that there be a joint money judgment against the
tortfeasor seeking contribution as well as the tortfeasor
from whom it was sought, and thus a tortfeasor who had
not been sued or against whom suit had been dismissed
could not be made to contribute.8 7 A second rule was that a
tortfeasor who had been actively negligent could not recover
from joint tortfeasors who had only been passively negligent
any portion of a judgment paid to an injured plaintiff."
Three cases decided in 1972 transformed doctrine. The
first, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,489 held that "where a third

party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not
all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the
prime defendant against the third party," either in a
separate action or by joining the third party in the original,
main action.49 Three months later, Kelly v. Long Island

Lighting Co.491 held that even an active tortfeasor could

recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor. The third
case, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,492 continued
the trend toward equitable apportionment of damages among potential defendants by permitting infant plaintiffs
injured by blasting caps to join fifteen manufacturers of the
caps and their trade association in a single suit even though
the plaintiffs did not know which manufacturer had produced the particular cap that had injured them. The decision was based on the theory either that the "defendants...
[had] exercise[d] actual collective control over a particular
risk-creating product or activity" or that 'liability...
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
486. Anderson v. Lib. Fast Freight Co., 135 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 1954).
487. See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648, 651 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Baidach v. Togut, 164 N.E.2d 373, 375 (N.Y. 1959).
488. See Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 192 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1963);
Colon v. Bd. of Educ., 184 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y.1962); Bush Terminal Bldg. Co. v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 174 N.E.2d 516 (N.Y. 1961); Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 158
N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1959); Rufo v. Orlando, 130 N.E.2d 888 (N.Y. 1955); McFall v.
Compagnie Maritime Belge S.A., 107 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1952); Beckerman v.
Walter J. Munro, Inc., 266 N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div. 1966); Musco v. Yonkers Gen.
Hosp., 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1964).
489. 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
490. Id. at 291-92.
491. 286 N.E.2d 241 (N.Y. 1972).
492. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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[should be] imposed on the most strategically placed participants in a risk-creating process. ' 93 Since each manufacturer was liable under at least one of these theories for
some negligence, they were proper parties to a suit, as well
as proper contributors to a judgment under Dole.
F. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur494 was another subject of pro-plaintiff
development. Basic doctrine, permitting a "jury to infer
negligence if the injury is the type which ordinarily does not
occur without the neglect of some duty owed to the plaintiff
and the defendant is in exclusive possession and control of
the instrumentality,"49 remained constant, and the decisive
issue in most reported cases always involved the sufficiency
of evidence. 49 6 But some significant developments did occur.
One development was the gradual erosion of the rule
arising out of dictum in the 1938 case of Ingersoll v. Liberty

493. Id. at 376. Joint liability would not be imposed on parties who were
merely engaged in an activity together, such as playing in a touch football game, if
their activity was not inherently dangerous. See Beaver v. Batrouny, 419 N.Y.S.2d
391 (App. Div. 1979).
494. An analogous and overlapping body of doctrine in New York dealt with
circumstantial evidence. Although an occasional case drew a distinction between
decisions on the basis of circumstantial evidence and decisions grounded in res
ipsa loquitur, see Markel v. Spencer, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770, 780 (App. Div. 1958), most
cases mixed the two approaches together with the observation that "[tihe doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule .... [but] a common-sense appraisal of
the probative value of circumstantial evidence.'m George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New
York, 38 N.E.2d 455,459 (N.Y. 1941).
495. DeWitt Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 377 N.E.2d 461, 465 (N.Y.
1978); see also Panico v. American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 116, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Dittiger v. Isal Realty Corp., 49 N.E.2d 980 (N.Y. 1943); George
Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 38 N.E.2d 455 (N.Y. 1941); Markel v. Spencer, 171
N.Y.S.2d 770 (App. Div. 1958). Oddly, the oldest and most recent of the cases cited,
Foltis and DeWitt Properties, both involved breakages in New York City water
mains and Court of Appeals reversals of judgments for plaintiffs in the courts
below.
496. See Putnam v. Stout, 345 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1976); Rogers v. Dorchester
Assoc., 300 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1973); Feblot v. New York Times Co., 299 N.E.2d 672
(N.Y. 1973); Langner v. Jessup Holding, Inc., 175 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1961); Cole v.
Swagler, 125 N.E.2d 592 (N.Y. 1955); Stein v. Palisi, 125 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1955);
Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 100 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1951); Broderick v. CauldwellWingate Co., 93 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1950); Betzag v. Gulf Oil Corp., 83 N.E.2d 833
(N.Y. 1949); McCabe v. Cohen, 63 N.E.2d 88 (N.Y. 1945); Neuhoffv. Retlaw Realty
Corp., 45 N.E.2d 450 (N.Y. 1942); Silverberg v. Schweig, 42 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y.
1942); Dillon v. Rochaway Beach Hosp. & Dispensary, 30 N.E.2d 373 (N.Y. 1940).
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Bank of Buffalo49 7 that, in cases involving more than one

possible cause of injury for only one of which a defendant
was responsible, the requirement of exclusive control prevented a plaintiff from recovering if it was equally probable
that the injury resulted from one cause as from another."8
The first step in the rule's atrophy occurred in a 1944 case
involving the collapse of a barricade erected by one of two
defendant construction companies engaged in renovating
the defendant owner's business premises. Resting at the
close of the plaintiffs case, the defendants offered no evidence as to who constructed the barricade, but the Court of
Appeals nonetheless held the doctrine of res ipsa applicable
to all three defendants-the owner and the two construction
companies. The court explained that, "[wihere, as here, one
or some or all of three interdependent defendants are in
control... , it is for them to explain their action and
conduct."499 Undermining of the rule continued with the
court subsequently holding that in cases where two or more
defendants had a "shared or dual duty" toward a plaintiff,
"the application of res ipsa loquitur against either or both"
was appropriate."0 With the Court of Appeals indicating its
opposition to "[r]igidity of legal rules" in negligence cases,
its preference for "more legal flexibility on what is
negligence," and its direction that "the question" of
negligence should be "left open to factual judgments of the
jury,"0 ' lower courts found "[e]xclusive control" to be "a
concept which is not 'absolutely rigid,"' particularly in cases
where "defendants came forward with no explanation
overcoming the implications of plaintiffs proof.""' Thus,
courts held that in cases "[w]here there is more than one
cause of an injury, the injured party," if he or she wished,
497. 14 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1938).
498. See Wragge v. Marmorale, 258 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560 (App. Div. 1965); Popper
v. City of New York, 117 N.Y.S.2d 335, 341 (App. Div. 1952); Solomon v. Brooklyn
Cornell Utilities, Inc., 38 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1942); Newton v. State, 222
N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Lipinsky v. City of New York, 179 N.Y.S.2d 978
(Sup. Ct. 1957).
499. Schroeder v. City & County Sav. Bank, 57 N.E.2d 57 (N.Y. 1944); see also
Dullard v. Berkeley Assoc. Co., 606 F.2d 890, 894 (2d Cir. 1979); DeWitt
Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 377 N.E.2d 461, 466 (1978) (dictum).
500. Corcoran v. Banner Super Market, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 304, 307 (N.Y. 1967)
(emphasis removed).
501. Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 216 N.E.2d 324, 325 (N.Y.
1966).
502. Chisholm v. Mobil Oil Corp., 356 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (App. Div. 1974).
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could bring suit against only one defendant and "need only
show that the injury was sustained wholly or in part by a
cause for which th[at] defendant was responsible." 3 In the
end, courts failed to apply the requirement of exclusive control "overliterally."5 4
A second change favoring injury victims occurred in the
rule that, when a plaintiff has some specific evidence about
how an injury occurred, he or she was required to elect
whether to rely on res ipsa loquitur or to present the
specific evidence to the jury."' The rule had never enjoyed
unanimous acceptance,'o however, and the Court of
Appeals ruled in Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc."°7 that a
plaintiff could proceed simultaneously both with specific
evidence of negligence and on a res ipsa theory, except in
cases where witnesses and other specific evidence were
readily available. 8 Lower courts, of course, followed suit.0 9
The central issue in the res ipsa cases, of course, was
always one of how best to allow a party without access to
evidence to present a case and to compel a party in possession of evidence to come forward with proof. Throughout the
middle of the twentieth century, New York courts leaned
toward an increasingly "'common-sense' approach,510 by
holding, for instance, that a plaintiff with amnesia as a
result of the events causing an injury would be held to a
lesser degree of proof than a plaintiff who could have
testified. Almost invariably this realist posture made it
easier for victims of injury to maintain their actions for
damages.

503. Lewis v. State, 179 N.Y.S.2d 2,5 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
504. Gerard v. Am. Airlines, 272 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1959).
505. See Colesanti v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 150 F. Supp. 880, 881
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Zaninovich v. Am. Airlines, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (App. Div.
1966); Whylie v. Craig Hall, Inc., 74 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (App. Div. 1947).
506. See Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, 264 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1959);
Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Caivana v.
Spohn, 217 N.Y.S.2d 624,625-26 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
507. 245 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1969).
508. See Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d 762, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
509. See Monroe v. City of New York, 414 N.Y.S.2d 718,723 (App. Div. 1979).
510. Panico v. American Export Lines, 213 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
511. See Wartels v. County Asphalt, Inc., 278 N.E.2d 627, 631 (N.Y. 1972);
Schechter v. Klanfer, 269 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1971).
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G. A New Choice of Law Theory
A final development generally favorable to injury victims occurred with the rejection of the traditional choice of
law rule, which had provided that liability in tort depended
on the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the alleged
tort occurred.51 The traditional rule had always contained
an exception against the application of foreign law contrary
to the public policy of New York,513 and in the first case signaling a departure from the old rule, the Court of Appeals
had refused to apply a $15,000 limitation on wrongful death
recoveries contained in a Massachusetts statute. The case
involved an airplane carrying a New York resident which
crashed in Massachusetts during a flight that had
originated in New York. As the court observed:
Modern conditions made it unjust and anomalous to subject the
traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States
through and over which they move. The number of States limiting
death case damages has become smaller over the years but there
are still 14 of them.... An air traveler from New York may in a
flight of a few hours' duration pass through several of these
commonwealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a State he
never intended to cross.... The place of injury has become
entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if possible provide protection
for our own State's people against unfair and anachronistic
14
treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters.

Two years later Babcock v. Jackson1 ' expanded the
public policy exception into a new choice of law test, giving
"controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or
the parties has the greatest concern with the specific issue
raised." This approach allowed New York courts "to apply
'the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately connected
with the outcome of [the] particular litigation,"' including
'New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to

512. See Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. Nat'l City Bank, 160 N.E.2d 836
(N.Y. 1959); Kaufman v. Am. Youth Hostels, 158 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1959); Lipton v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 121 N.E.2d 615 (N.Y. 1954); Coster v. Coster, 46 N.E.2d
509 (N.Y. 1943).
513. See Coster,46 N.E.2d at 511.
514. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. 1961).
515. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
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51 6
compensate.., for injuries caused by his negligence."
Once the Court of Appeals adopted this new choice of
law test, it typically applied it in ways that promoted compensation to accident victims. Judges expressed their
concerns that "the wife and children of a New York
decedent.., be compensated for the economic loss they
have suffered as a result of the wrongful killing of their
'bread winner;"'517 that New York residents not become
"public charge[s]," since if they did it would be "the people
of New York-whose services will go uncompensated and
whose tax dollars will be charged in the form of welfare
payments-who will feel the repercussions.., and not the
distant and unconcerned residents of the state of injury;"1 8
or alternatively that "the negligent defendant's assets are
not dissipated in order that ...blameless ... [persons] will
not have their right to recovery diminished." 9 At the same
time, however, the Court of Appeals "caution[ed] against
parochialism in selecting the proper choice of law rule," and
observed "that our courts 'should accord [to foreign law] the
recognition which comity between enlightened governments
requires. '5 In applying Babcock's new "'center of gravity'
or 'grouping of contacts"" approach, lower courts appear to
have done an adequate job accommodating the Court of
Appeals' conflicting concerns.522

H. The Meaning of Negligence: The Calculus of Risk
Most of the rest of New York's law of negligence
underwent little, if any, change after the Second World
War. One rule which remained fixed was that, unless no

516. Id. at 283-84.
517. Miller v. Miller, 237 N.E.2d 877,880 (N.Y. 1968).
518. Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792,797,800 (N.Y. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
519. Id. at 794 (majority opinion).
520. James v. Powell, 225 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1967).
521. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
522. See Pan American World Airways, Inc v. Boeing Co., 500 F. Supp. 656,
660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New York law); Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp.
517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Costa Rica law); Wheeler v. Standard Tool &
Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying Connecticut law); State
of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying New
York law); Ellis v. Newton Paper Co., 253 N.Y.S.2d 47, 50 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (applying
New York law); Riley v. Capital Airlines, 247 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(applying New York law to some and West Virginia law to other issues).
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facts were in dispute,523 the resolution of all issues relating

to negligence was solely within the province of the jury. A
As the Court of Appeals noted on one occasion, "[o]nly a jury
is constitutionally endowed with the right to pass on conflicting evidence."2 5
To get a case to the jury, a plaintiff did not have to
negate "remote possibilities that factors other than the negligence of the defendant may have caused the accident;" it
was enough to show "facts and conditions from which the
negligence of the defendant... may be reasonably inferred.""' Thus, a plaintiff seeking to show that her decedent died as a result of the failure of the police to furnish
medical assistance after arresting him needed only to
present testimony that injuries at the time of the arrest

with "reasonable medical certainty.., contributed" to the
death; she
did not need to "eliminate... all other possible
5, 27
causes."
Rules regarding the impact in negligence cases of legislation, administrative regulations and custom also underwent little change. Thus, it remained "well settled that the
523. See Rivera v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d 284 (N.Y. 1962); Morello v.
Brookfield Constr. Co., 149 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1958).
524. See Londa v. Dougbay Estates, 359 N.E.2d 980 (N.Y. 1976); Kelly v.
Watson Elevator Co., 127 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1955); Veihelmann v. Mfg. Safe
Deposit Co., 104 N.E.2d 888 (N.Y. 1952); Imbrey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 36 N.E.2d
651, 653 (N.Y. 1941); Walz v. Paul Helfer, Inc., 36 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. 1941). Of
course jury verdicts would be set aside if they had been prejudiced by improper
instructions. See Manzitto v. Jack Parker Constr. Corp., 259 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y.
1970); Villa v. Vetuskey, 376 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (App. Div. 1975). Courts also
continued to spend a good deal of effort evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in
support of verdicts. See Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 297 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y.
1973); Zweben v. Coral Reef Beach Club, Inc., 226 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1967); Nucci v.
Warshaw Constr. Corp., 186 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1962); Purcell v. Long Island Daily
Press Pub. Co., 173 N.E.2d 865, 866 (N.Y. 1961); Morello v. Brookfield Constr. Co.,
149 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1958); Mason v. United States Lines Co., 135 N.E.2d 57 (N.Y.
1956); Newburgh Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 30 N.E.2d 601 (N.Y.
1940); Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 26 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y. 1940). In
passing on verdicts, the Court thought it a "reasonable judicial policy" to avoid
granting new trials when they would project "protracted litigation into a possible
series of years in the future." Kennard v. Welded Tank & Constr. Co., 253 N.E.2d
197, 201 (N.Y. 1969).
525. Swensson v. New York, Albany Despatch Co., 131 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1956).
526. Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872, 877 (N.Y. 1952).
527. Id. at 876-77. For other cases holding governmental entities liable for
police negligence in apprehending suspects, see Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362
N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977); Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 127 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1955);
McCormick v. State, 229 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Ct. Cl. 1962).

1999]

TRANSFORMATION OF TORT LAW

215

unexcused violation of a statute '[was] negligence in itself,"'528 although a court, before mechanically applying the
statute had to take recourse to "the intent of the Legislature" to determine "if the person seeking redress [came]
within the protective orbit of the statute."5 Violation of an
administrative regulation or an ordinance of a municipality,
in contrast, was not negligence per se but merely some
evidence of negligence."' Likewise, except where "courts
[were] sure enough of their ground to overrule the customs
of a calling," conformity or nonconformity with the customary practices of an industry, in the words of Judge Learned
Hand, "measure[d] the proper standard."53 '
Basic definitions of negligence also remained firm.
"Negligence [was] defined, broadly and generally speaking,

528. Petrosa v. City of New York, 383 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (App. Div. 1976); see
also Walter v. State, 65 N.Y.S.2d 378, 384 (Ct. Cl. 1946). Indeed, in VanGaasbeck
v. Webatuck Cent. Sch. Dist., 234 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1967), the Court of Appeals
held that violation of a statute "gives rise to absolute liability" if the statute, like
the sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law dealing with the discharge of children
from school buses, "is designed to protect a definite class of persons from a hazard
of definable orbit, which they themselves are incapable of avoiding." Id. at 244,
246. The only operative difference between negligence per se and absolute liability
is that contributory negligence was a defense to the former but not to the latter. Id.
529. Lopes v. Rostad, 384 N.E.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. 1978). See also Michelsen v.
Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 419 (2d Cir. 1943); Burris v. Am. Chicle Co., 33 F. Supp.
104, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1940), affid, 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Durham v. Metro.
Elec. Protective Ass'n, 223 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y. 1966); Beauchamp v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 412, 416 (N.Y. 1963); Corsi Bros., Inc. v. Daly, 242
N.Y.S.2d 865, 869 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Statutes that created specific remedies for
wrongs were generally held to bar alternative common law remedies. See Rauch v.
Jones, 152 N.E.2d 63, 64 (N.Y. 1958). One statute that produced considerable
litigation gave a cause of action to firemen injured by negligence, with the courts
holding that the statute ordinarily did not permit suit for mere negligence by a
building owner in starting a fire, see McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 271
N.Y.S.2d 698, 710-11 (App. Div. 1966), but that it did create a cause of action for
firemen injured in vehicle collisions on their way to fires. See McAvoy v. City of
New Rochelle, 242 N.Y.S.2d 682 (County Ct. 1963).
530. See Horowitz v. Solomon, 283 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1960); Conte v. Large
Scale Dev. Corp., 176 N.E.2d 53, 56 (N.Y. 1961); Major v. Waverly & Ogden Co.,
165 N.E.2d 181 (N.Y. 1960). There was also a question of whether a violation was
the proximate cause of an injury. See Nusspickel v. Air Conditioning, Inc., 192
N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
531. Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946); see
also Santomarco v. United States, 277 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1960); Miner v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 353 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1976); Kolb v. George, 218 N.E.2d 319
(N.Y. 1966); Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 55 N.E.2d 497, 500-01 (N.Y. 1944);
Regan v. Eight Twenty Fifth Corp., 38 N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1941); Saglimbeni v.
West End Brewing Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App. Div. 1948).
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as the failure to employ reasonable care-the care which
the law's reasonably prudent man should use." 32 It was not

"a mere error of judgment," especially when made in an

emergency.533 "Negligence [was] not a stereotyped thing,
but... [was] a matter of time, place and circumstance " "
and could arise out of a variety of factors, ranging from
improper performance of work under a contract 35 to failure
to discover or failure to remedy a hazard.536
Despite this superficial continuity in the definition of
negligence, change nonetheless began to occur at a deeper
level. On the one hand, traditional conceptions of negligence
were put to new and more expansive uses. The most
extensive new use for negligence doctrine occurred in the
increasingly vast field of medical malpractice, which in' Another
cludeed cases of unique claims like wrongful life. 37
important extension was in the increasing number of suits
538
4
against
accountants,
architects,in539thesurveyors
others54' charged
with negligence
constructionand
of

532. McLean v. Triboro Coach Corp., 96 N.E.2d 83, 83 (N.Y. 1950), which held
an instruction that a defendant common carrier owed 'a very high degree ofcare"'
error, albeit harmless error. Id. at 84. For another case on a higher than
reasonable standard of care, see People v. Eckert, 138 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1956).
533. Rowlands v. Parks, 138 N.E.2d 217,219 (N.Y. 1956).
534. Levine v. City of New York, 127 N.E.2d 825, 826 (N.Y. 1955). See also
Mink v. Keim, 52 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1943).
535. See City of New York v. Bettigole, P.E., 394 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div.
1977).
536. See Blake v. City of Albany, 400 N.E.2d 300 (N.Y. 1979).
537. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Howard v. Lecher,
366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
538. See White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977); 1136 Tenants' Corp.
v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (App. Div. 1971); Stanley L. Bloch,
Inc. v. Klein, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
539. See 530 East 89 Corp. v. Unger, 373 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 1977); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc., Inc., 372 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1977); Olsen v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 175 N.E.2d 350 (N.Y. 1961); Cubito v. Kreisberg, 419 N.Y.S.2d
578 (App. Div. 1979).
540. See R.H. Bowman Associates, Inc. v. Danskin, 338 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
541. See Milan Associates, Inc. v. N. Ave. Dev. Corp., 56 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App.
Div. 1977) (involving a suit against a company that designed and installed
sprinkler system for fire protection); A & R Constr. Co. v. New York State Elec. &
Gas Corp., 261 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1965) (dealing with a suit against an
engineering company for negligent use of grid plan). Cf. Unity Sheet Metal Works,
Inc. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 101 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (involving a suit
against an engineering company for wrongful refusal to certify defendant's
completion of work).
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buildings. Novel claims of negligence were also advanced by
a widow against an insurance company that failed to put a
" by a
policy into effect although informing her that it had,54
business against an exhibitor that failed to construct a display for trade shows,543 by a traveler against a travel agent
who failed to provide promised limousine service following
completion of an airline flight,5" by the buyer of a horse
against a racing association that failed to properly list its
sex 545 and by a seventeen-year-old boy against a bartender
because the boy fell after the bartender had served him
thirteen drinks within a one-hour period.546
On the other hand, Cardozo's valiant Palsgrafsynthesis
of negligence and proximate cause under the single rubric
of foreseeability began to come apart with the adoption of
Learned Hand's utilitarian calculus of risk. And, as it did,
the post-World War II emphasis on reducing injuries, which
at first blush served to justify compensation in all cases in
which injury occurred, was transformed into an efficiency
principle that could be used to deny compensation as often
as to dispense it.
As already mentioned, the first clear announcement of
the utilitarian calculus occurred in Hand's opinion for the
Second Circuit in the 1932 case of Sinram v. Pennsylvania
Railroad.47 For a decade thereafter, Hand's calculus of risk
test was ignored, except arguably in a 1934 state case,
which declared that "[tihe degree of care to be exercised is
commensurate with the danger to be avoided."548 For
reasons already noted,5 9 however, the word "danger," as
used in this case, probably referred only to the likelihood
but not the magnitude of harm.
But there was no ambiguity when Judge Hand decided
to revive the calculus of risk test in two mid-1940s cases. In
the first, a 1943 case involving the loss of a shipment of
542. See Cavallo v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 262 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1965). This
novel problem, of course, was also the old one of Thorne v. Deas,4 Johns. 84 (1809).
543. See Springfield Elec. Specialities Co. v. Exhibit Techniques, Inc., 391
N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 1977).
544. See Ostrander v. Billie Holm's Village Travel, Inc., 386 N.Y.S.2d 597
(Dist. Ct. 1976).
545. See Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1979).
546. See Santoro v. DiMarco, 320 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
547. 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932).
548. Roach v. Yonkers R.Co., 271 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (App. Div. 1934).
549. See supra note 133.
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cotton aboard a railroad car float in New York harbor in the
midst of a hurricane, Hand held unambiguously that "[in
all actions for negligence the decision depends upon the risk
imposed on the person who eventually suffers, matched
against the prejudice or expense necessary to avoid it." ° He
further stated that the "prejudice and.., expense were no
more than the delay of a few hours; on the other hand the
risk was most substantial,"55' and he therefore reversed the
judgment below that the tug operator was not negligent.
Then, in 1947, Judge Hand published his now famous
opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,"2 wherein

he described a tug owner's duty to provide against injuries
as "a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she

will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if
she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions."553 "[Lbiability depend[ed] upon" an efficiency calculation of whether
the cost of preventing the injury was greater or lesser than
its gravity multiplied by the probability that it would occur;
if the cost of prevention was less, a defendant would be
negligent for not bearing that cost and would be liable for
injuries occurring as a result, but if the cost of prevention
were greater, a defendant would not be negligent and would
have no liabilities.554
The Second Circuit continued to follow this efficiency
approach, when Chief Judge Thomas Swan, citing Carroll
Towing and an earlier Hand opinion, dismissed a claim of
negligence after observing that "[niegligence may be measured as a product of the gravity of the injury, if it occurs,
multiplied by the factor of its probability." " Similarly,
Judge Henry Friendly observed in 1966 that"'[als the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood
of its occurrence need be correspondingly less' for a defendant to be negligent,556 and Judge Irving Kaufman wrote in
1968 that "[i]n determining whether a course of conduct is
reasonable, the probability and gravity of injury must be
balanced against the ease of taking effective preventive
550. Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 139 F.2d 288, 291 (2d
Cir. 1943).
551. Id.
552. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
553. Id. at 173.
554. Id.
555. Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1953).
556. Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 774, 777 (2d Cir. 1966).
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measures."557 The calculus of risk standard was also held
applicable on the issue of contributory negligence.55
Despite continued dicta that "[olne who collects a large
number of people for gain or profit must be vigilant to
protect them"
and that, whenever an individual recognizes that he or she is "caus[ing] danger of injury to the person or property of... [an]other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such injury,"56 New York's
state appellate courts joined the federal bench in accepting
Judge Hand's utilitarian calculus. The leading case was
Bennett v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co.,561
a 1945 case in which the Court of Appeals opined that the
"protective measures" required of a defendant "were proportioned to the danger" which its activity "created."562 This
language was taken to require courts and juries in negligence cases to balance the gravity and probability of harm
against the cost of preventing the harm.5 63 Likewise, the
Appellate Division declared that negligence "involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion to the danger." ' It also ruled in
product liability design defect cases, where "there is almost
no difference between a prima facie case in negligence and
one in strict liability," that a judge's task is one of "balancing of the alternative designs available against the
existing risk while taking into account the cost of the proposed alternative."565
An especially telling Court of Appeals decision was
Pulka v. Edelman,566 involving the issue of whether parking
garage owners should be liable to pedestrians struck by
557. Eaton v. Long Island R.R., 398 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1968).
558. See Richards v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 250 F.2d 609,
610 (2d Cir. 1957).
559. Antinucci v. Hellman, 174 N.Y.S.2d 343,345 (App. Div. 1958).
560. Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., 402 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (N.Y. 1980).
561. 62 N.E.2d 219 (N.Y. 1945).
562. Id. at 220-21.
563. See Dean v. Hotel Greenwich Corp., 193 N.Y.S.2d 712, 715 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Godulas v. New York City Transit Auth., 188 N.Y.S.2d 230, 240 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Hegarty v. Railway Express Agency, 126 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Bonded Freightways, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 671, 676
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
564. Morris v. Troy Say. Bank, 302 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (App. Div. 1969).
565. Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d
1009, 1013-14 (App. Div. 1980).
566. 358 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1976).
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drivers carelessly exiting from garages. The court held that
liability should not be imposed "where the realities of every
day experience show us that, regardless of the measures
taken, there is little expectation that the one made responsible could prevent the negligent conduct.""6 ' What requires
attention is the mindset of the Pulka court, which focused
on the efficiency question of whether the cost to garage
owners of trying to stop drivers from exiting their garages
negligently would exceed whatever safety benefits their
efforts might bring. The majority did not pay any heed to
the fairness argument noted by the dissent in reliance on
"the classic language of Palsgraf' that "the nature of...
[being in] business as a public garage operator attracted the
flow of automobile traffic across the public sidewalk" for
profit and thereby imposed a duty on the operator not to
"close his eyes to... pedestrians who are thereby imperiled."" 8
With Cardozo's Palsgraf synthesis undermined and
Hand's utilitarian calculus of risk entrenched as the definition of negligence, judges again struggled with the issue
of how to make sense of the requirement of foreseeability,
as well as the concept of proximate cause. Some judges simply reiterated without thought the old language of Palsgraf
that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty
to be obeyed" and hence the liability for injuries that a
6 9 Others, wishing to use proximate
wrongdoer would incur."
567. Id. at 1022.
568. Id. at 1023.
569. Cole v. New York Racing Ass'n, 266 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (App. Div. 1965);
see also Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. Am. Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1297 (2d Cir. 1974);
Eisenhower v. United States, 327 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1964); Jenks v. McGranaghan,
285 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1972); Williams v. State, 127 N.E.2d 545, 548 (N.Y.
1955); Farrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 1979);
Yusko v. Remizon, 116 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924 (App. Div. 1952); Betts v. State, 54
N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Ct. Cl. 1945). Compare Luce v. Hartman, 159 N.E.2d 677 (N.Y.
1959) (foreseeable that farmer would fall into hole while rounding up cattle which
had escaped through hole put in fence by negligent motorist), with Farkas v.
Cedarhurst Natural Food Shoppe, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that it
was not foreseeable that a customer would climb on a display shelfl). For cases on
the admissibility of evidence to prove foreseeability, including evidence of prior
accidents, compare Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 306 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d
Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (involving an express
warning of risk), Hyde v. County of Rensselaer, 415 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1980)
(involving a prior accident), Kahaner v. Acme Safe Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App.
Div. 1980) (dealing with an express warning of risk); with Bellefeuille v. City &
County Sav. Bank, 357 N.E.2d 1000 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that evidence of prior
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cause as a "concept stem[ming] from policy considerations... [in order] to place manageable limits upon the
liability that flows from negligent conduct,""' took the view
that "negligence and proximate cause," although they "fre571
quently overlap[ped]," were "not the same conceptually."

And, if they were not the same, then simple foreseeability
could not be the test for proximate cause, since foreseeability was already an element of the negligence calculus of
risk.
For this reason, many judges turned back to a classic
definition of proximate cause as one "which, in a natural
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces... [an]
event, and without which that event would not have occurred."5 72 This definition, however, merely raised a new

issue: namely, when a "new cause" would be deemed to

have broken a "natural sequence?"5 73 Other judges, like
condition and repairs is not relevant); Lawton v. Cuba Nat'l Bank, 276 N.Y.S.2d
912 (App. Div. 1967); Sabey v. Hudson Valley Girl Scout Council, Inc., 230
N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1962) (involving no notice of risk).
570. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980);
see also Pagan v. Goldberger, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (App. Div. 1976); Firman v.
Sacia, 184 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (App. Div. 1959).
571. Sheehan v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 832, 834 (N.Y. 1976); see also
Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (App. Div.
1977).
572. Hallenbeck v. Lone Star Cement Corp., 77 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (App. Div.
1948); see also Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
New York Dock Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 40 N.Y.S.2d 307, 310 (City Ct. 1943).
573. The courts answered that when "harmful consequences" were brought
about by "forces, the operation of which might have been reasonably foreseen,"
then there was not a sufficient break in the chain of causation to relieve the initial
actor from liability. Kingsland v. Erie County Agr. Soc., 84 N.E.2d 38, 46 (N.Y.
1949). In contrast, "if the consequences were only made possible by the intervening
act of a third party which could not have reasonably been anticipated then the
sequential relation between act and results would not.., come within the rule of
proximate cause." Gralton v. Oliver, 101 N.Y.S.2d 109, 114 (App. Div. 1950); see
also Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1964). Thus, a crime
committed by a third party would break a chain of causation only if it had been
unforeseeable, see Odgis v. Popock, 91 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Tirado v.
Lubarsky, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (Civ. Ct. 1966), but not if it had been foreseeable,
see McDonald v. Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 39 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Fiocco
v. Doerflinger, 431 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (Dist. Ct. 1980). It was similarly clear that
foreseeable negligence would not break a causal chain, see Derby v. Prewitt, 187
N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1962); Miller v. Bd. of Educ., 50 N.E.2d 529, 531 (N.Y. 1943),
although some support also existed for the rule that even unforeseeable negligence
would not break a chain, see Ammar v. Am. Export Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 955, 959
(2d Cir. 1964); Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 176 F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1949).
But see Exner Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp., 150
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Henry Friendly, focused not on breaks in the chain of
causation, but more directly on foreseeability. In doing so,
however, they defined foreseeability for purposes of proximate cause differently than they defined it for negligence,
suggesting that, while an ability to foresee harm of any type
might render an actor negligent," 4 the proximate cause requirement would be met only if harm of the same general
sort resulted to the same general class of persons from the
same general type of physical forces that required an actor,
in the first place, to take care. 5 The appellate courts failed
to eliminate this confusion on the subject of proximate
cause in holding that "[no particular formula [was] required" when trial judges gave "instructions on the subject
of causation."7 6
All of this was good calculation of efficiency, which
entailed the interpolation of three doctrinal requirements
into personal injury law. The first was the Hand calculus
with its call for cost-benefit analysis that encouraged action
when the benefits exceeded the costs but deterred it when
the costs were greater. The second was the demand for
manageable limits on negligence liability so that the law
would not interfere with business productivity. The third,
at least for the best of judges like Henry Friendly, was the
sense that the limits had to grow out of a concept of
foreseeability that was defined in a fashion that would
enable business to engage in rational planning-the only
F. Supp. 585, 587-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 258 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1958).
574. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Johnson v. State,
334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1975); Willis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 270
N.E.2d 717, 720 (N.Y. 1971); Poplar v. Boujois, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 334, 336 (N.Y.
1948); Gallin v. Delta Air Lines, 434 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding
that the duty to a person with a disability must be determined "in light of the
plaintiffs disability and the nature and extent of the defendant's knowledge
thereof).
575. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 722-25 (2d Cir. 1964)
(Friendly, J.); Farrell Lines Inc., v. S.S. Birkenstein, 207 F. Supp. 500, 511
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Friendly, J.); Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307 F.2d 757, 765-66 (2d Cir.
1962); Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 224 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1955);
White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977).
576. Karlson v. 305 East 43rd St. Corp., 370 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1967); see
also Curko v. William Spencer & Son, Corp., 294 F.2d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 1961)
(holding that a "but for" charge on the issue of causation "which equated actual
cause with proximate cause.., adequately informed the jury"). Cf United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 81 F. Supp. 183, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (ruling that causation
should be "understood as the man in the street... would understand it"), rev'd on
othergrounds, 178 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1949).
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sort of planning consistent with the achievement of efficiency.
The most striking quality, however, in the calculus of
risk cases and related ones like Pulka was a shift in emphasis. Palsgrafwas ultimately about fairness: it directed
juries to apply a word with moral connotations-negligence-to people who, foreseeing that a particular action on
their part would cause physical injury to others, nonetheless went forward with the action in an effort to benefit
themselves. Moreover, Palsgrafempowered juries to make
fairness judgments and declare people morally blameworthy without inquiry into the efficiency of conduct that
was foreseeably harmful. Pulka, on the other hand, was not
about moral blame but about deterrence. The Pulka court
reached its decision on the premise that garage owners
could do little, if anything, to reduce accidents when cars
were being driven out of their garages and accordingly,
without engaging in any fairness analysis, refused to impose any duty on the garage owners.
No case, however, better illustrates the efficiency
concerns of the late twentieth century Court of Appeals
than Boomer v.Atlantic Cement Co.577 The case arose when
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a cement plant in
the vicinity of Albany, New York. The Atlantic Cement Co.,
which owned the plant, sought to operate it even though it
imposed dirt, smoke and vibrations on the plaintiffs and
other neighboring landowners. Boomer presented a clear
case of an industrial firm which, "at the time the plant
commenced production.., was well aware of... the
probable consequences of its contemplated oVeration[,J" yet
"still chose to build and operate the plant." Nevertheless,
the court denied an injunction because of "the large disthat an injunction
'
parity in economic consequences "579
would create: the defendant's investment in the plant,
which employed some 300 workers, exceeded $45,000,000,
whereas the injury to plaintiffs amounted to only $185,000.
Under such circumstances, the result of granting an injunction "would be to close down the plant at once"58° at
great cost to the area's economy. Instead, the court granted

577.
578.
579.
580.

257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 877 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
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a damage remedy, at least in part on an efficiency rationale
that damages would provide "a reasonable effective spur to
research for improved techniques to minimize" the cement
plant's adverse effects on its neighbors.581
In focusing on economic consequences rather than fairness, the judges in Boomer, like other post-World War II
judges, adhered to the central policy goal underlying the
era's tendency toward doctrinal reform in the interests of
efficiency. Like other Americans in the postwar era, the
judges internalized the lesson of wartime medicine and
wartime training that calm and intelligent human effort
could reduce injury, illness and premature death, since
these accidents were a product not of fate but of human
carelessness and error. The judges recognized that accidents could be greatly reduced if people ceased to act in the
ways that produced them. However, as they pursued the
goal of reducing accidents, judges arrived at a point where
accidents could not be further reduced without ceasing
activity which was socially valuable. At that point, they
concluded that the goal of tort law should be the deterrence
not of all accidents but only of those accidents whose cost
outweighed the benefits of the conduct that produced them.
With that conclusion, judges modified the postwar emphasis on efficiency from one that counseled increased compensation for injuries to one that put the brakes on compensation.
CONCLUSION

Thus, in personal injury law, the prewar struggle over
whether compensatory justice demanded protection of property or compensation for injuries was transformed after
World War II into an analogous efficiency debate over
whether to promote injury deterrence by imposing costs on
victims or alternatively on others involved, perhaps only
peripherally or distantly, in causing the injuries. This shift
from a vision of personal injury law grounded in fairness to
one grounded in efficiency was not, however, linear. Two
complexities need to be mentioned.
Initially, the concern for efficiency seemed to be a proplaintiff development. In the years immediately following
World War II, the concern induced victims of injury to
581. Id.
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search out and sue those who had wronged them, and over
the next thirty years it led to a significant number of doctrinal developments that imposed increased liability on defendants. But, as an analytical matter, efficiency is neither
a pro-plaintiff nor a pro-defendant concept. Thus, it is not
surprising that, while plaintiffs brought more tort suits in
the aftermath of the war, the percentage of jury verdicts in
their favor declined.
The second complexity concerns the relationship
between the concepts of efficiency and fairness. The conception of fairness propounded by the judiciary in the years
around 1900 severely curtailed the tort liability of entrepreneurs and other potential defendants. Under this prodefendant judicial conception, victims of injury were likely
to be required to bear their own burdens far more often
than under any scheme of efficiency designed to deter the
occurrence of accidents. On the other hand, the conception
of fairness favored by early twentieth century tort reformers authorized recovery of damages in a greater number of
cases than a scheme designed to reduce accidents to some
optimal level would have done.
At the time of World War II, tort doctrine reflected
some balance between the older conception of limited entrepreneurial liability and the newer reform conception that
Cardozo and the Court of Appeals began to incorporate into
the law through Palsgraf.Assuming, however, that the balance continued to tilt strongly in the direction of the older
conception, then the concept of efficiency appeared congruent in the aftermath of World War II with the reformers'
conception of fairness. Proponents of continuing tort reform
along the lines begun by Palsgrafcould, that is, add an argument about efficiency to their existing argument about
fairness without any sense of inconsistency. In cases like
Carroll Towing decided in the context of the 1940s, Judge
Hand's articulation of the calculus of risk could appear as
yet another pro-plaintiff progressive development toward
increased fairness.
But, as tort doctrine moved increasingly in the direction
urged by early twentieth century reformers, the concept of
efficiency became increasingly less congruent with the reform conception of fairness, and began instead to act as a
conservative brake on further pro-plaintiff doctrinal development. Scholars like Richard Posner began to appreciate
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the restraining implications of the Hand calculus,

82

and

cases like Pulka began to codify them. Conflict between
fairness and efficiency thus emerged in cases where the cost
of foreseeable injury discounted by its probability was lower
than the profit obtainable from entrepreneurial activity, as
advocates like Posner argued against the award of those
damages which the reform conception of fairness demanded
in such cases.
With the development of efficiency as a concept for
restraining further expansion of tort liability, the late nineteenth century conception of fairness, which had severely
limited the tort liability of entrepreneurs and other potential defendants, largely disappeared from discussion. In
part, its disappearance resulted from the fact that lawyers
arguing against expansion of tort liability could turn to
efficiency arguments to halt liability's ever widening scope.
The disappearance was also related to a larger phenomenon-the final demise under the pressures of World War II
and the postwar world of the nineteenth century precepts
against redistribution of wealth which had underlain so
much of the common law.583 But, in today's world, as defense
lawyers search for arguments to roll back tort liability
beyond the level demanded by conceptions of efficient accident deterrence, some reactionary conception of fairness
may again be needed. And, with the growth of distrust of
government-supported redistribution," the old nineteenth
century conception may even reemerge.
In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize again that
tort law is a social construct which grows out of the needs
and ideas of the people, ranging from victims to judges, who
participate in its creation. It is not a product solely of the
reasoned elaboration of any single concept, whether of
fairness or efficiency, nor is it an unmediated product of
community will. During the course of this century, tort law
has changed in response both to the changing needs and
interests of its creators and to their articulation of old ideas
and their invention of new ones. It will continue to so
change in the century to come.
582. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33
(1972).
583. See William E. Nelson, The Growth of Distrust:The Emergence ofHostility
Toward GovernmentRegulation ofthe Economy, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1996).

584. Id.

